Ph.D.: Ohio State University, 1999
Jon Cogburn received his Ph.D. from The Ohio State University in 1999 and joined the philosophy faculty at LSU in the same year.
Areas of Interest
Dr. Cogburn teaches primarily in the areas of philosophy of mind, language, and logic. Research interests include realism/anti-realism debates, modality, the computational theory of mind, semantics for vagueness, dialethism, tacit knowledge, and issues at the intersection of the sociology of science and cognitive science.
- PHIL 2023 Philosophy of Art
- PHIL 4914 Philosophy of Language
- PHIL 4941 Philosophy of Mind
- PHIL 4952 Metaphysics
- J. Cogburn and M. Silcox. Philosophy of Video Games. Routledge, 2009.
- J. Cogburn and M. Silcox, eds. Dungeons and Dragons and Philosophy. Open Court, under contract.
- With Jeff Roland. “Strong, Therefore Sensitive: Misgivings about a Proposed Marriage between Contextualist and Anti-Luck Epistemologies.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, forthcoming.
- With Jeff Roland. “Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, forthcoming.
- With M. Silcox. “The Emergence of Emergence: Computability and Ontology.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48.1 (2011): 63-74.
- With J. Megill. “Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Philosophy of Mind.” Minds and Machines 20.3 (2010): 423-40.
- With M. Silcox. “Computability Theory and Literary Competence.” The British Journal of Aesthetics 46.5 (2006): 369-86.
- “The Logic of Logical Revision: Formalizing Dummett’s Argument.” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83.1 (2005): 15-32.
- With J. Megill. “Easy's Getting Harder all the Time: Human Emotions and the Frame Problem.” Ratio 17.3 (2005): 306-16.
- With M. Silcox, “Computing Machinery and Emergence.” Minds and Machines 15.1 (2005): 73-89.
- With R. Cook. “Inverted Space: Minimal Verificationism, Propositional Attitudes, and Compositionality.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 32 (2005): 73-92.
- “Inferentialism and Tacit Knowledge.” Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2005): 503-24.
- “Tonking a Theory of Content: An Inferentialist Rejoinder.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 13 (2005): 31-36.
- “Paradox Lost.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34.2 (2004): 195-216.
- “Manifest Invalidity: Neil Tennant's New Argument for Intuitionism.” Synthese 134.3 (2003): 353-62.
- “Logical Revision Re-revisited: The Wright/Salerno Argument for Intuitionism.” Philosophical Studies 60.1 (2002): 5-12.
- “Deconstructing Dummett’s Anti-Realism: A New Argument Against Church’s Thesis.” The Logica Yearbook (2002): 57-68.
- With R. Cook. “What Negation is Not: Intuitionism and '0=1'.” Analysis 60.1 (2000): 5-12.
Chapters in edited volumes
- With N. Hebert. “Role Playing Magic and Paradoxes of the Inexpressible.” In Dungeons and Dragons and Philosophy. Edited by J. Cogburn and M. Silcox. Open Court, forthcoming.
- “Alignment in the 4.5th Edition Dungeons and Dragons.” In Dungeons and Dragons and Philosophy. Edited by J. Cogburn and M. Silcox. Open Court, forthcoming.
- “Moore’s Paradox as an Argument Against Anti-Realism.” In The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science). Edited by Shahid Rahman, Giuseppe Primiero, and Mathieu Marion. Springer, 2011.
- With M. Silcox. “Azeroth versus the Experience Machine.” In World of Warcraft and Philosophy: Wrath of the Philosopher King. Open Court, 2009.
- “The Philosophical Basis of What? The Anti-Realist Case For Dialethism.” Pages 217-34 in The Law of Non-Contradiction. Edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Oxford University Press, 2004.
Reviews and critical notices
- “The Last Positivist: Critical Notice of Robert Brandom's Reason in Philosophy.” In The Journal of Value Inquiry, forthcoming.
- “Critical Notice of Robert Brandom's Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism.” In Philosophical Books 51.3 (2010): 160-74.
- With R. Cook. Review of Piergiorgio Odifreddi (ed.), Kreiseliana: About and Around Georg Kreisel, (A.K. Peters Ltd. Stanford ).” In Studia Logica 63 (1999).