Survey Findings on Antisemitism: A Four-National Comparison

by

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An English translation of:

"Umfragen zum Antisemitismus:
Ein Vergleich zwischen vier Nationen"

in

Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, eds.,
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(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp. 131-178.

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In analyzing anti-Semitism in Western societies, it is important to distinguish among various types of hostility to Jews, for if the form is incorrectly specified, it is possible to misunderstand the phenomenon. Therefore, it will be appropriate to begin by making a few preparatory theoretical remarks. (Some of the following arguments are developed further in Weil, 1983.) We may consider three main forms of hostility to Jews: (a) "traditional" folk prejudice and religious defamation, (b) "modern" nationalistic racism and ethnocentrism, or political anti-Semitism, and (c) hostility bred of direct intergroup conflict, mostly over material goods, but sometimes also over political goals, particularly where Jews sought or gained assimilation into national societies. These three forms may be briefly characterized in the following manner.

- Traditional anti-Semitism originated in the defamation arising from the conflict between the early Christian Church and the Jewish community, and from their mutual efforts to maintain boundaries between their adherents. From this beginning, a number of prejudices and stereotypes entered folk conceptions of the Jew by the middle ages, due more to the latter's segregation from gentile society than from any direct conflict between the groups.

- This "traditional" anti-Semitism is different from the political anti-Semitism connected to the ethnocentric aspects of modern nation-building and the insecurities arising among population groups displaced in the process of industrialization. Rather, modern anti-Semitism is secular and relies on somewhat different stereotypes than those of medieval folk culture (see Trachtenberg, 1943) - although the residue of "traditional" anti-Semitism left the Jews especially susceptible to being singled out as scapegoats by popular demagogues.

- Finally, it makes sense analytically to distinguish the conflictual aspects of intergroup tensions from the prejudicial aspects (recognizing, of course, that they may not be empirically separate). For while conflict free of prejudice tends to be resolvable by bargaining and mediation, conflict overlaid with prejudice tends to resist such resolution. Thus, it may not be best to analyze "traditional" or "modern" anti-Semitism most centrally in terms of intergroup conflict (cf. Rosenberg, 1967; Rürup, 1975), but rather, in terms of prejudice, stereotyping, and scapegoating. This is not to argue, as we will see, that anti-Semitic prejudice is the direct cause of all persecution or discrimination - prejudice is often the direct cause of Jews being selected as targets at times when targets were sought for other reasons - but only that conflict is not necessarily a more important cause. One might, for instance, compare the nature of tensions between Jews and gentiles during the period of urbanization and industrialization to tensions among distinct gentile groups in the same period (say, different ethnic groups in the United States or Austria). One could argue that it was the overlay of prejudice, and not simply the conflict of interests, which made the tension so sharp and some problems in intergroup relations so intractable (but see the important analysis of black and white ethnic success rates in the United States by Lieberson, 1980, which in some respects bridges this distinction).

"Traditional" and "modern" anti-Semitism are historical, not abstract types, but as with most such historical types, one may find residues of earlier forms during later periods. One could argue that from roughly the Jewish Emancipation to the aftermath of the Holocaust, one finds a declining influence of traditional forms and a growing predominance of modern or political forms, as Western society became increasingly secularized, as industrialization progressively wiped out the largely rural reservoirs of traditional beliefs, and as the mass population became ever more politicized in the processes of nation-building and class conflict. Nazi policy itself accelerated the decline of traditional forms, since it further undermined their social sources (see Schoenbaum, 1963). However, the Holocaust, together with the decisive defeat of Nazism, cauterized the further growth of radical political anti-Semitism: in defeat, Nazism's main effect was to discredit "modern" anti-Semitism in its nationalistic and racialist forms. Thus, we should not expect to find large pockets of radical political anti-Semitism in most Western societies since 1945 - and in former Axis countries, overt expressions of political anti-Semitism should be particularly delegitimated to the extent that liberal democratic political cultures have been popularly embraced.

We should expect to find three primary residues of anti-Semitism in Western societies since the Holocaust, corresponding to those outlined above. (1) Low levels of traditionalist anti-Semitism are most likely centered in the relatively small sectors least touched by industrial development and secularization. Similarly, since most Established Christian churches have now officially rejected or moderated religious anti-Semitism, the latter has been pushed to the fringes of the Christian world - especially in Western

Europe, although less so in the United States due to the importance of dissenting churches there.[1] (2) Political anti-Semitism now most likely takes a low-grade form which asserts that Jews have too much influence or that they have divided national loyalty, but not that they are betrayers of the nation or diluters of the racial blood - and Jews are no longer so easily made scapegoats for political and economic problems. And (3) hostility based on intergroup conflict should appear primarily in areas where Jews still reside and interact with gentile populations. Thus, for instance, one is unlikely to find a great deal of intergroup conflict in West Germany, where few Jews live, although the residues of anti-Semitic prejudice may remain. One may find higher levels of intergroup conflict in the United States, but levels of prejudice are likely to be lower due to the lack of historical "traditionalism" and the long history of democratic politics (see Halpern, 1956).

In this article, I examine the extent and structure of anti-Semitism in four Western societies: West Germany, the United States, France, and Austria, with the main emphasis on the first two. I will address the following questions:

- To what extent does a radical anti-Semitism similar to that of the Nazis still exist in West Germany and Austria?

- If anti-Semitism has declined in those countries, what is the source of this decline, and how do present levels compare with those in countries like the United States and France, which have longer histories of liberal democracy, but which have seen substantial degrees of anti-Semitism in their histories?

- What sectors of society are most prone to hold anti-Semitic views, and are there indications that such views are likely to become politically mobilized? And are other groups more likely than Jews to become targets of discrimination, scapegoating, prejudice, or hostility based on conflict?

  -To what extent are tensions between Jews and other groups actually the product of conflicts of interest, and to what extent are they prejudice or scapegoating? And must there be a large Jewish population for intergroup tensions to take the form of conflict rather than prejudice or scapegoating?

A. Trends in Popular Anti-Semitism since the Holocaust

1. "Established" and "dissenting" are used in the traditional sense: the former refers to the Catholic Church and those now or recently recognized as "national" churches, and the latter refers to the non-Established churches and sects. In this respect, as Lipset (1963) has argued, American culture is strongly affected by the fact that it is a nation of (religious) dissenters. (See also reflections of this pattern in the survey evidence in Glock and Stark, 1966, and Quinley and Glock, 1983.)

The causes of the Holocaust cannot be fully examined here, but one can argue that the systematic mass murders were possible only as the actions of (1) a modern secular state, and (2) a state radically opposed to liberal democracy. The Church never had the will to engage in genocide (see Baron, 1952-80; Parkes, 1969, 1976; Reuther, 1979), and hostile populations never had the ability to conduct more than incomplete pogroms. And liberal democracy, while in power, has seemed everywhere to provide decisive protection against such extremes (despite its deficiencies in protecting against lower levels of popular prejudice and discrimination, which have been noted since nineteenth century writers like Tocqueville and Marx). Moreover, with the destruction of liberal-democratic civil rights, and especially under conditions of political repression, the full support of the population was not even necessary for such mass murder - nor does it seem to have existed in Nazi Germany (see, e.g., Baum, 1982, on the question of "moral indifference;" and Steinert, 1967, on evidence from Nazi opinion surveys). Rather, one can argue, the causal sequence between popular anti-Semitism and the destruction of the Holocaust was indirect: a sufficient segment of the population was indifferent or hostile to a liberal democratic regime form, and after this regime was suspended, the new state was able to commit crimes which the population itself could not. Thus, while secularized and even political anti-Semitism within the population were (and are) serious matters, their most extreme effects depended on the attainment of power by a group radically committed to the persecution and destruction of the Jews - even if their mass base of support was not built directly on this intention (I develop this argument at greater length in Weil, 1980; see also Bracher, 1970; Lepsius, 1978; Reichmann, 1951).

Although I stress the importance of the political realm, it is not possible to examine changes in post-1945 Western political culture in detail here. Suffice it to say that while Western populations vary in their adherence to liberal and democratic values, these values tend to be strong in most countries, and their growth in post-authoritarian countries has been impressive (see Weil, 1981, 1982, 1987a, 1987c, Unpublished; for West Germany, see also Almond and Verba 1963, 1980; Verba, 1965; Dahrendorf, 1969; Conradt, 1980; for the United States, see also Smith, 1980, 1982; Davis, 1975, 1980; Nunn et al., 1978; cf. Sullivan et al., 1982). For instance, most West Germans accept the defeat of National Socialism, and there is almost no public support for its revival, at least not in its old color. But attributions of collective guilt have always been rejected. And radical right movements pose little serious threat to most other Western European and North American liberal democracies at present (see Lipset and Raab, 1978; Lipset, 1981a, 1981b; Husbands, 1981), although the growth of the Front National in France, the persistence of the MSI in Italy, and the renewed rightward lurch of the FPÖ in Austria have been disturbing. Likewise, an overwhelming majority of West Germans has come to support the Bonn government, and somewhat smaller, but rising numbers of West Germans also support civil liberties in concrete cases. Thus, the political orientations of West Germans and the citizens of other post-fascist regimes have largely converged with those of the older liberal democracies. These countries have begun to accumulate a

backlog of democratic tradition which is often thought to have prevented several older democracies from collapsing in the Great Depression.

West German opinions on politically motivated crimes against the Jews have followed much the same trends as opinions on National Socialism. The crimes have become increasingly delegitimated, but the guilt (or its consequences) has been more and more rejected. In 1949 and 1958 West Germans were asked whether "persons who commit anti-Semitic actions in Germany today should be punished by a court or not," and the proportion answering "yes" rose from 41 to 46 percent.[2] This figure rose to 78 percent when the same question was asked in 1960, but with the word "anti-Semitic" changed to "anti-Jewish" (judenfeindlich).[3] Thus, roughly comparable questions show a definite trend toward willingness to condemn political anti-Semitic crimes.

On the other hand, West Germans have increasingly rejected collective guilt for historical Nazi crimes. Thus, while 65 percent of respondents to a 1949 survey believed that Nazi propaganda had been effective in intensifying anti-Semitic feelings in Germany, much smaller numbers claimed that they themselves had been so affected. 21 percent said they were sympathetic to this propaganda (27 percent found it "repugnant"). And only 7 percent report reacting favorably to seeing Jews wearing yellow Stars of David (50 percent found the sight bad). Twelve years later in 1961, a number of surveys were conducted during the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who was sentenced to death by an Israeli court for mass murder. While 67 percent of the West Germans surveyed favored the death sentence or life at hard labor (15 percent urged consideration of mitigating circumstances), a majority also agreed with this statement in connection with the trial: "I personally had nothing to do with it and don't want to hear anything more about it" (59 percent). And 88 percent of the respondents to a 1961 survey denied that they "as a German feel at all guilty (mitschuldig) for the extermination of the Jews," while only 8 percent acknowledged any sense of collective guilt at all. However, large majorities have maintained that many Germans did not know at the time what was happening to the Jews - 72 percent in 196l and 77 percent in 1979. And while 31 percent of West Germans in 1949 disagreed that "Germany has an obligation to make reparations to the still living German Jews," 46 percent in 1966 agreed with the demand, "the reparations to the Jews should finally be ended; they have already gotten too much." Thus, there has been rising tendency to reject collective guilt or responsibility for past (proven) crimes. Here again, however, the West Germans compared favorably to Austrians. 76 percent of the latter in a 1973 survey rejected the statement that "Austrians in particular should stand up for the Jews because Austrians were involved in crimes against the Jews during the Hitler period."

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2. Full citations of the sources of these and other surveys may be found in Weil (1980; 1981) and in the notes to Table 1, below.

3. In 1970, the population of Hessen was asked their opinion on a statement regarding speech rather than actions, "one should not publicly abuse the Jews, of course, but prison is too hard a penalty for anti-Semitic remark": 60 percent agreed and 32 percent disagreed.

However, rejection of collective guilt does not by any means translate simply into anti-Semitism. On the contrary, the latter has steadily declined in West Germany since the early 1950s - although there are indications that it may have risen in the early 1950s. Some of these trends can be seen in Figure 1. The apparent rise in anti-Semitism in the early 1950s is visible for the open-ended question, "what is your overall view of Jews?" and for the perception that anti-Semitism was rising. Since that time, the latter question and most other indicators of anti-Semitism - and in some cases, ethnocentrism - have declined. This is true for the opinion that Germans are, or are for the most part, "more capable and gifted than other peoples," for an unwillingness to marry a Jew, and for the question, "would you say that Germany is better off without Jews?" The same downward slope is also visible for the most clearly political expression of anti-Semitism for which there are trend data - that Jews or Jewish organizations exercise too great an influence on national politics. Very similar results were obtained from a 1965 sample of elites (100 each doctors, lawyers, Catholic clergy, and Protestant clergy). 11 percent of the combined sample responded that the Federation of Jews in Germany had too much political influence. But significantly, 16 percent of the doctors and 18 percent of the lawyers, as against only 3 percent of the Catholic and 6 percent of the Protestant clergy, gave this anti-Semitic response. Considering that the clergy may have an interest in saying that another religion does not have too much influence, the fact that other elites are somewhat more anti-Semitic than the general population is a negative finding for West German tolerance (cf. Dahrendorf, 1969; Zapf, 1965, for critical mid-1960s' views on West German elites).

Some of these data can be compared to similar questions from other countries. In some cases there are comparable trend lines, while in other cases there are simply isolated data points. A selection of survey results is shown in Table 1, comparing West Germany with the United States, France, and Austria.

The questions in Part 1 of Table 1 generally concern political anti-Semitism, which I have argued is the most serious form. On the question whether Jews have too much power, we see that the West Germans are by no means the most anti-Semitic. Rather, the four countries exhibit roughly similar levels. In the U.S., the "too much power" response rose from 41 percent in the late 1930s to well over half in the mid-1940s, and then declined to a low of 11 percent in 1964. This response rose briefly in the aftermath of the post-1974 Arab oil-price hike, but fell again to about 20 percent by 1977, where it has hovered until the late 1980s - even through the second oil-price shock in 1979. Indeed, as Lipset and Schneider (1978) point out, neither Jews nor Israel were seen as the chief causes of America's economic or political problems connected with the oil price rise. Rather, the oil companies, the Arab nations, and the President were held mainly responsible, but large numbers still believed that Jews and Zionist organizations were among the groups with too much influence on American Middle Eastern politics. And whenever the "too much power" question has been asked in a list with other groups,

Jews have been near the bottom in both the United States and France. The data follow similar patterns in West Germany, Austria and France, although there are often too few surveys available to be completely confident about trends.

It may be argued (as Lipset and Schneider, 1978, do) that the question of Jewish power is not a pure measure of anti-Semitism, since it contains an evaluative or empirical component - whether Jews have proportionately more power than their share of the population. The questions of willingness to vote for a Jewish candidate of one's own party and, to a lesser extent, of questionable Jewish loyalty or "nationality" do not suffer from this objection.[4] On these questions, West German responses are considerably more anti-Semitic than those of Americans, but they are not more anti-Semitic than those of other Europeans. Roughly the same holds true of the less clearly political questions of Jewish power in business, whether there are too many Jews in the country, and whether Jews cause trouble (sometimes, with their ideas) - although there are not comparable data for all countries.

These data are too sparse to compute reliable estimates of anti-Semitism in the four countries. But rough calculations indicate that the West Germans express somewhat higher levels of political anti-Semitism than the Americans, but middling levels for Europeans - or more precisely, a good deal higher than the French, but somewhat lower than the Austrians (see Weil 1987b: Table 2). Some British surveys from the late 1950s also show anti-Semitism there somewhat higher than in America, but low for Europe. One could argue that these data distinguish between post-fascist and long-term liberal democracies: that twenty-five years after the defeat of Nazism, the after-effects of political anti-Semitism were still visible. However, political anti-Semitism has declined in all countries since World War II - most steeply in the late 1940s and the 1950s in America, and somewhat later in Europe.

A 1986 comparative survey in the same four countries, published in the West German magazine "stern," reinforces this impression (see Table 2). Thus, the Americans generally express the lowest levels of anti-Semitism, and the Austrians the highest, with the West Germans and French usually in between. There are several exceptions. As we found earlier, the same number of people in all four countries said they thought Jews have "too much influence" (but the balance between "just right" and "don't know" varies among countries). The most revealing responses were elicited by the question whether a prominent politician must resign if he says no Jews should be allowed to hold important positions, or whether he must at least retract his statement. The combined liberal responses (resign or retract) are about equal in the United States, West Germany, and France, at above 70 percent; but they are considerably lower in Austria (56 percent). And the anti-Semitic response (it is legitimate for a politician to say this) is about twice as

4. Jews themselves traditionally claimed a "national" component in their own identity, but in the modern period, whose hallmark in this respect is nationalism, charges of disloyalty are central to political anti-Semitism.

high in Austria (40 percent) as in the other three countries. But the three more liberal countries vary in a characteristic fashion. West Germans are more likely to say that the politician must resign than those in other countries. This may be partly due to a scandal which erupted some months before the survey, in which Wilderich von Spee, CDU mayor of Korschenbroich, was forced to resign after he said "a few rich Jews should be slaughtered to pay off the town's deficit." But more generally, it may be due to a special sensitivity of the more-recently liberalized West German political culture in demanding a more extreme and formal disapproval of anti-Semitism in the public realm. For in the otherwise more liberal United States, ten percent more people said that it is legitimate for a politician to make anti-Semitic remarks. One might argue that Americans are more accustomed to the rough-and-tumble of open ethnic conflict and have had to develop thicker skins. Perhaps Americans' orientation is "political" rather than "legal." They expect recipients of an ethnic slur to press for a resignation or retraction, but they do not expect the law to require it.

I have argued that economic and social anti-Semitism are less dangerous to Jews than political anti-Semitism. For that reason, although there are more available data, these aspects will be reviewed more briefly. Some of these data are shown in Part 2 of Table 1 (other data are given in Weil, 1987b: Table 3). In general, most of the questions which measure probable behavior showed some easing of economic and social anti-Semitism in West Germany. But trends in prejudicial stereotypes were more ambiguous. Thus, a declining number of respondents said they would not shop in a Jewish store if the same goods were cheaper there (25 percent in 1949, 14 percent in 1974). And a declining number also said they would not marry a Jew, but here prejudice was higher than that in the United States and France at the same time - but not more than in Austria. Other questions which elicited decreasingly anti-Semitic responses included the perceptions that Jews are industrious, peace-loving, helpful, and artistically talented. West German opinions here were generally more philo-Semitic than those of Austrians. Questions which showed rising levels of economic and social anti-Semitism include the opinions that Jews do not like physical work and will avoid it, that they are cowardly, and that they keep others out of business - in these cases, more anti-Semitic than the Americans or Austrians. There was a small decline in the opinion that Jews are intelligent, and Jews are seen much more often in West Germany as using shady business practices and dirty tricks than in the U.S.

B. The Structure of Anti-Semitism in Western Countries since the Holocaust

Studies in the United States have established that certain structural factors in the American population are associated with higher levels of anti-Semitism (Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Lipset and Schneider, 1978; Martire and Clark, 1982). Their findings can be used as a benchmark against which to compare the structure of anti-Semitism in West Germany and other countries. In particular, the better educated are much less anti-

Semitic than the worse educated in the U.S., and no other measure of social status (e.g., income, occupation) can account for this relationship. Moreover, a good portion of falling levels of anti-Semitism in America is due to rising levels of formal education in the population. Age, too, plays an important role. In general, the young in America are less anti-Semitic than the old; and older liberals are less anti-Semitic than older conservatives (ideology plays no role among the young).

Most studies of anti-Semitism in West Germany reveal patterns for age and education similar to the American studies. In a 1974 survey in West Germany (Sallen, 1977; Silbermann, 1982), it was found that those with a university degree were a full 35 percentage points less anti-Semitic on a general scale than were those with just a grammar school education (Volksschule ohne Lehre), and that those under 30 were 18 percentage points less anti-Semitic than those over 55. In Austria, too, the younger are considerably less anti-Semitic than the old. But in France age seems to have little effect on anti-Semitism. We may speculate that the younger generations in West Germany and Austria are less anti-Semitic than the old because they did not grow up under a fascist regime, while there is little difference between generations in France because there was no regime change (except the wartime Vichy regime) - but this does not satisfactorily explain the existence of a generation gap in the United States. I believe the factor of a regime change played an important role here (see Weil, 1987a), but clearly, other factors must also be adduced.

This result reinforces the importance of interpreting such findings in a comparative framework. In related research (Weil, 1985), I have shown that the effect of education on political anti-Semitism is not universal as generally thought (e.g., Hyman and Wright, 1979), but rather, varies considerably across time and place. Table 3 illustrates this point. While the better educated are more liberal in certain countries and in certain historical periods for certain values, they are not more liberal under other conditions.[5] The question here is what factors determine education's effects on political anti-Semitism. Selznick and Steinberg (1969) postulated that education's liberalizing effects in the United States represent the influence of the "official," Enlightenment culture. This hypothesis was expanded and applied cross-nationally to the U.S., West Germany, France and Austria. The results showed that this effect varied according to two determinants of Enlightenment culture: the length of time a country had had a liberal democratic regime form, and the degree either of "traditionalism" or of religious pluralism

5. Since this is true, the psychodynamic interpretation of education's effects can be rejected (see, e.g., Adorno, et al., 1950; Lipset, 1981a; cf. Kohn, 1969). This interpretation may be valid under some historical and cultural conditions, but it is not universal. It was not possible to assert this on the basis of data from a single country because one could argue that students with certain psychological predispositions might seek more education than others (see Plant, 1965); but they cannot be expected to choose their country or historical period - at least not as a result of their psychological predisposition. The interpretation that education's effects simply reflect class interests must also be rejected since these effects remain strong even when class variables are controlled. Thus, it may be concluded, the effect of education on political anti-Semitism must be interpreted as a form of socialization.

in the country. Thus, education had the strongest effect of reducing political anti-Semitism in the United States, a long-term liberal democracy with a small traditional sector and important religious pluralism. It has the weakest effect in Austria, a short-term liberal democracy with a large traditional sector and a religiously homogeneous population. And it has a middling effect in West Germany and France, which are mixed cases in this respect. This conclusion is reinforced by findings for Eastern European samples that education had no effect, or a reversed effect, on anti-Semitic attitudes there (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1980: 17-18). And previous research (Weil, 1981, 1982) showed that education's effect on tolerance of political opposition may have grown in West Germany since the late 1960s, and I argued that this was due to the lag in institutionalization of liberal values (through the school system) in a post-fascist democracy. Thus, there is reason to think that as more time passes in West Germany and Austria since their transitions to liberal democracy, education is likely to attain a stronger influence in reducing political anti-Semitism - and tolerance will become more firmly structurally grounded in the dominant institutions of socialization.

Most studies also indicate that other peripheral segments of Western societies tend to be the most anti-Semitic, just as they tend to be least politically tolerant or liberal: those in rural areas, the petty bourgeoisie and sometimes workers (especially if they are not in the unions), those in the peripheral regions (e.g., the American and German south), and as pointed out, the old and poorly educated. These demographic patterns bear some similarity to the sociological base of support for the Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s (see the on-going debates on this topic in, e.g., Falter, 1979, 1980; Falter, et al., 1987; Lipset, 1981a; Hamilton, 1982; Childers, 1983). However, studies of the United States since World War II also conclude that while anti-Semitism is more prevalent among peripheral segments of American society, and that while it is tied to certain identifiable clusters of authoritarian values, anti-Semitism is <u>not</u> an important part of any conservative political movement which has succeeded in gaining a mass following - from the McCarthyites to the John Birchers to the new Christian Right, and from Goldwater to George Wallace to Reagan (see Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Lipset and Raab, 1978; Martire and Clark, 1982). Indeed, Lipset (1981a, 1981b) argues that recent economic difficulties in Western societies have not resulted in greater political and ethnocentric reaction because the demographic reservoirs of reaction have largely been drained by the same processes of modernization against which they traditionally protested. I would argue, however, that one should be cautious about reaching too optimistic conclusions based on the reactionary potential of declining population segments, since future dislocations which affect currently <u>powerful</u> groups could perhaps produce similar political reactions.

On the other hand, disturbing patterns of political anti-Semitism can be found in surveys from the last period of mild right-wing political radicalization in West Germany during the late 1960s when the National Democratic Party (NPD) nearly cleared the 5 percent hurdle required for representation in Parliament in the 1969 federal elections. Only 11 percent of the respondents with an opinion in a 1969 survey believed that "the

Jews once again have too much power and influence here" (19 percent thought it was partly true, and 69 percent did not believe it). But this position was taken by 36 percent of those who said they would vote for the NPD and 23 percent of those who welcomed the NPD's electoral gains. Several other groups also registered higher than average levels of anti-Semitism: those whose economic situation had worsened in the past year (18 percent: see Liepelt, 1967); refugees or expellees from the East (16 percent); those who were dissatisfied with the performance of the government (15 percent); those who favored outlawing the West German Communist Party (14 percent); and - significantly - those who favored an end to war-crimes trials (17 percent) or thought that "the Guest Workers harm us more than they help [nützen] us" (20 percent).

Do these findings mean that political anti-Semitism is still flourishing in West Germany? There are three questions here: (a) Is political anti-Semitism widespread? (b) Is it increasing or decreasing over time? (c) Can we identify a coherent political anti-Semitism connected to a radical political ideology in the general public? The first and second questions have already been largely answered in the negative. In order to answer the third question, a factor analysis was conducted of a set of ideological questions on the 1969 survey just cited. Three factors summarizing the responses were extracted, which can be identified as Main-Stream Partisanship, National Socialist Ideology, and völkisch Ideology. The results showed that a national socialist ideology did indeed continue to exist as an identifiable cluster of opinions at this time - although only a very small segment of the population still adhered to it - and that anti-Semitism was one important element of this cluster, along with prejudice against the Guest Workers and concern for issues remaining from the historical Nazi regime (war crimes and the statute of limitations). But this ideology was not related to main-stream politics in West Germany or to a milder kind of patriotic or völkisch ideology (the two other factors). Nor were sympathy with the neo-fascist NPD or anti-communism major components of this traditional national socialist ideology, since neither loaded strongly on this factor. This finding supports Niethammer's (1969) argument that the West German neo-fascism of the 1960s had a different character than the Nazism of the 1920s-1940s, since it was no longer strongly connected to racialist theories but rather rested mainly on anti-communism.

Thus, a coherent, radical politicized anti-Semitism appears to have become something of an historical relic in West Germany. Once this historical national socialist ideology is taken into account, contemporary West German neo-fascism hardly appears to contain an anti-Semitic component. Nor are the followers of any of the mainstream parties distinguished from any others by a stronger adherence to political anti-Semitism. In contrast, the adherents of the right-wing third party in Austria (the FPÖ) express considerably higher levels of political anti-Semitism on almost all survey questions (Marin, 1983; Dr. Fessel survey of 1976). But in France, higher levels of political anti-Semitism are generally not associated with the voters of any of the mainstream parties - with the slight exception of the Communists.

C. Anti-Semitism in the context of Intergroup Relations

I suggested earlier that certain elements of apparent hostility to Jews might the product of intergroup conflict rather than anti-Semitic prejudice or scapegoating. One could argue, following Halpern's (1956) account of the United States, that where the historical continuity of peasant beliefs was broken, and where the forces of nation-building defined citizenship in ideological rather than ethnic terms (see Grew, ed., 1978), neither traditional nor modern-political forms of anti-Semitism were likely to have taken root. Rather, in such a case, the usual form of tension between Jews and other groups should be intergroup conflict - perhaps in the context of pluralistic politics.

A simpler way to distinguish anti-Semitic conflict from anti-Semitic prejudice is whether levels of intergroup conflict vary according to the presence of Jews in a country. For if Jews need not be present for anti-Semitic prejudice to exist (e.g., Marin, 1979), it is difficult to imagine intergroup conflict without both Jews and other groups being present. Thus, conflictual "anti-Semitism" should be higher in countries where there are many Jews - especially the United States, but to a lesser extent also France - than in countries where there are few - as in West Germany and Austria. It is not easy to test this theory with the available data, but the 1986 "stern" survey does give some support. While roughly equal numbers of respondents thought Jews had "too much" influence in their respective countries, perceptions differed widely about "how much" influence Jews have in each country. The perceptions of factual influence vary more or less according to the Jewish percentage of the population. 55 percent of Americans thought Jews have a great deal of influence; 37 percent of Frenchmen, 32 percent of Austrians, and 26 percent of West Germans held this view. One could argue that where Jews are in fact powerful, many gentiles are able to regard this power as a factor to be dealt with, without wanting to delegitimate it. In such a setting, there could be conflict between Jews and gentiles over specific goals, but no necessary connection between this conflict and anti-Semitic prejudice.

This is does not constitute proof of the proposition that "conflictual" anti-Semitism is relatively more important than "prejudicial" anti-Semitism in countries with large Jewish populations. For instance, the Soviet Union and Argentina have large Jewish populations, but anti-Semitic prejudice is probably relatively high in those countries. Still, it will be useful to look closely at Jewish-gentile conflict and prejudice in the United States, where a large Jewish population does play a major role in society and politics - and where the data enable us to examine intergroup relations more closely.

Most historians of twentieth-century American Jewry agree that from the New Deal until at least the mid-1960s, Jews were strong adherents of the Democratic party and liberal in virtually all respects; and their average socioeconomic status rose from

moderately high to very high levels (Ladd, 1981; Kahan, 1981). Their social and political alliances followed from these positions. Jews tended to agree with well-educated, higher status liberal gentiles on social issues like religious tolerance (separation of church and state), tolerance of political dissent, tolerance of changing sex roles (female employment, contraception), and increasingly, opposition to U.S. military involvement in the third world. They also supported the civil rights movement, and Jewish leadership was politically allied to the black leadership. In turn, upper-status liberals and black leaders tended to sympathize with Israel in the Middle East conflicts. Since Jews generally took economically liberal positions, despite their own increasingly high status, they also tended to be fairly close to urban ethnic Catholics - political bedfellows in the New Deal coalition. And with the official softening of the Church's views toward Judaism after the Second Vatican Council, theologically-based tensions with Catholics also eased. American Jews were probably at greatest social and political distance from the counterpart of these groups: archetypically, non-urban, conservative, lower-middle status, white fundamentalist Protestants - who were often Republicans in the North and Democrats in the South.

Since the late 1960s, Jewish positions and Jewish alliances seem to have changed. Some surveys show that from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, American Jews have become politically less liberal. When asked in the 1972 to 1977 General Social Surveys to describe their own political position, 52 percent of Jewish respondents said they were liberal (35 percent said moderate and 13 percent said conservative). But when the New York Times/CBS News Poll repeated the question in 1987, only 38 percent still said they were liberal (44 percent said moderate and 16 percent said conservative).[6] Surveys also show that the Jewish Democratic vote and Jewish Democratic party identification have fallen since the late 1960s (Himmelfarb, 1981, 1985). And at the elite level, many of the most prominent American neo-conservatives have been Jewish intellectuals (see Lipset, 1987). This does not mean that at the mass level Jews have become conservatives in American society. Even on these measures, Jews remain among the most liberal and heavily Democratic groups in America - perhaps the most liberal and Democratic white group - and by other measures, as we will see, they do not seem to have become less liberal at all.

Whether or not Jewish positions have changed since the late 1960s, it does seem likely that the pattern of Jewish alliances with other groups has changed. The first signs of change came in the mid-1960s, on both the domestic- and foreign-policy fronts. Jews were prominently involved in the civil rights movement, and when that movement began to turn to black power and expel whites from its leadership after the mid-1960s, Jews were disproportionately affected. There had long been lines of intercommunal conflict between Jews and blacks (see Rose, 1981), especially in neighborhoods where blacks had displaced Jews residentially, but where Jews retained business and professional

6. The pooled 1972-77 surveys contained 233 Jewish respondents (see Ladd, 1981), and the 1987 survey contained a special oversample of 437 Jewish respondents.

interests. Jews sometimes were landlords to black tenants and operated stores in increasingly black neighborhoods. This was a long-term pattern, but latent intercommunal conflict came into the open in the 1969 New York teachers strike. The United Federation of Teachers, with heavy Jewish representation, found itself unexpectedly opposed by black groups who objected to "Jewish hegemony" over the educational establishment and advocated "community control" of schools in black neighborhoods. Tensions between blacks and Jews on these issues expanded from the community level to the national level over the question of affirmative action in college admissions and employment. Blacks sought redress for historical patterns of discrimination, and while Jews had generally supported black aspirations in this regard, the policy of affirmative action reminded them too much of the quota systems that had historically been used to exclude Jews. Jews had succeeded in American society by merit criteria and felt that their paths of access were threatened. Blacks felt that paths of merit advancement would remain closed to them unless they were given initial compensatory access.

Blacks and Jews also began to diverge on foreign policy issues. With the decline of the civil rights phase of the black movement, black leaders became interested in developing a distinctive black position on foreign policy, especially stressing good American relations with, and aid to, African nations. This might not have conflicted with Jewish foreign policy positions, which were generally liberal, if Israel had not developed ties to the racist South African regime and become embroiled in conflicts with some black African states like Uganda (in this case, probably caused more by Uganda's dictator, Idi Amin) - and if American blacks had not expanded their interest in African politics to include support for Arab (especially Palestinian) nationalistic aspirations, to the detriment of Israeli nationalistic aspirations. Again, simmering tensions boiled up when the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, secretly met with PLO-chief Yassir Arafat. This was against administration policy, and President Carter forced Young to resign. But many Jews saw signs of black anti-Semitism in Young's meeting, and many blacks believed that Jews had pressed behind the scenes for the resignation and saw signs of Jewish machinations and racism. Similar tensions emerged a few years later during Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential candidacy. Jews had long suspected Jackson of harboring anti-Semitic beliefs, and they felt these suspicions were justified when Jackson, believing he was speaking off the record, uttered openly anti-Semitic slurs, and they were published. Jackson also refused to renounce the support of black-muslim leader Louis Farrakan, even after Farrakan praised Hitler and called Judaism a "gutter religion" in a radio sermon. Again, blacks felt Jews were attacking their chosen leaders, and Jews felt blacks were attacking Jewish interests.

Jewish political and social relations with white gentiles in the United States also seem to have changed since the late 1960s, although perhaps not to the same extent as black-Jewish relations. As noted, prior to the late 1960s, Jews were probably closest on domestic and foreign-policy issues to better-educated Northern urban liberal Protestants, furthest from worse-educated Southern non-urban conservative fundamentalist

Protestants, and somewhat close to ethnic Catholics. These sociopolitical distances have remained unchanged on many domestic issues through the late 1980s. Jews continue to agree with liberal Protestants, and disagree with fundamentalist Protestants, on questions of religious tolerance and church-state separation (e.g., prayer in schools), political tolerance, gender roles, and some (but not all) questions of racial discrimination and sexual morality. However, certain issues like affirmative action, abortion rights, and non-discrimination against homosexuals, have split American Jews into liberal and conservative groups, just as white Protestants and Catholics tend to be split.

The greatest change in social and political relations between Jews and white gentiles has probably come in the foreign policy area. American foreign-policy liberals had long favored a non-confrontational stance toward communist countries and support for third world development and independence. And since the mid-1960s, they have also become increasingly anti-interventionist. Prior to the 1967 war in the Middle East, foreign-policy liberals tended to support Israel, regarding it as one of the few successful post-colonial national liberation movements-turned-state - a democratic "third way" between communist and rightist dictatorships - and at the same time, a beleaguered regional underdog. But after the Six Day War, foreign-policy liberal sympathies began shifting in favor of the Palestinians and the Arab states. This change came at a time of rising opposition to American involvement in Vietnam, and some opponents of that war ceased to see Israel as an underdog and began to regard it as an extension of American "imperialism" in the third world. While most liberal Jews also became increasingly critical of Israel's foreign policy, all but a few tended to remain broadly supportive. Thus, a gap opened between liberal gentiles and Jews on foreign policy. The gap widened because the Soviet Union's position on the Middle East shifted in parallel with that of American liberals, and the Soviet regime also became more restrictive towards its own Jewish population. At the same time, many non-Arab third world countries, especially those aligned with Russia, began to condemn Israel and support the PLO. These developments drove a bigger wedge between American Jews and the traditional tenets of foreign-policy liberalism: support for third world countries and non-confrontation with the Soviet Bloc countries. Pro-Israel Jews now often found themselves in alliances of convenience with anti-communist conservatives, with whom they had little in common on domestic issues. The strangest of these alliances has been with fundamentalist Protestants who strongly support Israel - not only for the sake of opposing Soviet-backed Arab states, but also because they regard the construction of a Jewish state as a necessary prelude to the second coming of Christ!

Clearly, if the political and social alliances of American Jews have shifted, then many apparent expressions of hostility to Jews may simply reflect policy disagreements or conflicts of interest, and not prejudice. We would not expect survey respondents to say that their own political allies have "too much power," or that they would not vote for them. But they might well say that their political <u>opponents</u> have too much power or that they would not vote for them. The opinion that one's foreign-policy opponents are "disloyal"

may go beyond the bounds of pluralist politics, but saying so might again reflect intergroup conflict - to be sure, with a poor understanding of liberal democracy - rather than anti-Semitic prejudice.

In order to discover whether some survey questions measure intergroup conflict rather than prejudice, factor analyses were performed on indicators of anti-Semitism in the two most extensive American surveys on this topic, conducted in 1964 and 1981.[7] The results, shown in Table 4, suggest that it is indeed possible to distinguish a "conflict" dimension from a "prejudice" dimension of anti-Semitism. Survey questions cluster together in the predicted fashion, and this structure was quite stable from 1964 to 1981. The first factor, labeled "Prejudice," is mainly composed of several traditional stereotypes about Jewish cliquishness and unfair business dealings. The accusation that Jews are disloyal to their country also loads on this factor. This opinion is sometimes interpreted as a modern, political form of prejudice, but it correlates here with more traditional stereotypes. And the opinion that "Jews are always stirring up trouble with their ideas" also loads on this factor, but in 1964 it loaded equally on the second factor. The second factor, labeled "Conflict," is composed of the opinion that Jews have too much power in the nation or in business, the opinion that they try to push in where they are not wanted, and support for the Arab states against Israel in the Mideast conflict. And the third factor, labeled "Social Distance," consists of objections to having a Jew marry into the family, having a Jewish neighbor, or voting for a Jewish Presidential candidate in one's own party. Again, unwillingness to vote for a Jew is often interpreted as a question of political anti-Semitism, but here it correlates more with standard measures of social distance. One item does not load consistently over time, the view that the suffering of Jews is caused by their rejection of Jesus. In 1964 this question loads on the Prejudice factor, and in 1981 it loads on the Social Distance factor. This result is consistent with the finding that religious anti-Semitism is no longer clearly linked with modern political anti-Semitism or with the remnants of traditional folk prejudice (Weil, 1985) - even though it may have provided the "bridge" in the 18th and 19th centuries by which Jews became targets of secular hostility (Katz, 1980). Nevertheless, as we will see shortly, religious anti-Semitism remains an important factor for certain segments of American society.

If some tensions between Jews and gentiles reflect intergroup conflicts rather than prejudice - conflicts that emerged as the result of changes in group positions and interests - then social groups should respond to survey indicators of conflict and prejudice in characteristic fashions. We can use the factors extracted in Table 4 to examine changes in groups' opinions over time. Table 5 shows several racial and religious group means on the factor scores in the top panel, and unstandardized regression coefficients for the groups, controlling for educational level, in the bottom panel.

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7. The 1964 survey was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) (see Selznick and Steinberg, 1969). The 1981 survey, largely a replication of the first, was conducted by Yankelovich (see Martire and Clark, 1982).

The results broadly conform to the historical sketch given earlier. White fundamentalist Protestants and blacks exhibit the highest levels of anti-Semitism on these indexes, but their scores vary from factor to factor. Thus, white fundamentalists favored a greater social distance over the entire 1964-81 period and were more prejudiced than average against Jews in 1964.[8] But by 1981, they expressed only average levels of prejudice and may have become somewhat more sympathetic to Jews on the Conflict factor.[9] This pattern corresponds to the growing support for Israel among fundamentalists noted earlier. Blacks also have higher than average scores on the anti-Semitism factors, but these scores emerge on different factors. Like white fundamentalists, their desire for social distance rose, but unlike white fundamentalists, they scored higher than average on the prejudice factor over the whole 1964-81 period and their feelings of conflict rose dramatically. The rise of conflictual feelings corresponds to the growing intergroup conflicts mentioned earlier. In contrast, non-fundamentalist whites do not deviate greatly from the population averages on most factors. Occasionally they appear more sympathetic to Jews than average, but most of these differences disappear when educational level is controlled for.

Some studies have suggested that low levels of education may partly account for measured anti-Semitism among certain social groups like white fundamentalists or blacks: education provides access to the "enlightenment" subculture that reduces traditional prejudices (e.g. Selznick and Steinberg, 1969). But other studies have argued that education is unlikely to depress anti-Semitism if it is an expression of intergroup conflict or distance: people generally know their own interests and social distance from other groups whether they are well or poorly educated (Jackman and Muha, 1984). In the present case, the controls for educational level, shown in the bottom panel of Table 5, do not substantially affect the anti-Semitism scores of white fundamentalists or blacks. Rather, some studies have found that among blacks since the late 1960s, it is the <u>better</u> educated - and younger - who express highest levels of anti-Semitism (Lipset and Schneider, 1978; Martire and Clark, 1982). This pattern indeed differs from the majority, for as we just saw, most positive or negative scores on the anti-Semitism factors for non-fundamentalist whites disappear (become statistically insignificant) when educational level is controlled for. These findings provide additional support for interpreting measured anti-Semitism among white fundamentalists and blacks as expressions of intergroup conflict or social distance. If they were simply prejudice, the theory predicts that education should counteract anti-Semitism; but this is not the case.

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8. White fundamentalists' score on the prejudice factor declined somewhat and their score on the social distance factor rose over this period. There may be a technical explanation for these changes. The "Jews rejected Jesus" item moved from the prejudice factor to the social distance factor in the later survey. Since religion is such a central concern for fundamentalists, this change in the composition of the factors may be largely responsible for their apparent shift in views.

9. This depends on whether "White Other Protestants" or "White Other/No Religion" are excluded from the regressions.

We can pursue these patterns in more detail by examining a survey question from each anti-Semitism dimension with fuller multivariate models. The questions used are whether Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States, whether Jews have too much power, and whether one would object to a Jewish candidate for President in one's own party. To begin with, Table 6 shows the basic bivariate relations between these indicators and educational level, cohort (year the respondent turned age 21), race, and religiosity (fundamentalist of either race vs. "moderate" denominations). The breakdowns mirror the results obtained above and in previous studies. The better educated and the younger cohorts are consistently less anti-Semitic, but the effects usually weakened from 1964 to 1981. Blacks exhibit the same historical movement to higher levels of anti-Semitism we saw earlier, now on all three indicators. And religious fundamentalists (of both races) are more likely to believe that Jews are not loyal to America and are less willing to vote for a Jewish candidate. But, as before, they are somewhat less likely to say that Jews have too much power.

These variables were combined in multivariate tables, which were analyzed with log-linear models. Effect parameters from the final fitted models are shown in Table 7.[10] The basic correlations found in the bivariate tables generally survive the introduction of controls, but several significant new patterns now come into view.

The most important new finding concerns racial and generational differences. Recent studies have noted that younger blacks began to express higher levels of anti-Semitism since the 1970s. This represents a change from earlier generational differences among blacks and long-term generational differences among whites. In these cases, the young are less anti-Semitic. This generational reversal among blacks emerges in Table 7, but with a crucial modification. Both younger blacks and younger whites are less anti-Semitic for all questions in 1964. As predicted, younger blacks are more anti-Semitic for most questions in 1981. But a second pattern overlays the first in 1981. For some questions in 1981, the youngest and the oldest cohorts are most anti-Semitic. This emerges most strongly for blacks, but it is also true for whites on one question. Put another way, by 1981 the middle generations of both blacks and whites are less anti-Semitic. These are the generations that came to maturity in the period leading up to and including the civil rights movement (they turned age 21 between 1933 and 1965). Cohort theory stresses the importance of historical events occurring in late adolescence and early adulthood in shaping views held throughout the life course. Birth cohorts tend to carry these historical imprints with them unless subsequent events overwhelm the formative events. Thus, we

10. Several interaction effects in the lower part of Table 7 (e.g., "Race-Education"). These indicate that the two-variable effects vary among the categories of the third variable. For example, a Race-Education interaction indicates that education affects the responses of blacks differently from the responses of whites. Since by definition, the effect parameters sum to zero across categories of each variable, a redundant category is omitted for interaction effects to save space (e.g., whites are not shown in the Race-Education interaction effect). Log-linear models were also fitted to tables pooled over time, with year treated as a variable. This procedure permits one to test explicitly whether correlations changed over time. These results are not given in Table 7, but are discussed in the text.

might call this second generational pattern the "civil rights effect," especially among blacks for whom the pattern is strongest. The civil rights period can be seen as an historically exceptional interlude of improved cooperation between blacks and (liberal) whites, in a history that has otherwise been characterized by much conflict between the races. Since Jews were among the strongest white proponents of the civil rights movement, blacks who came to maturity during a period of growing cooperation between blacks and liberal whites might have developed less conflictual (or prejudicial) views of Jews than blacks who came to maturity during periods of greater conflict.[11]

Recent studies also find that while the better educated of both races expressed lower levels of anti-Semitism prior to the late 1960s - a pattern which persists among whites for most indicators - better educated blacks began to express higher levels of anti-Semitism after the late 1960s. But rather little of this educational reversal emerges in Table 7. Better educated blacks are more anti-Semitic than worse educated blacks only for the question of Jewish loyalty to the U.S., but not for the questions of Jewish power or a Jewish candidate. And this education reversal existed in 1964 as well as in 1981. Thus, there is some evidence that education may not lower anti-Semitism among blacks to the degree it does among whites - although this reversal does not appear for all indicators. But there is no evidence that this reversal emerged at a particular historical juncture. One could attempt to interpret these findings in terms of the "dimensionality" of the indicators, but the interpretation would probably be weak. Analysis of additional variables might shed further light on the results in this case.

Finally, Table 7 shows that whites fundamentalists are sometimes more anti-Semitic relative to white moderates than are black fundamentalists relative to black moderates. This finding is not surprising, but since the relationship is not strong or consistent, not too much should be made of it.

Up to this point, I have analyzed gentile attitudes toward Jews, with very little attention paid to Jews' own attitudes. But intergroup relations are a two-way street. If there are tensions between Jews and other groups, the sources should be sought on both sides.[12] There are two major ways to investigate these reciprocal attitudes. The first is the extent to which various groups differ on matters of mutual concern. This might be called the "issue distance" between them. If the issues concern social policy rather than simply ideology - or, better, if they reflect zero-sum games rather than nonzero-sum games -

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11. "U-shaped" age curves are quite rare in published attitudinal research (an exception is my own study of West German cohorts who grew up under Hitler: Weil, 1987a). Thus, when they consistently emerge for several indicators, they should probably be given considerable credence.

12. This was the error made by Sartre (1948) in his study of anti-Semitism. He argued that all Jewish characteristics were the product of forces stemming from the dominant gentile culture. Anti-Semitism was then the reflexive hostility of gentiles toward the negative characteristics of the group they had forged. Katz (1961) strongly criticizes this position, arguing that one must assume a good deal of autonomy in group cultures. Group interaction certainly affects both groups, but it does not entirely determine the characteristics of even the weaker partner.

then the issue distances can be interpreted as indicators of intergroup conflict of interests. The other method of investigating intergroup relations complements the study of anti-Semitism among gentiles: namely, Jewish sentiments of prejudice or conflict directed at other groups.

The 1964 and 1981 surveys on anti-Semitism contain a number of questions that allow us to examine the issue distance between Jews and various gentile groups. Unfortunately, while most anti-Semitism indicators were replicated in the later survey, only a smaller number of other questions were repeated. A number of important new questions were introduced, but since they were not asked in 1964, it is not possible to see whether groups moved closer together or further apart.

Table 8 summarizes the positions of Jews and other groups on several social issues. These include a scale of views on liberal democratic practices, a question whether minorities' rights are receiving too much attention, a scale of tolerance toward atheists, a scale of xenophobic opinions, a question of whom one favors in the Middle East conflict, a scale of questions about religious conviction, and a question about prayer in public schools. (The last question was asked only in 1981.) The liberal, pro-Israel, or secular category is placed in the first row of each panel for easier comparability.

The results in Table 8 show that Jews were much more liberal, pro-Israel, and secular than other groups in 1964.[13] This gap declined in 1981, but it was still substantial. For most items, the rest of the population converged with Jewish stances, while the Jews changed more slowly. Jews are usually at greatest issue distance from white fundamentalists and blacks and closest to whites with no religious preference. But as before, issue distance varies from item to item for the different social groups. For instance, the largest and historically most stable distances from white fundamentalists and blacks generally emerge on the questions of religiosity and tolerance for atheists, and to a lesser extent on the anti-liberal democracy scale. It is likely that controls for education would greatly reduce the gaps in tolerance and democracy, but they probably would not reduce the gaps in religiosity much. The black-Jewish gap on the xenophobia scale shrank dramatically, and blacks may have become much more in favor of minority rights than Jews from 1964 to 1981 (the survey questions are not identical). But blacks moved farther from Jews on support for Israel, while white fundamentalists moved closer. On the whole, issue distances between Jews and other groups mirror the patterns of anti-Semitism we saw earlier. The issue distances on policy questions tended to be somewhat more volatile over time than the issue distances on questions of ideology or tolerance. Thus, one could again argue that some of the changing levels of tension between Jews and other groups since the late 1960s actually reflect changing conflicts of interest rather than simply prejudice.

13. The results in this paragraph were reconfirmed with log-linear analysis.

The second method of studying intergroup relations, mentioned above, is to examine not only gentile groups' attitudes toward Jews but also Jewish attitudes toward various gentile groups. Up to now, white fundamentalists and blacks are the most distinctive gentile groups we have examined. But since opinion surveys on racial attitudes are abundant, while surveys about fundamentalists are rare, as a practical matter, I will restrict the following investigation to the attitudes of blacks and Jews about each other.

Table 9 shows levels of black anti-Semitism, with comparisons to white gentile anti-Semitism, in 1964 and 1981. These are the same indicators we have examined previously, and they are grouped according to the dimensions of anti-Semitism established in Table 4. They follow the same patterns we have seen, but they are shown here in somewhat greater detail. Again, we can see that the greatest rises in black hostility to Jews came in the conflict dimension, rather than prejudice or social distance. But where anti-Semitism items did rise - regardless of dimension - they seem to refer to political tensions rather than strictly socioeconomic tensions. These indicators show the greatest increase: Jewish power in the U.S., Jewish power in business, objection to a Jewish candidate, Jewish loyalty to America, and Jewish tendencies to push in where they are not wanted.

Table 10 shows the other side of the intergroup-relations coin: levels of Jewish racism from 1972 to 1986, with comparisons to white gentile racism. The data come from the General Social Surveys, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Since the number of Jewish respondents is small, in order to increase the sample sizes, seven surveys were pooled for the period 1972-78, and six surveys were pooled for the period 1980-86. Since it has not yet been possible to conduct a dimensional analysis of these items, they are listed simply by decreasing levels of Jewish racism.

As with gentile anti-Semitism, levels of Jewish racism varied considerably from item to item, and as before, these differences are quite revealing. This variation can be considered according to the absolute level of Jewish racism, or according to the gap or ratio between Jewish and white gentile levels. Both views tell the same story.[14] Where the item pertains to affirmative action or a zero-sum contest between black and Jewish interests, Jews express higher levels of racial hostility. But where the item pertains to discrimination, social distance, or aid to minorities, Jews express lower levels of racial hostility.

These patterns can be seen in the absolute levels of Jewish racism. Negative Jewish views about blacks are highest (above 40 percent) for items pertaining to affirmative action or for situations that would risk putting Jews themselves at a disadvantage: mandatory school busing, blacks pushing too fast, preferential treatment by the government for blacks, school integration where most of the pupils are black, and

14. Rank-order correlations between absolute levels and Jewish/white-gentile gaps are quite strong.

enforced open housing policies. And negative Jewish views are lowest (below 15 percent) for items pertaining to discrimination, social distance, or non-affirmative action aid for blacks: inviting a black to dinner, school integration, voting for a black Presidential candidate, interracial marriage, and government spending on blacks. The ratios of Jewish racism compared with white gentile racism mirror these differences, as can be seen in Table 10. Put in terms of percentage differences, Jews averaged about 10 points more liberal than white gentiles in both periods. Both groups may have become slightly more liberal over this period - analysis of the Jewish data shows no statistically significant change for any item, but this may be due to the small sample sizes - but the gap between Jews and white gentiles remained almost identical over time for each item. Thus, in terms of both absolute levels and Jewish/white-gentile ratios, Jews express most racial hostility when black and Jewish interests conflict - especially over affirmative action policy - and they express least racial hostility when it is a matter of discrimination, social distance, or (non-affirmative action) aid to minorities.

The results of these analyses, taken together, provide impressive empirical support for the picture of intergroup relations in America given in the historical sketch at the beginning of this section. As is the case for most empirical studies, the data show higher levels of anti-Semitic prejudice among the older and less educated sectors of the population. But it was also possible to distinguish conflictual elements of intergroup tensions from prejudicial elements, and here groups varied as one would have predicted from their changing interests. White fundamentalists moved somewhat closer to Jews by the early 1980s on questions of conflict, while blacks moved considerably further away. And when it was possible to analyze Jewish views of gentile groups - racial attitudes, in this case - the same intergroup conflicts were mirrored. Jews are quite liberal when it comes to prejudice (possibly because they have very high educational levels), but when their interests conflict with those of other groups, their views harden. One set of intergroup relations could not be easily examined with the data at hand: the relations between Jews and white liberals, especially in the foreign policy realm. It would be valuable to find data to investigate this question (Lipset and Schneider, 1978, provide some analysis).

D. Contemporary Anti-Semitism in Perspective

The foregoing propositions and analyses of anti-Semitism in Western countries can be summarized as follows:

A distinction must be made for the modern period between political anti-Semitism and other forms, mainly social, economic, and religious. Although the latter forms have been irritating and sometimes damaging to the life-chances and living conditions of Jews, only political anti-Semitism has been truly dangerous.

Radical political anti-Semitism was probably not widespread among the German population prior to the Nazi rise to power, nor was it likely prevalent during their rule. (See Steinert, 1967, for evidence regarding opinion surveys conducted for the Nazi regime; see Massing, 1949; Pulzer, 1964; Tal, 1971, 1975; Rürup, 1975; Rosenberg, 1967; Bracher, 1970, for evidence regarding not only the successes but also the limitations of pre-Nazi German anti-Semitism.) The Holocaust was therefore not the direct result of popular anti-Semitism but rather of the attainment of power of a radical movement, an event which must be explained in other terms - mainly, the weakness of liberal democratic orientations. Thus, there was no reason to expect, nor did we find, that the postwar West German population is radically politically anti-Semitic. They are more anti-Semitic than the American population, but they occupy a middling position among other European nations.

Trends in the absolute levels and structures of anti-Semitism in all countries examined are encouraging. There has been an overall reduction in anti-Semitism, and the structures which support this reduction are strengthening. In particular, education seems to be acquiring an ability to reduce anti-Semitism, which it did not always and everywhere possess. And new generations are expressing less prejudice and, to some extent, less hostility to Jews than older generations. Moreover, political anti-Semitism is not connected to the mainstream party systems of any of the countries except Austria and to some extent France, but instead is restricted to marginal political movements which have little following.

The main reason for this change in the structural basis of anti-Semitism in West Germany is that the latter's political culture has converged to a very great extent with that of countries with much longer liberal democratic traditions. Institutions of socialization have largely "caught up" with the post-1945 regime change (there is evidence that they lagged in this), and both schools and the direct experience of liberal democratic practice are now socializing new generations in greater ethnic and religious tolerance. And on the negative side of the same coin, political anti-Semitism has declined because of its connection to the old, discredited historical Nazi regime; and it is only weakly tied to mass-based neo-fascism. It was not possible to investigate Austria's political culture as thoroughly here, but we have found that declines in political anti-Semitism were more sluggish there. Considering the extent of decline in the United States and France, however, it seems reasonable to suggest that the reduction of anti-Semitism in these countries and West Germany is also related to the general liberalization from the 1950s to the mid-1970s.

A final reason for this decline is the reduction of the traditionalist sources of anti-Semitic prejudice. On the one hand, the Churches have moderated many of their views, and on the other hand, the religious and traditional sectors have declined as a proportion of Western populations. (There has been much less decline in American than European Christian religiosity, but the former was never as important a source of anti-Semitism as

the latter. See, however, the debate in Glock and Stark, 1966, and Middleton, 1973.) This further reduction in traditional anti-Semitism affects the possible future of political anti-Semitism, since anti-Semitic prejudice often conditioned the selection of targets for modern nationalistic ethnocentrism (see Katz, 1980).

For these reasons, tensions which arise between Jews and gentiles are more likely than in the past to be manifested as simple intergroup conflict and be reducible by negotiation and mediation, and Jews are less likely to be selected as scapegoats for problems they had little to do with creating. In countries where few Jews still live - above all, West Germany - there is probably insufficient contact between Jews and Gentiles for much conflict to exist. But if contact is not responsible for the decline in prejudice there, anti-Semitism has declined for other reasons which we have explored. In countries where many Jews live - above all, the United States - much of what appears to be anti-Semitic prejudice actually consists of intergroup conflict. This is true, for instance, of conflicts of interest between Jews and blacks over racial quotas, and possibly between Jews and foreign-policy liberals over Israel. Such a situation is more auspicious for the reduction of hostility to Jews, since the resolution of conflict is a more straightforward task in liberal democracies than the deconstruction of prejudice. The roles of contact and conflict are perhaps more complex, however, in Austria where many of the resident Jews are transients from the Soviet Union to Israel and other Western countries, and in France where a good many Jews are recent, culturally foreign immigrants from North Africa - but it is not possible to take these factors into account in this short article.

The problem of anti-Semitism has not disappeared in Western countries since the Holocaust, but considering the evidence we have seen, it seems reasonable to believe that renewals of anti-Semitism in the foreseeable future are unlikely to be as severe as those of the turn of the century - let alone as dangerous to Jews as those of the Nazi period. At the same time, however, the danger does continue to exist that scapegoats will be sought during crises. I have suggested that levels of hostility to certain groups need not necessarily be high in normal times for tragedy to result from a crisis if that prejudice is mobilized by a radical political movement. For better or worse, the likely target of scapegoating may simply have shifted away from Jews to other ethnic minorities - especially the foreign workers in Europe and foreign workers and blacks in America. On the other hand, some studies show reductions in racial prejudice in the United States and Europe. Perhaps the best hope is that intergroup tensions can be confined to matters of conflict - which can be mediated - rather than prejudice, which is little susceptible to rapid reduction, especially during a crisis.

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Table 1

Trends in Anti-Semitism in Four Western Countries
Part 1: Political Anti-Semitism

Year	37-38	46	49	50	52	56	60	61	62	63	64	66	67	68	69	71	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	81	82	86	87
1. Do Jews have too much power (% Yes)																											
US	41	55	-	-	34	-	-	-	17	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	26	19	-	17	20	-	15	21
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	18	13	-	-	9	6	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	13	23
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-
2. Do Jews have too much power in business? (% Yes)																											
US	47	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	-	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Would vote for Jew in own party (% No)																											
US	46	-	-	-	49	-	22	23	-	17	-	-	13	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-
4. Questionable Jewish loyalty/nationality (% Yes)																											
US	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	26	-	27	-	29	29	30	-	28
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	-	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-
5. Are there too many Jews in the country? (% Yes)																											
US	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	37	29	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6. Jews cause trouble (sometimes: with their ideas) (% Agree)																											
US	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	15	9	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	-	-
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 1, cont.

Trends in Anti-Semitism in Four Western Countries
Part 2: Social and Religious Anti-Semitism

Year	37-38	46	49	50	52	56	60	61	62	63	64	66	67	68	69	71	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	81	82	86	87
7. Can tell a Jew just by looking? (F: Are Jews a separate race?)																											
US	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. Are Jews being punished today by God for killing Jesus? (% Yes)																											
US	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. Would you marry a Jew (or: let your child) (% No)																											
US	-	-	-	57	-	-	-	-	37	-	56	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	61	-	-	-	-	42	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	70	-	-	-	-	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
10. Have contact with, know Jews (% Yes)																											
US	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	-	46	-	80	-	-	-
BRD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Key: US = United States; BRD = West Germany; A = Austria; F = France.

Sources:

Bensimon and Verdes-Leroux, 1970; Bichlbauer and Gehmacher, 1972; Erskine, 1965-66; Dr. Fessel, 1976 (survey); Gallup, 1976, 1980; Hyman and Wright, 1979; Institut für Demoskopie of Allensbach, Jahrbücher; Marin, 1979, 1983; Martire and Clark, 1982; Marx, 1967; Quinley and Glock, 1983; New York Times/CBS News Polls, 1987; Rosenfeld, 1982; Sadoun, 1967; Sallen, 1977; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Silbermann, 1981, 1982; Smith and Dempsey, 1983; Sondages, 31, 1-2 (1969): 114; Stember, 1961, 1966; Weiss, 1977-78.

Table 2

Levels of Anti-Semitism in Four Western Countries, 1986

(Anti-Semitic opinion underlined)

	USA	Germany	Austria	France
"Do you think that Jews have too much influence in this country, too little, or just the right amount?"				
Too Much	15	13	13	13
Too Little	7	5	3	2
Just Right	68	31	33	56
Don't Know	10	51	51	29
"If someone said 'it would be best if all Jews went to Israel; that is their country,' - would you agree or disagree?"				
Agree	9	20	24	17
Disagree	87	56	40	65
Don't Know	4	24	36	18
"If a major politician demanded that Jews not be permitted to hold any important positions in this country - do you think he should have to resign, or at least retract this statement, or is it okay for a politician to say something like this?"				
Must Resign	19	28	12	12
Retract Statement	52	43	44	65
(Resign or Retract)	(71)	(71)	(56)	(77)
Okay to Say This	24	15	40	14
Don't Know	5	14	4	9
"Some people are nice to have as neighbors, but it's harder to imagine this with others because they have completely different lifestyles. What would you think of having Jewish neighbors?"				
They are good neighbors	91	52	37	85
They are not so good	7	22	30	10
Don't Know	2	26	33	5
"You often can't trust Jews"				
Agree	12	11	20	21

Source: "stern" Magazine

Table 3

The Effect of Education on Anti-Semitism in Four Western Countries

Jews Have Too Much Power (% Yes)

	USA				BRD		France	Austria
	1945	1952	1964	1981	1966	1974	1969	1976
Non HS Grad	59%	38%	19%	25%	13%	19%	19%	23%
HS Grad	61	32	7	21	14	16	26	33
College Grad	53	26	5	17	14	8	23	29
Total	58%	34%	12%	20%	13%	18%	24%	28%
Gamma	-.08	-.21	-.47	-.15	.04	-.23	.10	.20

Would Vote for Jew in Own Party (% No)

	USA				BRD	France
	1952	1960	1969	1981*	1960	1966
Non HS Grad	51%	32%	15%	46%	45%	51%
HS Grad	46	18	4	34	42	47
College Grad	43	17	3	23	44	41
Total	49%	22%	8%	34%	44%	50%
Gamma	-.15	-.32	-.60	-.33	-.05	-.18

Questionable Jewish Loyalty/Nationality (% Yes)

	USA			BRD	France	Austria
	1952*	1964	1981	1974	1966	1968
Non HS Grad	13%	41%	37%	58%	20%	42%
HS Grad	12	23	27	51	18	41
College Grad	10	11	24	41	17	34
Total	12%	30%	28%	55%	19%	40%
Gamma	-.11	-.58	-.32	-.19	-.06	-.09

*Question formulation differs substantially from others in the series for country.

Table 4

Factor Analyses
Anti-Semitism Survey Questions, USA 1964 and 1981

	Factors					
	Prejudice		Conflict		Social Distance	
	1964	1981	1964	1981	1964	1981
Shady Dealings	.74	.73	.17	.13	.07	.07
Shrewd Businessmen	.70	.74	.30	.02	.11	.15
Jews Dishonest	.68	.50	.10	.14	.12	.06
Jews Disloyal	.66	.51	.23	.16	.00	.10
Don't Care About Others	.63	.65	.33	.21	.08	.17
Jews Stick Together	.47	.49	.31	.24	.16	.02
Jews Cause Trouble	.44	.63	.47	.05	.11	.18
Too Much Power	.17	.18	.77	.76	.07	.18
Too Much Business Power	.26	.21	.67	.76	.07	.08
Jews Pushy	.22	.15	.59	.47	.16	.33
Support Israel or Arabs	.04	.15	.37	.42	-.02	-.17
Not Marry a Jew	.10	.05	-.04	.09	.79	.74
Not Vote for a Jew	.21	.19	.09	.22	.70	.64
No Jewish Neighbor	.03	.10	.36	.07	.46	.57
Jews Rejected Jesus	.44	.17	-.04	-.21	.10	.50
Eigenvalues	4.60	3.93	1.19	1.34	1.08	1.21

Table 5

Effects of Social Groups and Education on Anti-Semitism Factors, 1964-81
(Factors from Table 4)

	Anti-Semitism Factors					
	More Prejudiced		Higher Conflict		Socially More Distant	
	Mean Factor Scores					
Social Groups	1964	1981	1964	1981	1964	1981
Blacks	.42	.50	-.05	.28	-.39	.17
White Catholics	-.21	-.04	.03	.09	-.12	-.18
White Fundamentalists	.20	.06	-.04	-.23	.22	.50
White Other Protestants	-.11	-.14	.02	-.01	.13	-.14
White Other/No Religion	-.08	-.14	.04	-.14	-.06	-.07
Eta	.22**	.20**	.03	.15**	.20**	.24**
	Unstandardized Regression Coefficients					
Educational and Social Groups	1964	1981	1964	1981	1964	1981
(Constant)	.71**	.67**	.58**	-.07	-.18*	.23
Blacks	.36**	.52**	-.19*	.42**	-.31**	.21
White Catholics	-.15	.03	-.02	.23*	-.05	-.12
White Fundamentalists	.19*	.06	-.14	-.10	.29**	.52**
White Other Protestants	.01	-.05	.01	.13	.19*	-.08
White Other/No Religion	-	-	-	-	-	-
Education Level (3 lev.)	-.47**	-.37**	-.32**	-.03	.07*	-.14**
Adjusted R^2	.14	.09	.04	.02	.04	.06

** = p < .01; * = .01 < p < .05

Table 6

The Effects of Background Characteristics
On Three Indicators of Political Anti-Semitism: Part 1

Bivariate Breakdowns

	Jews More Loyal to Israel Than to U.S.		Jews Have Too Much Power		Object to Jewish Candidate	
	1964	1981	1964	1981	1964	1981
Total	30%	28%	11%	21%	45%	34%
Education						
Primary	41%	36%	16%	25%	46%	44%
Secondary	23	27	6	21	46	35
University	12	24	5	17	38	23
Tau_b	-.22**	-.09**	-.15**	-.06*	-.03+	-.14**
Cohort						
Post 1965	--	27%	--	18%	--	33%
1949-1965	27%	25	7%	21	44%	31
1933-1948	25	30	7	28	41	36
1918-1932	37	36	15	22	51	44
pre 1918	48	--	21	--	50	--
Tau_b	.14**	.04+	.14**	.06*	.07**	.05*
Race						
Black	32%	39%	10%	37%	30%	40%
Others	31	27	11	17	47	33
Tau_b	.01	.08**	-.02	.16**	-.11**	.05+
Religiosity						
Fundamentalist	41%	36%	10%	17%	58%	47%
Moderate	27	25	11	21	41	32
Tau_b	.12**	.06*	-.02	-.04	.15**	.12**

** = p < .01
* = .01 < p < .05
+ = .05 < p < .10

Table 7

The Effects of Background Characteristics
On Three Indicators of Political Anti-Semitism: Part 2

Log-Linear Models: Effect Parameters

	Jews More Loyal to Israel Than to U.S.		Jews Have Too Much Power		Object to Jewish Candidate	
	1964	1981	1964	1981	1964	1981
Education						
Primary	.20	.05	.32	-	-	.20
Secondary	-.04	-.04	-.09	-	-	.03
University	-.16	-.02	-.23	-	-	-.23
Cohort						
Post 1965	-	-	-	-.12	-	.13
1949-1965	-.07	-	-.17	-.05	-.04	-.13
1933-1948	-.16	-	-.19	.03	-.10	-.12
1918-1932	.03	-	.09	.13	.10	.12
Pre 1918	.19	-	.27	-	.04	-
Race						
White	-.08	-.09	-	-.22	.20	.02
Non-White	.08	.09	-	.22	-.20	-.02
Religiosity						
Fundamentalist	.14	.11	-	-.10	.07	.08
Moderate	-.14	-.11	-	.10	-.07	-.08
Race-Education						
Non-White Primary	-.19	-.15	-	-	-	-
Secondary	-.06	.03	-	-	-	-
University	.25	.12	-	-	-	-
Cohort-Race						
Post 1965 Non-White	-	-	-	.09	-	.19
1949-1965 Non-White	-	-	-	-.08	-	-.07
1933-1948 Non-White	-	-	-	-.24	-	-.14
1918-1932 Non-White	-	-	-	.23	-	.03
Pre 1918 Non-White	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religiosity-Race						
Fundamentalist White	-	-	-	.12	.08	-

Unstandardized effect parameters from final fitted log-linear models.

Dash (-) indicates $p > .05$.
Other effect parameters significant at .01.

Table 8
Issue Distance between Jews and Various Social Groups: Selected Issues[a]

	1964							1981						
	Tot	J	Bl	Ca	Fn	Pr	Other	Tot	J	Bl	Ca	Fn	Pr	Other[b]
Anti-Liberal Democracy Scale														
Low	34	67	-46	-32	-43	-29	-27	54	72	-34	-16	-39	-20	-10
Medium	40	23	23	15	19	18	15	32	20	18	14	20	13	9
High	26	10	23	17	24	10	12	14	8	16	2	19	7	1
Do Minorities Receive Too Much Attention														
Too Little	30	67	-11	-39	-48	-42	-37	21	22	39	-3	-11	-12	-3
Don't Know	12	5	5	6	13	4	9	35	38	-5	-1	-10	1	-5
Too Much	58	28	6	34	36	38	27	44	41	-35	4	21	11	8
Tolerate Atheist														
More Tolerant	45	80	-51	-29	-49	-32	-27	76	86	-25	-2	-26	-10	-5
Less Tolerant	55	20	51	29	49	32	27	24	14	26	2	26	10	5
Xenophobia Scale														
Low	39	59	-32	-17	-28	-15	-14	24	31	-9	-6	-20	-11	2
Medium	46	34	9	12	16	10	8	56	56	-6	2	-3	8	-4
High	16	7	23	5	12	6	6	19	13	15	3	23	3	1
Support Israel or Arabs in Mideast Conflict														
Israel	24	-	-76	-71	-72	-67	-68	51	95	-63	-54	-38	-51	-49
Neutral or DK	69	-	68	65	65	59	62	46	5	58	52	37	47	46
Arabs	7	-	8	6	6	8	6	3	1	5	3	1	4	3
Religious Conviction Scale														
Low	31	82	-62	-58	-62	-43	-37	31	-	-60	-57	-65	-47	-26
Medium	35	16	30	23	13	19	7	28	-	3	23	4	14	0
High	34	2	32	35	49	24	30	41	-	58	34	61	34	26
Prayer in Schools														
Oppose	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	68	-54	-43	-58	-44	-29
Favor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63	24	54	43	61	47	22
Average Diffs			-46	-40	-50	-37	-35			-29	-25	-36	-27	-17

[a]Table shows: percentage response for Total Sample and Jews | Percentage difference between other social groups and Jews. (Where the Jewish response for one year is missing, the Jewish from the other year is used.)

[b]Key to Social Groups:

Tot = Total
J = Jews
Bl = Blacks
Ca = Catholics
Fn = White Protestant Fundamentalists
Pr = White Other Protestants
Other = White Other/No Religion

Table 9

Black/White Anti-Semitism, 1964-1981[a]

	Black			White (gentile)			Black/White Ratios	
	1964	1981	Chg.	1964	1981	Chg.	1964	1981
Prejudice Factor								
Jews Use Shady Practices	58%	38%	-20%	40%	20%	-20%	1.5	1.9
Jewish Businessmen Too Shrewd	45	35	-11	34	18	-16	1.3	1.9
Jews Not Honest Businessmen	35	30	-5	27	14	-13	1.3	2.1
Jews More Loyal to Israel	32	39	7	30	27	-3	1.1	1.4
Jews Don't Care About Others	43	35	-8	24	14	-10	1.8	2.5
Jews Stick Together	48	48	1	53	39	-13	.9	1.2
Jews Stir Up Trouble	16	18	2	10	8	-2	1.6	2.3
Averages	40%	35%	-5%	31%	20%	-11%	1.3	1.8
Conflict Factor								
Jews Too Much Power in U.S.	9%	38%	29%	11%	17%	6%	.8	2.2
Jewish Power in Business	18	43	26	29	31	2	.6	1.4
Jews Push in Where Not Wanted	18	24	6	18	15	-3	1.0	1.6
Support Arabs in Middle East	9	6	-4	7	4	-4	1.3	1.5
Averages	14%	28%	14%	16%	17%	0%	.9	1.6
Social Distance Factor								
Child Not Marry a Jew	46%	45%	-1%	59%	42%	-18%	.8	1.1
Object to Jewish Candidate	30	41	11	47	33	-13	.6	1.2
Not Want Jew as Neighbor	6	9	3	7	5	-3	.9	1.8
Averages	27%	32%	4%	38%	27%	-11%	.7	1.2
Jews Rejected Jesus	27%	26%	0%	20%	9%	-11%	1.4	2.9
Ns	244	127		1670	915			

[a]Percentage base includes those with no opinions. Items grouped by factors in Table 4.

Table 10

Jewish/White-Gentile Racial Attitudes, 1972-78 - 1980-86[a]

Jewish/Gentile	Jews			White Gentiles			Ratios	
	72-78	80-86	Chg.	72-78	80-86	Chg.	72-78	80-86
Against School Busing	78%	72%	-6%	83%	77%	-6%	.9	.9
Blacks Push Too Fast	51	41	-10	72	62	-10	.7	.7
Against Preferential Treatment	48	46	-2	56	57	1	.9	.8
School Integration: Most Black	46	50	4	42	45	3	1.1	1.1
Oppose Open Housing	45	41	-4	63	53	-10	.7	.8
Favor Residential Segregation	26	16	-10	40	28	-11	.7	.6
Govt. Spends Too Much on Blacks	16	10	-6	27	22	-5	.6	.5
School Integration: Half Black	16	19	3	20	19	-1	.8	1.0
Oppose Interracial Marriage	15	9	-6	35	30	-5	.4	.3
Against Black Candidate	11	9	-2	20	15	-5	.6	.6
Against School Integration	4	2	-3	14	10	-5	.3	.2
Not Invite a Black to Dinner	3	2	-1	13	10	-3	.2	.2
Averages	30%	26%	-3%	40%	35%	-5%	.8	.7
Ns	252	159		9068	5565			

[a]Percentage base includes those with no opinions. Items listed by descending order of statements unfavorable to blacks in 1972-78.

Source: General Social Surveys, 1972-1986.