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Facilitative Interactions of Model- and Experience-Based Processes:  
Implications for Type and Flexibility of Representation

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## Abstract

People are often taught using a mix of instruction and practice. In prior research, we have distinguished between model-based knowledge (e.g., acquired from explicit instruction) and experience-based knowledge (e.g., acquired from practice), and argue that the issue of how these types of knowledge (and associated learning processes) interact has been largely neglected. Two experiments explore this issue using a dynamic control task. Results demonstrate the utility of providing model-based knowledge before practice with the task, but more importantly, suggest how this information improves learning. Results also show that learning in this manner can lead to “costs” such as slowed retrieval, and that this knowledge may not always transfer to new task situations as well as experientially-acquired knowledge. Our findings also question the assumption that participants always acquire a highly specific “lookup” table representation while learning this task. We provide an alternate view and discuss the implications for theories of learning.

Facilitative Interactions of Model- and Experience-based Knowledge:  
 Implications for Type and Flexibility of Representation

The goal of education and training, whether in the classroom, on the athletic field or in the conference room, is to bring people from a relatively novice state of knowledge to a relatively more expert one. Yet, progressing from a novice to an expert on a complex task is typically a long, tedious process (e.g., Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993). Given that typical forms of training include some mix of instruction and experience, one possible path for optimizing learning involves discovering how to best integrate such activities.

A wide variety of evidence has been used to argue that complex mental skills are learned and deployed through the use of two different and complementary types of processes (and resulting representations, e.g., Anderson, 1982; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Mathews, et al., 1989; Reber, 1993; Sun, 2002, for arguments against, see e.g., Shanks & St. John, 1994). Although a variety of theoretical terms have been used to describe these two types of processes (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Reber, 1967), we refer to these two categories as *experience-* and *model-based processing* (see Mathews, et al., 1989; Sallas, Mathews, Lane & Sun, in press)<sup>1</sup>. In this conception, experience-based knowledge is acquired relatively directly from the environment and features of family resemblance are abstracted over multiple encounters with category members (e.g., Brooks, 1987; Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). This type of processing is relatively error-tolerant (e.g., Sun & Mathews, 2005), and the resulting knowledge is often difficult to articulate (e.g., Reber, 1989; Lewicki, Czyzewsks & Hoffman, 1987). More broadly, important features of stimuli may be learned without the intention to do so. In contrast, model-based processing involves using a mental model (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1982) or other type of explicit task representation to guide performance, and the

resulting knowledge is communicated to others relatively easily. This knowledge can vary from fairly abstract representations of a task (e.g., an equation) to more concrete representations of how to accomplish a task goal (e.g., a set of instructions or a recipe). When one performs a task using model-based knowledge, the kind of thinking required can place a substantial demand on people's limited capacity memory and attention (e.g., Hayes & Broadbent, 1988), and often leads to slow, but accurate, performance (e.g., Domangue, Mathews, Sun, Roussel, & Guidry, 2004).

Much of the research on this topic has attempted to identify tasks which isolate a specific type of processing, often under the assumption that individuals rely exclusively on one process rather than another during learning (e.g., Lewicki, et al., 1987). However, a growing number of researchers have begun to acknowledge that both types of processes operate in nearly all tasks (e.g., Mathews, 1997; Reber, 1989; Seger, 1994; Willingham, Nissen & Bullemer, 1989).

Because most tasks involve both processes, one important but understudied question concerns how these processes interact (Mathews, 1997; Mathews, et al., 1989; Sun & Mathews, 2005). The purpose of the following experiments is to explore this interaction and its implications, particularly for the type and flexibility of knowledge representations which result from these processes. We examine this question in the context of a dynamic control task; a task that can be learned and performed quite well before participants have acquired explicit knowledge of the underlying system (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 1988; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989). In other words, participants often learn the task in a relatively experiential manner. In the following studies, we manipulate whether participants receive model-based knowledge about the task prior to task experience, and assess its influence on performance and the nature of the resulting knowledge representation acquired from training. In the remainder of the introduction, we first briefly describe the dynamic control task and then consider relevant

research on the interaction of model- and experience-based knowledge. Subsequently, we discuss the widely held notion that learning in the dynamic control task consists of building up instances of successful interactions with the system (a *lookup table*; Broadbent, Fitzgerald and Broadbent, 1986; Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1998; Marescaux, Luc & Karnas, 1989), and note its implications for the potential interaction of model- and experience-based processes. Finally, we describe our specific hypotheses and the general procedure of our studies.

### *Dynamic control task*

In the following experiments, we explore learning processes using the dynamic system control task developed by Berry & Broadbent (1984). In our version of the task, participants control the temperature of a nuclear reactor by varying the number of fuel pellets fed into it. The target temperature was 6000 degrees. Production is affected by the number of pellets according to the formula:  $T = |20P - T_{tr-1} + N|$ . In this equation,  $T$  = current reactor temperature in thousands,  $P$  = number of pellets in hundreds,  $T_{tr-1}$  = reactor's temperature on previous trial, and  $N$  = random noise (+1000, -1000 or 0 with equal probability). Participants receive immediate and accurate (with small deviations for noise) feedback on each trial in the form of the resulting production level. During practice, participants complete blocks of 10 trials, and each block begins with a new randomly chosen temperature level. Participants receive extensive practice with the task (multiple sessions).

Although the task is fairly straightforward, it has a number of features which characterize learning in many real-world situations. In particular, we note that 1) it is a dynamic task in that the existing state of the system keeps changing, 2) noise affects the precision of the feedback received by participants, 3) performance is enhanced by extensive practice (e.g., Stanley, et al., 1989), and 4) mental models develop late in learning and are sometimes inaccurate (e.g., Stanley,

et al., 1989). Participants never discover or state the underlying formula (To the extent participants are able to articulate their understanding of the task; their reports tend to consist of inputs to enter for certain output states).

A brief example makes clear that these features are not uncommon. Imagine you are trying to improve the performance of employees under your supervision. The effectiveness of a given intervention with an employee will often depend on factors such as their stage of development (a dynamic context; i.e., an intervention will work better at some stages than others). Further, a given intervention may have slightly different effects depending on the day which it is applied (i.e., there is noise in the feedback). Becoming a good manager can sometimes take years, and an individual can become a good manager without necessarily being able to articulate the rules that are the basis for his or her performance. In short, the dynamic control task has a number of features which make it useful for studying the process of learning.

#### *The Interaction of Model- and Experience-based Processes*

In considering the nature of the interaction of model- and experience-based processes, we first argue that although both processes are typically involved in most tasks, it is possible to manipulate conditions to emphasize one type over another (Sun, et al., 2005). In the following experiments, we examine one specific type of interaction, namely the effect of providing partial or full model-based information before training on participants' ability to learn to control a dynamic system (Berry & Broadbent, 1984). We note that participants in prior studies using this task learn to control the system quite well without being given explicit instructions about the underlying nature of the system (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1988; Dienes & Fahey, 1995; 1998) and achieve this level of performance before they are able to articulate a (relatively) accurate description of the system's behavior (Stanley, et al., 1989). Thus, we argue that

participants can learn to control a dynamic system using primarily experience-based processing. Most previous attempts to study the impact of model-based processing on learning this task have focused on the effect of instructing participants to try to discover the rules governing the system (e.g., Berry and Broadbent, 1988; Sun & Mathews, 2005), and the result has often been performance decrements rather than facilitation.

A different approach was taken by Roussel (1999). Specifically, he attempted to facilitate learning of the dynamic control task by providing a hint (valid inputs for three output states) to some participants. The motivation for this manipulation came from the notion of a “lookup” table (Broadbent, et al., 1986; Dienes & Fahey, 1995; 1998; Marescaux, et al., 1989). According to this concept, participants learn to control the dynamic control task by constructing a table of successful output-input responses (e.g., “when temperature is 1000 degrees, input 400 fuel pellets”) while they are learning the task. As learning progresses, participants are able to rely on their memory for previous experiences to make responses to current system states. Further, Dienes and Fahey (1995; 1998) provided arguments and evidence that these representations are acquired implicitly rather than explicitly. Because of this, Roussel (1999) predicted that providing information relevant to a lookup table representation should enhance performance relative to participants who simply practice the task without this information. This model-based knowledge could enhance performance either by “filling in” entries in the table or by enhancing attention to appropriate aspects of the task. Roussel’s results confirmed this prediction, as participants who received the “hint” substantially outperformed participants who learned the task experientially. In other words, the provision of model-based knowledge of this nature allowed participants to acquire more valid knowledge about the system.

Although Roussel’s (1999) findings demonstrate that providing model-based knowledge

can improve performance, they nevertheless leave open a number of questions about the locus of this effect. First, Roussel's design did not definitively rule out the possibility that improved performance in the hint condition was simply a function of participants doing better when they encountered the "hint" states. In other words, did the hint help change the manner in which participants learned the task or did it simply allow them to utilize the provided knowledge to act appropriately in certain specific situations? Second, Roussel's hint provides two different types of information to participants; either one of which could facilitate learning. Specifically, the hint tells participants that they should look for a relationship between prior output states and the input to achieve the goal state, *and* it informs participants of specific valid inputs for three output states (out a total of twelve). As will be seen, both of these issues are addressed by Experiment 1. A third broad issue concerns the nature of the knowledge representation that results from receiving model-based knowledge and extensive practice with the task. Although learning in such a manner has a performance benefit, does knowledge acquired under such conditions differ in any way from knowledge which is acquired only from experience? For instance, it has been argued that model-based (explicit) knowledge can be transferred to new situations much more readily than experience-based (implicit) knowledge (e.g., see review by Dienes & Berry, 1997; but see Willingham, 1997). One implication of this claim is that explicitly-provided lookup table information may transfer *more* effectively (e.g., because participants can adjust table values) than similar information that is acquired only through experience (e.g., because it is not easily accessible to awareness for modification). Finally, there is research suggesting that provided model-based knowledge may lead to improved accuracy in relatively implicit tasks, but often has a cost in terms of speed of retrieval (e.g., Domangue, et al., 2004; but see Sallas, et al., in press). Both Experiments 1 and 2 will address these issues by providing data on the nature of the

acquired knowledge representation.

### *Current Experiments*

In the following experiments, we had participants learn the dynamic control task over a series of sessions (i.e., they received extensive practice). Participants varied in the type of information they received prior to and during training. In each experiment, an Experiential condition served as a baseline. These participants were given task instructions and the goal of maintaining the system at a given level (6000 degrees), but were given no additional information about the task. Participants of primary interest were provided information about the correct response to make in a given system state (i.e., the proper input to achieve the task goal) for either a subset (Experiment 1; Hint+Quiz condition) or all system states (Experiment 2; Table condition) before they began training. Acquired knowledge was assessed using computerized performance tests (where participants attempted to attain a goal state) and, in Experiment 1, a final paper-based “table” test where participants were questioned about their knowledge of valid inputs for each output state.

Experiment 1 was designed to test between alternative explanations of the effectiveness of providing a task hint to participants, and to establish whether the hint has narrow or broad impacts on learning the dynamic control task. There were three conditions. Experiential (Control) participants were simply told to achieve and maintain the system at the goal state during training. A second group (Quiz-Only) was given the same instructions and was also quizzed during every two blocks of training about their knowledge of appropriate inputs to make for each output state. The goal of the quiz was to highlight to participants that they should consider the relation between prior output states and inputs when trying to learn how to attain the goal state (note that it also alerts participants that there is a single correct answer for each output

state). A third group (Hint+Quiz) received, in addition to task instructions and quizzes, partial lookup table information in the form of three valid output-input pairs (e.g., “If temperature is 1000 degrees, then input 400 fuel pellets) before training. This design allowed us to test several hypotheses. First, if providing specific examples to participants leads them simply to apply those “rules”, then any advantage of the Hint+Quiz condition in overall performance over the remaining groups should disappear when only “non-hint” states are considered. However, if the specific examples lead participants to more effectively learn the task as a whole, then any advantage should remain. Second, if prior findings of the effectiveness of the hint (Roussel, 1999) is simply a function of focusing participants on the importance of the relation between prior output states and inputs, then performance in both Quiz-Only and Hint+Quiz groups should exceed that of Experiential participants, and should not differ from each other. If the provided examples are playing a critical role, then Hint+Quiz participants’ performance should exceed that of the Quiz-Only condition. Finally, we examined whether there is any “cost” to provided model-knowledge by evaluating response times during the performance test. Based on prior research (e.g., Domangue, et al., 2004), we predicted Hint+Quiz participants would be slower than participants who learned the task experientially.

To foreshadow, the results of Experiment 1 suggest the importance of provided model-based knowledge. In Experiment 2, we utilized a group of “Table” participants who received full lookup table information (all correct output-input pairs) before training. We examined the nature of knowledge which is acquired from practice by assessing the flexibility of such knowledge using a transfer test. We discuss these issues in more detail in the introduction to that experiment.

## Experiment 1

*Method*

*Participants and Design.* Eighty-five undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State University were recruited to voluntarily participate in return for extra credit. There were three training conditions: Experiential (control), Quiz-Only, and Hint+Quiz. Although participants were randomly assigned to conditions, some participants did not attend all 3 sessions and their data was excluded. Altogether, there were 29 participants in the Experiential condition, 31 participants in the Quiz-Only condition, and 25 in the Hint+Quiz condition.

*Task.* The Reactor Control task used in the current work is a computer-based task in which participants imagine they are in charge of a nuclear reactor. The participants attempt to achieve and maintain a specified level of an output variable, reactor temperature, by controlling the number of fuel pellets consumed by the reactor. Participants were given the goal of maintaining production at 6000 degrees. Task trials were grouped into blocks of ten trials and each block began with a randomly selected temperature level. On each task trial, the computer presented the current temperature. Participants saw a display which depicted temperature and the number of fuel pellets input. Reactor temperature was allowed to vary from 1000 degrees to 12000 degrees. Participants could select a number of fuel pellets ranging from 100 to 1200 in multiples of 100. The participants responded by choosing and entering the number of pellets to be fed into the reactor. The computer then updated and displayed the new temperature level. As noted in the introduction, the formula determining the output includes a random noise element (+ or - 1000 degrees). Thus, for a given input, 1/3 of the time it would result in a corresponding output (e.g., 6000 degrees), 1/3 of the time it would be 1000 degrees higher, and 1/3 of the time it would be 1000 degrees lower. The task was constructed such that if the input resulted in an

output less than 1000 or above 12000 degrees, it was set to 1000 and 12000, respectively.

Participants were made aware of the lower and upper limits of production levels. At the end of each block (i.e., every 10 trials), the display was cleared and a new graph displayed for the next block of trials. The main dependent measure was the mean unsigned deviation from target production, in degrees. Because the target production level was always 6000 degrees, the dependent measure could vary from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 6000. Response time was also recorded.

Each session consisted of a study phase and a test phase. The duration of the study phase was twenty minutes, and participants worked at their own pace. At the end of every second block (twenty trials) of the study phase, participants in the Quiz-Only, and Hint+Quiz conditions were given a quiz. The quiz appeared in a pop-up window that completely occluded the visual display of the primary task. For each of the twelve positions on the temperature scale (1000-12000 degrees in increments of 1000), participants were asked “If the reactor’s temperature is (insert temperature) degrees, how many fuel pellets should you enter to move the temperature to 6000 degrees?” The presentation order of an item (output state) within a quiz was chosen randomly without replacement. Participants selected a response from the same levels of fuel pellets used in the main task (100-1200 in intervals of 100), and no feedback was given. The quiz was not present during the test phase.

Participants in Hint+Quiz condition also received a printed hint before the study phase. They were told that the hint would help them learn to control the reactor’s temperature. The hint was taken away at the beginning of the test phase for each session. The hint was as follows:

If temperature is 1000 degrees, then input 400 fuel pellets.  
If temperature is 4000 degrees, then input 500 fuel pellets.  
If temperature is 7000 degrees, then input 600 fuel pellets.

*Procedure*

Participants were tested in groups ranging from three to eight. Each group was randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Regardless of condition, all participants completed three sessions, one per day with one day between each session (i.e., Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of the same week). Each session consisted of a 20-minute training phase and a test phase.

Participants were instructed to take on the role of manager of a nuclear reactor, and that their job was to learn how to achieve and maintain a target temperature level (6000 degrees) by interacting with the simulation. They were further informed that the only variable they could control was the number of fuel pellets entered into the reactor. Thus, their task was to learn the relationship between number of fuel pellets and reactor temperature. After receiving instructions, participants were given twenty minutes to practice the task. As described above, participants in the Quiz-Only and Hint+Quiz conditions were quizzed after every other block. Participants in the Hint+Quiz condition had the hint available to them during the study phase.

Each day, after practicing for twenty minutes, all participants completed the performance test. The test was comprised of fifty blocks of 10 trials of the reactor control task. The participants were informed that their goal was to maintain a temperature level of 6000 degrees. Participants were excused from the session after all participants finished the test phase during the first two sessions. After completing the test phase of the third session, participants completed a table test (a paper version of the same questions asked during practice in the quiz groups), which required them to provide the correct number of fuel pellets to use for each output state (from 1000-12000 in increments of 1000) to achieve a temperature of 6000 degrees.

*Results and Discussion*

All analyses were conducted with an alpha level of .05. The primary dependent variable

of interest was performance as indicated by the average absolute deviation from target goal and thus performance is better the lower the score. Means and standard errors (in the form of error bars) for this measure are depicted in **Figure 1**. We report means and standard errors for response time and table test measures in the text below.

*The effect of type of training on task performance.* We examined test performance across the three sessions using a 3 X 3 mixed factorial ANOVA with training type (Experiential, Quiz-Only, and Hint+Quiz) as a between-subjects variable and session (1, 2, 3) as a within-subjects variable. Performance improved across sessions ( $\underline{M} = 1525, 1120, \text{ and } 946; \underline{F} (2, 162) = 43.1, \underline{MSE} = 7502055, \eta_p^2 = .347$ ), and subsequent comparisons revealed that performance on each session was better than the previous session. Performance also differed significantly as a function of training type ( $\underline{F} (2, 81) = 219.0, \underline{MSE} = 369929625, \eta_p^2 = .730$ ). Subsequent comparisons revealed that participants in Hint+Quiz condition performed more accurately than the Quiz-Only and Experiential conditions (which did not significantly differ from each other,  $\underline{M} = 725, 1257, 1665$ ). The interaction between training group and session was not statistically significant ( $\underline{F} < 1$ ). Thus, facilitation from the provided hint appears to be primarily a function of receiving valid output-input knowledge (rather than simply increasing awareness of output-input relationships). However, such model-based knowledge could simply help performance in ways that are narrowly limited to specific provided examples. Thus, we also examined performance restricted to “non-hint” output states. A parallel ANOVA to the one described above was conducted and revealed that, even with these trials removed, the Hint+Quiz condition still showed superior performance relative to the Quiz-Only and Experiential conditions ( $\underline{M} = 742, 1426, 1589, \underline{F} (2, 81) = 8.6, \underline{MSE} = 18163413, \eta_p^2 = .172$ ). Thus, our results suggest that the facilitation observed in the Hint+Quiz condition is relatively broad, because participants’

performance improved even for system states that were not specified in the hint. It appears that the provided information allowed these participants to infer the remaining states and thus reduce the problem space to be searched (Newell & Simon, 1972).

We next examined the speed of participants' responses at test using a 3 x 3 ANOVA as described above, using median response time as our dependent measure. Our results revealed only a main effect of training condition ( $F(2, 81) = 12.9$ ,  $MSE = 3281285$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .236$ ), with the Hint+Quiz and Quiz-Only participants significantly slower than participants in the Experiential conditions ( $M=1004, 864, 625\text{ms}$ ;  $SE = 42, 62, \text{ and } 60$ , respectively)<sup>2</sup>. Thus, consistent with prior research (e.g., Domangue, et al., 2004), the superior accuracy of the Quiz-Hint condition appeared to have a cost.

*The effect of training on the "table" test.* Finally, we measured participants' task knowledge on the paper-based table test, completed by all participants at the end of the third session. As with the performance test, the dependent measure was the average absolute deviation from target goal. A one-way ANOVA with training type (Hint+Quiz, Quiz-Only and Experiential) as a between-subjects variable revealed significant differences between groups ( $M = 1145, 1917 \text{ and } 2663$ ,  $SE = 169, 259 \text{ and } 288$ , respectively;  $F(2,81) = 10.6$ ,  $MSE = 16026743$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .986$ ). Results of subsequent comparisons showed the Hint+Quiz condition performed significantly better than the Quiz-Only condition, which performed significantly better than the Experiential condition. However, when the "hint" states were excluded from the analysis, the Hint+Quiz and Quiz-Only groups did not significantly differ from each other, although both groups were significantly more accurate than the Experiential condition ( $M = 1344, 1859 \text{ and } 2987$ ,  $SE = 221, 272 \text{ and } 311$ , respectively;  $F(2,82) = 9.951$ ,  $MSE = 19093185$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .201$ ). Thus, receiving the quizzes regularly during training did improve the accuracy of *acquired*

model-based knowledge of the task relative to participants who simply practiced the task. However, receiving the example states did not confer any significant additional advantage beyond those of the specific examples (although Hint+Quiz participants were nominally better even on non-hint states).

To return to our original hypotheses, our results first suggest that providing model-based knowledge about valid inputs for a subset of output states appears to change how participants learn from training rather than simply allow them to deploy that knowledge for those specific states. Hint+Quiz participants were superior to other conditions on the performance test, even when only “non-hint” states were considered. Thus, the effects of the “hint” were broad rather than narrow in that the provided knowledge allowed them to infer the appropriate inputs for the non-hint states. Second, facilitation resulting from the task hint appears to come primarily from the provided model-based information (and its resulting effects on learning), rather than from highlighting the relation between prior output states and inputs, or that there is a single correct answer for each output state. This was demonstrated by the clear superiority on the performance test of Hint+Quiz over the Quiz-Only participants. Finally, even with extensive practice on the task, there was a “cost” to utilizing model-based knowledge to improve performance. Although Hint+Quiz participants improved their accuracy, they were slower to respond.

## Experiment 2

The results of Experiment 1 revealed that provided model-based knowledge in the form of a subset of valid output-input states improves task performance in a non-trivial manner, as participants showed superior performance even for states that were not directly specified in the hint (although there was a cost in speed of response). In Experiment 2, we sought to extend the findings of Experiment 1. In particular, we were interested in potential differences in the

flexibility of knowledge acquired experientially versus from provided (model-based) task information. To do so, we more strongly manipulated reliance on these two types of knowledge by having a group of participants learn a full, accurate lookup table prior to training on the task. Specifically, these *Table* condition participants learned to criterion the appropriate inputs for achieving the goal state from each of the 12 output states (1000-12000). This could be conceived as a “super-hint” in that it provides an optimal (and highly specific) guide for how to perform the task. Thus, these participants are likely to rely fairly heavily on provided model-based knowledge, particularly compared to participants who simply practice the task (Experiential condition). More broadly, this manipulation allows us to ask about the nature of knowledge which is acquired from practice with the task.

In Experiment 2, participants in the Table and Experiential conditions completed a series of tests. During the first and second sessions, participants completed a test that used the same goal as during training (6000 degrees; Standard test). Obviously, one would predict the Table condition to do much better on these tests. More importantly, participants completed two other tests during the second session. The first test, using the same goal, assessed participants’ ability to control the system under time pressure (Speeded test). If the “cost” of utilizing provided model-based knowledge observed in participants from Experiment 1 is a general one (e.g., Domangue, et al., 2004), then one would predict it would be more difficult to access model-based knowledge to perform the task. Thus, the prediction would be that Table participants would be more impaired on the speeded test (relative to the unspeeded test) than Experiential participants. However, an alternative hypothesis is that the “cost” in speed incurred by Hint+Quiz participants in Experiment 1 resulted from not having the opportunity to practice deploying their model-based knowledge (because they needed to acquire knowledge of “non-

hint” states during practice). In this case, one might predict that the Table participants would be better able to convert their model-based knowledge into procedural (i.e., experience-based) knowledge and thus should show little impairment on the speeded test (e.g., Anderson, 1982).

The last and most important test required participants to maintain a different goal (8000 degrees; the Transfer test) than the one they had during training as a means of assessing knowledge flexibility. We note that competing theoretical assumptions lead to different predictions about performance on the transfer test. As noted in the introduction, the issue of flexibility of representation has been much discussed with respect to implicit/explicit learning. Specifically, it has been assumed that explicit (model-based) knowledge transfers more easily than implicit (experience-based) knowledge (e.g., Dienes & Berry, 1997; but see Willingham, 1997). One implication of this claim is that explicitly-provided lookup table information (Table condition) would be predicted to transfer *more* effectively than similar information that is acquired through experience (Experiential condition). This seems a reasonable possibility, as knowledge of the lookup table for the old goal could be transferred to the new goal simply by adding a constant to each entry.

A similar prediction would be made by theories of the dynamic control task which assume that Experiential participants learn a goal-specific implicit lookup table. These theories (e.g., Cleeremans, described in Marescaux, et al., 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995) assume that participants acquire specific lookup table entries through interaction with the task. When participants successfully achieve the goal from a given output state, they encode this information into memory and later rely on the entries to make responses when they face previously encountered system states. When participants face situations which have not been encountered before (as would be the case on a transfer test), responses will be made with some baseline

probability (in Cleereman's theory, these responses are equiprobable). Thus, these theories suggest that learning in the dynamic control task which is acquired with one set of parameters should not transfer well when those parameters are changed. More specifically, theories which posit specific implicit lookup table entries (e.g., Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Marescaux, et al., 1989) would predict poor transfer for the Experiential condition and would be agnostic on the outcome of the Table condition.

Finally, this prediction about lack of transfer only comes from theories which claim that *specific* output-input pairs are represented in the lookup table. As noted by Dienes & Fahey (1995; 1998), although their results are consistent with specific lookup representations, such specificity may not characterize the knowledge of participants with extensive task experience. Given that our participants receive considerably more training than do participants in typical dynamic control task studies; this is a clear possibility (e.g., Experiential participants in Exp. 1 completed an average of 3410 study trials across three sessions versus 40-80 trials in typical studies, e.g., Dienes & Fahey, 1995). In principle, representations in a lookup table can also define task situations in a more abstract way such that they approximate general rules ("when output is high, do X"). Theories of learning that allow for more abstract representations (e.g., Reber, 1993; Mathews, et al., 1989) would predict transfer when task parameters are changed to the extent that the general rules are still applicable. If acquired lookup table representations are more general than provided lookup-table (model-based) representations, this would predict better transfer in the Experiential condition and poorer transfer in the Table condition (relative to their performance on the same goal test).

We had three control groups which allowed us to more precisely assess the effects of our experimental conditions. One control group had no training, but simply took the standard test

(No Training – Standard), another had no training and took the transfer test (No Training – New Target) and a third memorized the table and then took the transfer test (they were told the table applied to a goal of 6000 and that the test goal would be 8000; Table Control – New Target).

The two no-training conditions provide a strong baseline for assessing the impact of task practice on test performance. The Table Control condition allows for an assessment of how much model-based knowledge can transfer without experience in the task.

### *Method*

#### *Participants*

Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State University who voluntarily participated for extra credit. A total of one hundred twenty-seven participants were randomly assigned to conditions. Altogether, there were 21 participants each in the Experiential and Table conditions. We also had 30 participants in the No Training – New Target test condition, 30 participants in the No Training – Standard test condition, and 25 participants in the Table Control – New Target test condition.

#### *Materials and Procedure*

In this experiment, we used the same nuclear reactor cover task. All participants in the experimental conditions completed two 1-hour sessions (spaced 48 hours apart).

*First Session.* In the first session, all participants were told about the simulated nuclear reactor task and were informed that their goal was to discover how to achieve and maintain a target level of temperature (6000 degrees) by interacting with the simulation. Participants were told that they were in control of only a single input variable (i.e., the number of fuel pellets).

Participants in the Experiential condition began performing the task immediately after reading its description and did not receive any further instruction. Participants in the Table

condition were provided with a table listing all the potential beginning states (previous output) and the correct corresponding inputs, and were instructed to study the table for two minutes for a recall test. After the two-minute study period, Table participants were given two recall tests. Each test consisted of all the possible output states of the nuclear reactor and a space to indicate the correct input responses. The two versions of the recall test contained the same information (all possible outputs), but in two different orders. Participants were required to get all twelve input responses correct in both orders before beginning the practice phase. If they failed to meet criterion, participants had to restudy the table and were retested until they met criterion.

Following instructions, participants had 20 minutes of practice time using a self-paced version of the task. Participants next completed a self-paced test, consisting of 50 blocks of 10 trials each (i.e., 500 trials). As in the practice phase, they were given the goal of maintaining the system at 6000 degrees.

*Second Session.* At the beginning of the second session, participants received a copy of their group's instructions (Table participants were given the table to review before practicing), and completed 5 minutes of self-paced practice. Following the practice period, participants completed another self-paced test (6000 goal) consisting of 50 blocks. We refer to these tests in Sessions 1 and 2 as *Standard tests* in that both were self-paced and used the same target level as used in practice<sup>3</sup>. We also tested a control condition (No Training – Standard) which received no training but completed the 50-block standard test with a goal of 6000. This baseline condition allowed for a comparison to experimental conditions to determine performance improvement from training.

After completing the Standard test, participants completed the remaining tests in a single, standard order. First, participants completed a fast-paced version of the standard test that we

term the *Speeded test*. Participants in this version had to enter their input for each trial within 1.5 seconds (1500 ms). If they failed to make a response within the time limit, the computer entered a random value, which typically made the next trial more difficult. Thus, the test reinforced quick responses. As in the standard test, participants completed 50 blocks. Finally, participants received the transfer test. On this *New Target Goal* test, participants were told to maintain temperature at 8000 degrees instead of 6000. All other aspects matched the standard test (e.g., 50 blocks, self-paced).

Besides the experimental conditions described above, we also had two control conditions for the New Target Goal test. In the No Training – New Target condition, participants were given task instructions and began the test. In the second control condition (Table Control), participants exactly replicated the Session 1 procedure for the Table condition (i.e., they memorized the table and were required to recall it twice). Following this phase, they were immediately given the New Goal transfer test without any practice. Participants were informed that the goal of the new test would be 8000 degrees and that they had just learned the table which provided correct answers for a goal of 6000. The performance of this control group is useful when compared against the Table condition because it allows us to separate transfer effects which result from practice from effects which result from good knowledge of the table. Note that knowledge of the lookup table could be transferred to the new goal simply by adding a constant to each entry.

### *Results and Discussion*

As in previous experiments, the alpha level was set to .05 and the primary dependent measure was the absolute deviation from target. Means for the conditions in each of the tests are portrayed graphically in **Figure 2**.

*Standard Tests*

We first examined the effect of training condition on test performance using a 2 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA with training condition as a between-subjects factor and session (Standard tests 1 and 2) as a within-subjects factor. The analysis revealed there was a significant main effect of type of training ( $F(1, 40) = 45.7$ ,  $MSE = 785157$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .53$ ). As is clear from the figure, learning a complete lookup table before practice led to dramatically better test performance than simply practicing the task. Although the main effect of session did not reach statistical significance ( $F(1, 40) = 3.34$ ,  $MSE = 83273$ ,  $p < .08$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .08$ ), the session by training interaction was significant ( $F(1,40) = 8.25$ ,  $MSE = 83273$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .17$ ). This reflected the fact that the performance in the Experiential condition improved from session 1 to session 2 ( $F(1,20) = 8.1$ ,  $MSE = 114095$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .29$ ), but the Table condition did not ( $F < 1$ ).

We next compared performance of the experimental conditions on the second session test against the No-Training control (Standard) condition using a Dunnett's test. Results revealed that both the Table and Experiential conditions were significantly more accurate than the No-Training control ( $p < .01$ ). In short, both Table and Experiential groups learned from practice with the task, but the additional explicit task information provided to Table participants allowed them to reach very high levels of performance.

*Speeded test*

We next examined performance in a test environment which was designed to restrict the amount of time participants had available to recall table entries, and thus potentially affect reliance on model-based knowledge. We assessed performance on the Speeded test using a one-way ANOVA. The effect of training condition was just shy of statistical significance (See Figure 1;  $F(1, 40) = 4.0$ ,  $p = .051$ ,  $MSE = 662575$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .09$ ). Although Table participants had

nominally better performance than Experiential participants on this test, a comparison of performance across the Standard and Speeded tests also suggests that this group was disproportionately impaired by the speeded conditions. We sought further evidence of this effect by performing a 2 X 2 mixed factorial ANOVA with training type (Table and Experiential) as a between-subjects factor and type of test (Standard Test and Speeded Test from session 2) as a within-subjects factor. Of greatest relevance is the obtained group x test type interaction ( $F(1,40) = 14.4$ ,  $MSE = 140593$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .27$ ). Simple effects analyses revealed that although both groups were significantly less accurate on the Speeded than the Standard test, this drop in performance was greater for Table participants ( $F(1, 20) = 62.24$ ,  $MSE = 164524$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .76$ ) than for Experiential participants ( $F(1, 20) = 12.1$ ,  $MSE = 116661$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .38$ ). This suggests that even with the opportunity to repeatedly practice deploying model-based knowledge, Table participants were much less accurate when they had restricted time to use their knowledge. Thus, the results are consistent with Experiment 1 and other research (e.g., Domangue, et al., 2004) in suggesting that model-based knowledge is often highly accurate, but may require more time to apply. However, we note that the Speeded test also had (less pronounced) negative effects on performance in the Experiential condition. We believe this suggests that either these participants may acquire some model-based knowledge during training or that, even though experientially-acquired knowledge is generally retrieved more quickly (e.g., Domangue, et al., 2004), our test was fast enough to interfere with retrieval on some attempts.

#### *New Target Goal test – Transfer*

Performance on the transfer test with a new target level (8000) was analyzed with a one-way ANOVA. As is clear from **Figure 2**, the effect of type of training was not significant ( $F < 1$ ). This finding suggests that a similar amount of generalizable knowledge was learned by

participants in the two conditions. To address the issue of transfer, we first compared the groups against the No Training – New Target condition using a Dunnett's test. Results revealed that performance in each of the conditions was significantly better than the control group ( $p < .01$ ). Thus, we see transfer to a new target level in both conditions.

Although both conditions benefitted from practice, what is performance on the new goal relative to the same goal? We analyzed performance using a 2 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA with type of test (Session 2 Standard test vs. New Goal test) as a within-subjects variable, and type of training (Table vs. Experiential) as a between-subjects variable. The finding of greatest interest was a significant interaction ( $F(1,40) = 39.31$ ,  $MSE = 160114.88$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .50$ ). As is obvious from Figure 2, Experiential participants showed nearly the same performance on the transfer test as the standard test ( $M = 1324$  and  $1325$ , respectively,  $F < 1$ ), while Table participants' performance was significantly worse on the transfer test ( $M = 1293$  and  $198$ ,  $F(1,20) = 63.67$ ,  $MSE = 197526.44$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .76$ ).

These results have important implications for clarifying what type of knowledge transfers in the Table condition. As we have seen, the advantage of the Table condition over the Experiential condition on the standard test is eliminated in the transfer test. However, performance in the Table condition does not get worse than the Experiential condition on the transfer test, but rather returns to the same level. This suggests two things. First, Table condition participants appear to also acquire experience-based knowledge through training. When test conditions make it difficult to use the provided model-based knowledge, they appear to rely more on experience-based knowledge. Second, when considering transfer test performance, it appears that their experientially-acquired knowledge transferred, while their explicit (model-based) lookup table knowledge did not. This possibility can be directly

addressed by comparing performance between participants who learned the table and practiced the task to participants who learned the table but did not practice the task before taking the transfer test (Table Control – New Goal). We made this comparison in the context of comparing performance in this control condition against the Experiential and Table conditions. A Dunnett's test revealed that performance in both conditions was significantly more accurate than in the Table Control condition ( $p < 01$ )<sup>4</sup>. Thus, Table participants do show transfer to a new goal, but the knowledge used for this transfer appears to be largely acquired by experience rather than from the explicit lookup table knowledge provided beforehand.

Returning to our original questions, the results of Experiment 2 revealed that although provided model-based knowledge greatly facilitated performance on a test that mirrored training conditions, there were “costs”. Although a speeded test did not eliminate the advantage of Table over Experiential participants, their performance was disproportionately affected. More strikingly, the advantage of Table participants was completely eliminated in a transfer test which required them to achieve and maintain a new goal, even though they could have performed successfully simply by modifying their table entries by adding a constant. Importantly, Experiential participants showed evidence of transfer to the new goal, as their performance was nearly identical in the Standard and New Goal tests. The fact that Table and Experiential participants performed similarly on the transfer test suggests both groups acquired experience-based knowledge from practicing the task, and that in the case of the Table condition, this knowledge transferred more easily than provided model-based knowledge. Finally, the pattern of findings on the transfer test appears most consistent with the notion that typical (i.e., Experiential) participants acquire general rather than specific lookup table representations with extensive practice.

## General Discussion

Two experiments confirm the facilitative effects of provided model-based knowledge on learning to control a dynamic system (Roussel, 1999). More importantly, our results clarify the impact of providing such knowledge and the nature of the resulting knowledge representation. In Experiment 1, providing accurate task knowledge (3 correct output-input pairs) to participants before practice increased accuracy at test relative to participants who simply practiced the task or those who practiced and were repeatedly quizzed about the appropriate inputs for each output state. Results revealed that the impact of the provided model-based knowledge was broad rather than narrow, as performance in this condition was superior even when hint states were excluded. However, Hint+Quiz participants' speed of responding at test was significantly slowed relative to the Experiential condition. Experiment 2 showed the dramatic impact of providing a complete and accurate lookup table to participants before practice. Although this model-based knowledge led to very high levels of accuracy when tested using an unspeeded test, performance was reduced in a speeded test. In addition, Experiment 2 provided evidence of transfer of experience-based knowledge, as Experiential participants performed similarly on standard goal and new goal tests. The results also suggest that experience-based knowledge transferred better to a new goal than did provided lookup table (model-based) knowledge. We next discuss the implications of these findings for a number of important issues.

### *Effects of Providing Model-Based Knowledge*

In both experiments, participants who received model-based knowledge before training were demonstrably better at controlling the system than were participants who relied more heavily on experience-based knowledge (i.e., those participants who simply practiced the task), when the task parameters mirrored those encountered in training. The results of Experiment 1

showed that such improvement can be non-trivial, as performance was improved even for states for which answers were not explicitly provided. Thus, receiving task information appears to change how participants learn from training rather than simply allow them to deploy the knowledge for those specific states. The results of that experiment also suggest that the utility of the “hint” was primarily in the provided information, as participants who were repeatedly quizzed about the table entries did not significantly improve performance over participants who only practiced the task. Most likely, the provided information allowed Hint+Quiz participants to infer the remaining states. Put another way, the hint allowed participants to reduce the problem space to be searched (Newell & Simon, 1972).

Despite the advantages of model-based processing for learning, there do appear to be costs. In Experiment 1, Hint+Quiz participants’ test performance was more accurate than those in other conditions, but they were also the slowest at making responses (see also Domangue, et al., 2004). One likely possibility is that participants were deliberately attempting to retrieve correct table entries (or exemplar states from training) from memory, while those who simply practiced did not. There is also evidence for slowing in Experiment 2. Although Table participants learned the table to criterion before training (and thus had the opportunity to practice retrieving these entries), their performance was substantially impaired when the test required speeded responses (however, their accuracy remained superior to Experiential participants).

A second intriguing cost concerned the ability of participants to transfer their knowledge to a new goal state. Experiment 2 provided clear evidence of transfer, as participants who learned the task experientially performed similarly under old and new task goals. Although Table participants’ performance on the new task goal was significantly poorer than on the old task goal, their performance was similar to participants who only practiced the task. In other

words, experience-based knowledge acquired during practice appeared to show *greater* flexibility than provided model-based knowledge of a full lookup table. Thus, our results also call into question the notion that experience-based representations are always less flexible than model-based ones (e.g., Berry & Dienes, 1997). One might argue that this particular result is not surprising, in that the model-based knowledge we provided participants was highly specific to a particular goal state. But this is exactly the point. We do not claim that experience-based knowledge will always be more flexible than model-based knowledge, or that model-based knowledge will not transfer (see, e.g., Kieras & Bovair, 1984). Rather, we argue that both types of knowledge can show flexibility or inflexibility depending on the relationship between learning and testing conditions (see also Willingham, 1997; Kolers & Roediger, 1984). In most studies using “implicit learning” paradigms (e.g., artificial grammar, dynamic control tasks), participants typically have relatively few training trials and the variability of exemplars within a category is typically low. Because of this, such training can lead to hyperspecific knowledge which shows low levels of transfer (Mathews, 1997). Our training procedures (see also Stanley, et al., 1989) included substantially more practice and our version of the dynamic control task begins each block of trials with a random current output value, forcing participants to experience all of the potential problem space. Given our results, we believe the flexibility of experientially acquired knowledge is dependent on the range of variability inherent in training, and more broadly, the match between training and performance conditions (Mathews, 1997; Willingham, 1997).

The transfer test results also have interesting implications with respect to the deployment of model- and experience-based processes during learning. The Table condition presents a situation where participants could rely exclusively on model-based knowledge to perform the dynamic control task. After all, these participants were explicitly provided with all the

information they needed to do the task correctly. Even in this extreme case, they nevertheless appeared to have acquired experience-based knowledge during training. Specifically, when their ability to use model-based knowledge to perform the task was disrupted by having to maintain a new goal at test, performance in the Table condition returned to the level of Experiential participants. Further, on the New Goal test, performance in the Table condition was significantly higher than control participants who received the table without additional training. Thus, even in situations where we might expect to see heavy reliance on model-based knowledge, participants appear to be utilizing both model- and experience-based processes during training.

### *Theoretical Implications*

Our results have clear implications for the hypothesis that participants normally learn the dynamic control task by acquiring a lookup table (e.g., Broadbent, et al., 1986). Although our results are consistent with the notion of an implicit lookup table representation, they are not consistent with the idea that entries in this table are always highly specific representations of successful output-input pairs (e.g., Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Marescaux, et al., 1989). Rather, in line with Dienes & Fahey's (1995; 1998) speculation, the representations which are acquired during extensive practice with the dynamic control task do not appear to be as specific as those observed with less practice.

We believe two findings are particularly difficult to reconcile with theories that argue that participants rely on highly specific representations of previously successful outcomes (i.e., achieving the goal state) to make task responses (e.g., Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Marescaux, et al., 1989). First, we find transfer of learning to a new system goal. If Experiential participants were simply relying on specific table entries to guide performance, one would expect that performance would be poor when the system goal is changed because the table entries change. In contrast to

this prediction, performance in Experiment 2 was quite similar in the Experiential condition for both the Standard and New Goal tests, showing substantial transfer. Second, participants who had extensive practice with the task nevertheless showed poor knowledge of the appropriate inputs to make in a given situation. Performance of Experiential participants on the table test in Experiment 1 ( $M = 2663$  deviation units) was substantially poorer than their task performance on a test taken minutes beforehand ( $M = 1497$  deviation units). This finding stands in contrast to prior research (e.g., Dienes & Fahey, 1995) which found good memory for previously successful outcomes compared to situations where they had not experienced success during a short training period. Further, if one assumes that participants rely on specific lookup table entries, then one should see a very strong correlation between performance on the “table” test and task performance. We computed this correlation for Experiential participants in Experiment 1 and obtained  $r(28) = .44$  ( $p < .05$ ). The  $r^2$  of .20 indicates that output-input knowledge can only account for a small proportion of the variance associated with task performance. Here we must emphasize that the nature of our procedure provides extensive experience with system states relative to most previous work (e.g., 80 trials, Experiment 1, Dienes & Fahey, 1995). In our procedure, participants not only practice for many trials (e.g., in the Experiential condition of Experiment 1,  $M = 3410$  trials), but in each block (i.e., every 10 trials) they receive a new random starting output (1000-12000 degrees). In the majority of prior research (e.g., Broadbent & Berry, 1984), participants begin from the same starting point on each block (for an exception, see McGeorge & Burton, 1989). Thus, an average Experiential participant in our Experiment 1 would have seen each potential output state on their first trial a minimum of 28 times during practice (341 blocks/12 potential states) and likely many more times during the remaining 9 trials they encountered in each block. Further, these participants had experienced success in achieving

the goal from most or all the output states before taking the table test<sup>5</sup>. Under these conditions, these theories would predict very good memory for specific output-input situations. The fact we did not obtain this result would seem to require at least a consideration of alternatives.

One alternative view suggests that participants do not need to store instances (e.g., output-input situations) in memory to learn the dynamic control task, but instead use successful outcomes to “tune” a small set of strategies over time (Fum & Stocco, 2003a, 2003b). This theory of the dynamic control task utilizes the procedural sub-system of ACT-R<sup>6</sup> (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). Specifically, participants start with a small group of general strategies (e.g., *Pivot around target*, *Stay-on-hit*) that are represented as productions. As training proceeds, the more often a strategy leads to success (i.e., achieving the goal state), the greater the increase in a parameter corresponding to its expected utility. “Good” strategies are used with increasing frequency and “poor” strategies are used with decreasing frequency. Strategies are chosen according to updated expected utilities in a stochastic rule. Strategies are thus tuned to the task goal (e.g., 6000 degrees), but are not tuned differently for different output states. Although such an approach can account for the observed transfer performance of Experiential participants in Exp. 2 (because the expected utility of the strategies is similar for the old and new goal), we believe it has more difficulty accounting for several other findings. First, it appears that providing information about correct inputs for output states has a big impact on learning the task. Participants who received a task hint in Exp. 1 improved performance relative to Experiential participants, even for states not covered by the hint. Thus, this result appears inconsistent with their argument that instances do not play a significant role in learning the dynamic control task (Fum & Stocco, 2003b, p. 431). Second, Table participants in Experiment 2 would seem to have little need to use the strategies hypothesized by Fum & Stocco given they could recall the

optimal response to make in a given situation, yet they too acquired experiential knowledge at levels similar to Experiential participants as evidenced by their transfer test performance. In other words, there should have been little tuning of the strategies and performance would be expected to be extremely poor when Table participants could not rely on the model-based knowledge. Although our study was not designed to test this theory (and thus this remains a question for future research), we believe our results appear more consistent with the notion that participants do store instance-based information about their interaction with the system. We discuss this alternative below.

If participants do not acquire *specific* output-input information while learning the dynamic control task but they do encode information about previous interactions with the system, what type of knowledge do they acquire? Although they endorsed a relatively specific lookup table representation, Dienes & Fahey (1995) noted that the lookup table conception can be extended from highly specific instances at one end of a continuum to more abstract representations at the other. Further, they suggested that representations may become more general with increased learning; "...implicit learning itself may become less well-approximated by a lookup table as learning proceeds, and subjects may progressively extrapolate and interpolate to greater degrees around the situations trained on (p. 609, Dienes & Fahey, 1998)." This suggests that, early in learning, participants rely upon specific instances where they made the appropriate response, but as the amount of experience with the task increases this knowledge is represented in more abstract ways such as "when output is high, choose about 800 workers". Such a shift is also consistent with the "forgetting algorithm" proposed by Mathews (1991), which asserts that forgetting of distinguishing features of individual instances is adaptive as the commonality between instances (or "gist") is retained. This view can account for the previous

findings of good performance on “specific situation” tests at short intervals (e.g., Dienes & Fahey, 1998). Further, it suggests that as participants see more situations, interference increases and there is greater forgetting. This process allows commonality between similar situations to be detected and used by participants. After substantial training, these representations become more abstract and allow for greater flexibility of application (i.e., transfer). Thus, we suggest that participants who simply practice the task develop general, but contextually-relevant, representations of which actions should be performed in given output-input situations.

#### *Application to Real-World Learning*

Much research effort has been expended to identify “pure” tasks which isolate implicit or explicit learning processes (Mathews, 1997). Although there has been much theoretical progress in the field, we feel this emphasis has led researchers to overlook the important issue of how learning processes interact. This is a particularly important oversight as nearly every real-world task of any complexity (e.g., radiologist, fighter pilot, truck driver) relies upon both experience- and model-based knowledge for its performance. Our results join those of prior work in suggesting that the two types of processing can sometimes be fruitfully combined to facilitate learning (e.g., Sallas, et al., in press; Stanley, et al., 1989, but not always, Domangue, et al., 2004; Sun & Mathews, 2005).

To the extent the characteristics of our dynamic control task reflect real-world learning, our findings also have potentially broader implications. For example, our Hint+Quiz condition is similar to the situation where students are taught a subset of important facts about a task and then focus on important variables during subsequent practice (e.g., guided learning; e.g., Mayer, 2004). Such guidance appears to be quite beneficial relative to simply practicing the task without guidance (although we note that even our experiential practice is well-structured).

However, our results suggest that improvement in accuracy may sometimes be accompanied by slower responding. In fields where speed of execution is critical (e.g., air traffic control, emergency room medicine), this may be an important issue. Recent work from our laboratory in the artificial grammar paradigm suggests that slowing may often be a problem when model-based knowledge is given before training (Domangue, et al., 2004), but can be overcome in situations where model-based knowledge is provided during practice precisely when it is needed to perform the training task (Sallas, et al., in press). Our results also suggest the importance of structuring practice as a means of enhancing the flexibility of knowledge. One critical aspect of our practice procedure is that it involves extensive exposure to all the potential states of the system (i.e., search space). Practice conditions that lack variability and which are not a good match to “test” conditions are likely to lead to knowledge that transfers poorly (Mathews, 1997; Willingham, 1997). Finally, some good news for educators and coaches is that learners who are provided with and use specific task information during learning can show great improvement and still acquire useful experiential knowledge that can generalize to new situations. These findings, and the new questions they suggest, support the claim that pursuing a greater understanding of the interaction between these processes has the potential to illuminate the mechanisms involved in the development of expertise.

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## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> We have adopted these terms (as opposed to other terms such as implicit/explicit; see Reber, 1993) for two major reasons. First, although experiential knowledge is largely nonconscious, people can and often do consciously access this information by observing the cues they are attending to while performing a task (see Frensch, et al., 2003, for a related but somewhat different approach). In other words, participants can become explicitly aware of knowledge that they nevertheless learned in an experiential manner (e.g., Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007). Second, although we argue that these two categories are psychologically meaningful, we also assume that both types of processes operate in nearly all tasks (e.g., Mathews, 1997; see also Reber, 1989; Seger, 1994; Willingham, Nissen & Bullemer, 1989; but see Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987), and thus the potential interaction of these processes should be considered.

<sup>2</sup> Quiz-Only participants were significantly slower to respond than Experiential participants. We assume that the quiz manipulation encourages model-based processing, such that participants may attempt to discover the appropriate inputs for the output states (i.e., engage in hypothesis testing). Thus, they too may attempt to retrieve the “correct” inputs for an output state that they learned during training.

<sup>3</sup> Experiment 2 used a version of the program that did not record response time (but was the same in all other respects). Thus, our only speed-related measure in this experiment is performance on the speeded test.

<sup>4</sup> Although not of primary interest, the data also allow us to ask whether learning the lookup table before taking the new goal test improves performance on the test relative to participants who simply took the test. When compared directly, performance in the Table Control condition was nominally, but not significantly more accurate on the new goal test than the No Training

condition ( $F(1, 53) = 3.4$ ,  $MSE = 460891$ ,  $p < .07$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .06$ ).

<sup>5</sup>We examined the number of times that Experiential condition participants in Experiment 1 successfully achieved the goal from each of the 12 output states during Test 3 (which occurred just prior to the table test). According to Dienes & Fahey's (1995) theory, if participants had been successful at least one time for a given output state, they should be able to store this information and later produce it on the table test. Our analysis revealed that, on average, participants achieved the goal at least once for 10.56 of the 12 output states. Note that this calculation does not include the practice trials completed earlier in that session or practice and tests from the previous two sessions. Thus, we feel safe concluding that, according to Dienes & Fahey, participants should have done much better on the table test if they were storing specific output-input representations whenever they successfully reached the goal state.

<sup>6</sup>Note that the argument that follows only applies to Fum & Stocco's strategy-based view, not ACT-R. ACT-R could accommodate our results, for instance, by encoding general lookup table representations (e.g., "when output is high, choose about 800 workers") into production rules.

## Figure Caption

*Figure 1.* Test performance in Experiment 1 by training condition. The dependent measure is the absolute deviation from target, and lower scores indicate greater accuracy. Error bars are in standard error units.

*Figure 2.* Test performance in Experiment 2 by training condition and type of test. The dependent measure is the absolute deviation from target, and lower scores indicate greater accuracy. Error bars are in standard error units. Session 1 refers to the standard test (same goal as during training) administered during the first session, Session 2 refers to the standard test administered during the second session, Speed refers to the speeded test given during the second session which utilized the same target goal as the standard test, and New Target refers to the transfer test during the second session which had a different target goal. Besides the Experiential and Table conditions, we had control participants who did not practice the task before taking the standard test (No-Training ST), participants who did not practice the task before taking the new goal test (No-Training NT) and participants who memorized the table of correct inputs for the standard test before taking the new goal test (Table Control NT).



