Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. 1990, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8
Ch. 1. What 2 traditions have dominated the study of coalition formation? How does this divide between approaches compare with Gary Cox's distinction between students of electoral systems?
Ch. 2. Who are the players in the coalition game? What are the costs and benefits of treating parties like unitary actors?
Ch. 5. What do office seeking theories assume about parties? What do they predict? With what accuracy? What is a Minimum Winning Coalition? What is a Minimum Connected Winning Coalition? What do policy oriented models assume about parties? What do theories predict might happen when we assume that parties compete in a multidimensional space? What really happens?
Ch. 8. What do most coalition theories leave out of their explanations? How can these factors be brought into the models?
Kaare Strom and Jorn Leipart 1993. "Policy, Institutions, and Coalition Avoidance: Norwegian Governments 1945-1990." American Political Science Review 87:870-887.
When is it rational to stay out of a governing coalition?