

Balancing Act? Anti-Americanism and Support for a
Common European Foreign and Security Policy *

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Abstract

Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon that has received increasing attention in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and more recently with the invasion of Iraq. However, despite its wide use, anti-Americanism is used often as a polemic term, and then often inconsistently. We attempt to provide a clearer and more consistent definition of anti-Americanism. Then, using newly released Eurobarometer data from the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003, we observe the prevalence of anti-American attitudes among the peoples of Europe, and what leads to these attitudes. We find that ideology, nationalism, attachment to a supranational Europe, the security concerns of Europeans, and U.S. behavior on the international stage are all strong predictors of anti-American attitudes. We then draw inferences about the effects of anti-Americanism. We find that anti-Americanism leads to an erosion of support for NATO and increased support for a defense arrangement led by the European Union, with no noticeable effect for support of defense led by national governments. Furthermore, anti-Americanism is increasing in Europe, which implies this trend of decreasing popular support for NATO and increasing support for an EU-led defense will continue.

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Introduction

Speculation and commentary about Anti-Americanism abroad has increased dramatically since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. The rapid evolution of events since then has highlighted a number of different sources and motives of anti-American attitudes. In the initial response to the attacks, there was a natural focus on Islamic extremists, as reflected by President George Bush's rhetorical question "Why do they hate us?" (Joint session of Congress, Sept 21, 2001). In turn, some commentators began to suggest that this hatred may find roots in American foreign policy. Some proponents of this view soon found themselves labeled "Anti-American," particularly those who stood aloof from the general outpouring of international sympathy for the United States. As the "War on Terror" mutated from an assault on Al-Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan in late 2001 to an invasion of Iraq in 2003, international condemnation of the United States experienced a resurgence which would have been difficult to imagine in late 2001.

This paper will discuss the problematic nature of the concept of "anti-Americanism" and examine empirical evidence about anti-American attitudes in the European Union before and after the invasion of Iraq. Using survey data from 2002 and 2003, we investigate the degree to which negative evaluations about the United States reinforce each other. We will assess the impact of American foreign policy towards Iraq on the attitudes of Europeans. Then we will examine the consequences of rising Anti-Americanism for public opinion about NATO and EU security and defense cooperation.

Anti-Americanism

The concept "anti-Americanism" is a particularly problematic one, with inherent ambiguity compounded by frequent use of the term as a polemical tool. As a previous scholar noted, "anti-Americanism... proves difficult to define once you start peeling back the layers of meaning" (Crockatt, 2003: 43). The task would be difficult enough if the term used was simply "anti-America" meaning opposition to that exceedingly complex and contested concept which is "America." The suffix "ism," associated with ideologies

or prejudices such as fascism, liberalism, or racism, suggests that we are dealing with attitudes that are somehow systematic, structured, or irrational.

Some discussions of anti-Americanism begin with a brief excursion into “Americanism” before turning to its presumed opposite. Crockatt identifies Americanism with the nationalist thought of Theodore Roosevelt (2003, 49) and finds elements of a distinctively American nationalism in such phenomena as the nativist movement and the McCarthy era persecution of “un-American” activities. Phillippe Roger considers the meaning of Americanism, a term he also traces back to Theodore Roosevelt, before concluding that the multiplicity of subsequent usages has removed much of the meaning from this term. In his analysis of French anti-Americanism, Roger concludes that in France, “Americanism” is nothing more than the set of negative clichés about America which are criticized by anti-Americans (2002, 15). Roger argues further that some varieties of French “anti-Americanism” offer a critique of a modern consumerist lifestyle which is only coincidentally related to the United States. Crockatt likewise sees anti-Americanism as more than a response to Americanism, and casts the net quite widely indeed, stating that “to some extent, anti-Americanism ... is a reaction to modernity rather than to America itself” (57). While the equation of America with modernity does seem to hold in the minds of some critics, this type of anti-Americanism should be fairly independent of the policies of the United States government, and is not quite the mindset which we are trying to examine.

In Hollander’s work on anti-Americanism, the focus returns to criticism of the United States. Hollander draws a parallel between racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Americanism which he describes as “an unfocused and largely irrational, often visceral, aversion towards the United States, its government, domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people” (Hollander 1992: 334-335). Of course, one must be careful to document the “visceral” and irrational motivation behind any specific critique of the United States, lest all criticism be swept into the net. Indeed, Hollander includes very general criticisms of U.S. policy or social structure as being indicative of anti-Americanism, and seems to find this “visceral” dislike of the United States to be almost omnipresent. Hollander’s list of “anti-American” culprits ranges from

Noam Chomsky, to Kurt Vonnegut, to Walter Cronkite, to Miss America 1988.¹ While others have productively applied Hollander's definition of anti-Americanism (e.g. Smith and Wertman 1992a), his own text veers well into a polemical use of the term to undercut any criticism of America by impugning the motivations of the critic. The tendency of Hollander to identify as anti-American many of the positions taken by the radical left, while almost ignoring condemnations of American society by the radical right highlights the risk of asserting an untested "visceral" motivation as the litmus test for anti-Americanism. This polemical use of the "anti-American" label knows no bounds-literally. Foreign critics of the US now find the charge of "knee-jerk anti-Americanism" wielded by their own countrymen (Kilfoyle, 2003).

Taking a somewhat more careful approach to the "visceral" nature of anti-Americanism, Haseler introduces his discussion of the topic by excluding criticism of specific American policies or administrations from his definition (Haseler 1985). Instead, Haseler insists on emotional and ideological components of anti-Americanism, which for him involve opposition "to the cultural and political values of the United States" which is "often the product of rage based on *resentment and envy*" (Haseler 1985, p.6, emphasis in original). Haseler goes on to argue that this irrational anti-Americanism will persist despite changes in American policies or administrations.

Since we wish to examine changes in attitudes towards America in response to American policy, Haseler's definition is as problematic as the conflation of America and modernity dismissed earlier. Indeed, one difficulty inherent in using most of the literature on anti-Americanism is that most authors depict anti-Americanism as a sort of primary affect laden attitude which can be invoked in order to explain a range of opinions and behaviors which would otherwise be inexplicable (at least to an observer who disagrees with the opinions and behaviors.) Robert Kagan, for example, dismissed European criticism of American policy by arguing that the people of Europe are largely anti-American, the result of irrational sentiments and covert anti-Semitism (2003).

If negative evaluations of American influence or American policy are systematic and structured, it is indicative of latent anti-Americanism, with or without visceral

¹ The statement by miss America 1988 which Hollander characterizes as "visceral" anti-Americanism was "Society has lost its bearings" (Hollander 1992: 3.)

opposition to “the idea” of America. We interpret anti-Americanism more as an ideology or system of thought than as an irrational prejudice. This is not to say that emotive dislike for all things American is not anti-Americanism, only to highlight that we have in mind a rather different concept. While systematic opposition to U.S. policies and the role the U.S. plays in the world may not necessarily be tied to some sense of emotive aversion – indeed it may be completely removed from such sentiments – such systematic opposition merits the label anti-Americanism.²

What would induce a structure in attitudes about America? For our purposes, we wish to consider the possibility that anti-Americanism could be a product of opinions about the United States, and not just a cause of these opinions. Simply put, perhaps anti-Americanism is not a “visceral” attitude which lies within an individual awaiting measurement by the appropriate survey question. It is perhaps a bit presumptuous to assume that Europeans carry about in their heads a running evaluation of the United States. Instead, attitudes among the mass public about America may be constructed by survey respondents on the spot, in response to the external stimuli of a survey interview. John Zaller and Stanley Feldman have argued that survey respondents “carry around in their heads a mix of only partially consistent ideas and considerations. When questioned, they call to mind a sample of these ideas including an oversample of ideas made salient by the questionnaire and other recent events” (Zaller and Feldman 1992: 579-580.) In answering a series of questions about the United States, respondents are not only revealing their anti-Americanism, they are constructing it as they go along. In 2003, some of the most salient considerations, both due to the questionnaire and to current events, would have involved US policy in Iraq.

If survey respondents do construct an ad hoc summary evaluation of the U.S. in response to the stimulus of a questionnaire on the topic, their evaluation of the U.S. will in turn be used to generate further evaluations of American policy. There is no guarantee that individuals will hold consistent attitudes, particularly about as complex a topic as the United States. As Crockatt notes, “expressions of anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism can exist in the same culture, indeed in the same individual” (2003, p. 57).

² It is important to point out that in arguing this we are not making normative judgments about the nature of anti-Americanism, and whether or not it is justified. Unlike Hollander (1992) and Haseler (1985), we do not offer anti-Americanism as a pejorative term.

However, balance theory (Heider 1958) suggests that survey respondents will be under some cognitive pressure to give a consistent set of responses. This may be particularly strong for evaluations on less salient dimensions of American policy, which will be colored by the respondent's newly formed summary judgment about America based on the more salient aspects of U.S. policy. We would expect that dramatic American actions in one area can then alter overall evaluations of the United States, and alter evaluations of American policy in other domains.

The result would be a structured set of pro or anti American attitudes which responded to current events rather than reflecting a steady "visceral" disaffection. We define anti-Americanism as *a propensity to believe that the United States plays a negative role in the world across a range of issues*. As a propensity, anti-Americanism is not dichotomous in nature, which is to say that some people can exhibit more anti-Americanism than others. While an emotional or irrational element may be present, we will not define anti-Americanism by their presence, allowing for anti-Americanism to result from normal cognitive processes rather than emotional prejudice.

The prevalence of anti-American attitudes in Europe

The study of European attitudes and policy and towards the U.S. has seen several changes over the past few decades. During the Cold War, the focus was on security issues and geopolitics. As Hollander (1992) and Smith and Wertman (1992b) point out, there was much disagreement over the deployment of the United States' nuclear weapons on the continent. Preceding that, there was some concern over German chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, or more relaxed relations toward the Soviet Bloc. The main focus of anti-Americanism regarded communist ideology and perceived sympathy for Moscow. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the focus of the attitudes and policies of Europeans would go to economic matters.

Using survey data from the 1980s and early 1990s, Smith and Wertman (1992a, 1992b) demonstrate that anti-Americanism, defined as a more or less emotional dislike of all things fundamentally American, is weak in Europe. While popular criticism of or disagreement with certain U.S. policies such as the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe and the advent of SDI (the strategic defense initiative) are well known, they

coexisted with what were generally positive attitudes about United States, its people, and its policies. Looking forward, the authors argue that the most important events shaping public opinion about the United States would be primarily economic in nature. While sensible in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, this analysis seems dated to a reader during the War on Terror. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 once again changed the focus of the attitudes and policies of Europeans, this time back to security matters.

Writing in 2003, Crockatt (2003) echoes Smith and Wertman insisting that the people of Europe may express opposition to specific policies of the United States and its role in the world, but this should not be confused necessarily with a rejection of the very notion of America and what it stands for. However, now the crucial topic is security, not economics. Crockatt argues that the events of September 11, “while generating broad sympathy and solidarity with the victims of the terrorist attacks, also polarized opinion about the United States” (60). While many Europeans expressed sympathy for and identification with the American people, others, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of France’s far right National Front party, expressed that the U.S. essentially got what it deserved, a sentiment echoed by many on the left in Europe as well.

The invasion of Iraq has created further rifts about the role of the United States around the world. This is most apparent in the split among the leaders of Europe, with prime ministers Berlusconi (Italy), Aznar (Spain) and Blair (U.K.) supporting the U.S.-led invasion, while President Chirac (France) and Chancellor Schroeder (Germany) strongly opposed it. Clearly the Iraq issue has split the leaders of Europe, but popular opinion regarding Iraq has been less divided, in October 2003, 68% of Europeans thought that the intervention in Iraq was “not justified” (European Commission 2003a). Did anti-Americanism increase after the invasion of Iraq? And if so, what are its effects? In this paper we hope to offer answers to these questions. First, however, we must observe the nature of anti-Americanism, and attempt to measure it.

Measuring anti-Americanism

In our conceptualization, it is not a single opinion in isolation which is anti-Americanism, but rather a set of related negative evaluations. It is not anti-American to

criticize any single aspect of the United States. It is when that negative evaluation induces negative evaluations of other aspects of the United States that we see a structured set of criticisms which we label anti-Americanism. Accordingly, we measure this concept using multiple indicators. In the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003 the Eurobarometer survey included a battery of questions about the role of the United States. Respondents were asked “In your opinion, would you say that the United States plays a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive or negative role regarding...”. Respondents were then given a list of five items: 1) peace in the world, 2) the fight against terrorism, 3) growth of the world economy, 4) the fight against poverty in the world, and 5) protection of the environment. These five evaluations of the U.S. role serve as the basis for our measure of anti-Americanism.³

Table 1 presents the mean evaluations of the U.S. on each of these dimensions for a representative sample of residents of the EU. Since positive scores on these variables reflect more anti-American attitudes, it is apparent that Europeans have a generally negative view of the role of the U.S., with a mean score above 0 for three of the five dimensions in 2002, and four of five in 2003. Only in fighting terrorism is the role of the U.S. viewed positively in both time periods, while the most negative evaluations are for the U.S. role in protecting the environment.

In order to demonstrate the degree to which these attitudes are structured, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis for both time points. These results are reported in table 2. Clearly there is a strong common element to these responses, a single unmeasured factor, which we interpret to be a systematic component to anti-American attitudes regarding the role of the U.S. in the world. This is represented not only by the consistency of the factor loadings, but also the high degree of consistency across all fifteen countries.⁴ Interestingly, the structure of these evaluations as revealed in the factor loadings, is remarkably stable. In both time periods, the evaluation of the role of the US with respect to world poverty has the highest loading. Negative evaluations of the role of the US with respect to peace in the world have a very stable relationship to

³ Consistent with the theme of anti-Americanism, negative responses are coded as 1, positive responses coded as -1, and all others are coded 0.

⁴ Running the factor analyses by country, the lowest factor loading observed for either time point was .564. Most loadings were higher than .7.

underlying anti-americanism, with only a very small increase in the factor loading. Since evaluations of the US share such a large proportion of their overall variance, it would not be surprising if shifts on one evaluative dimension prompt changes on other dimensions as well.

Did anti-Americanism increase after the invasion of Iraq? A glance back at Table 1 indicates that negative evaluations of the US increased on all five of the dimensions. This increase was smallest on those dimensions least directly related to Iraq, but even for “fighting poverty” the evaluations of the US became more negative. Increasing negative opinions about the American role on “world peace” clearly influence evaluations on other dimensions as well. Using factor scores extracted from the analysis of the merged datasets, we can compare the mean level of anti-Americanism in the two years. Table three shows a T-test comparing the mean anti-Americanism scores of respondents for both years⁵. Clearly anti-American sentiment was higher leading up to and right after the Iraq invasion than it had been three to four months earlier. This is very suggestive as to the effects of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

Other Factors leading to anti-Americanism.

Many factors apart from the Iraq conflict may lead to anti-American attitudes. Using multiple regression analysis, we can control for some of these other influences, and better isolate the independent impact of the war in Iraq. One obvious variable is ideology. Much of the literature on anti-Americanism suggests that those on the far left and far right tend to have more anti-American attitudes. We believe, however, that those on the left will be much more likely to oppose U.S. policies, demonstrating more anti-Americanism than those on the right, or even moderates. This is because we believe those on the right are much less likely to be sympathetic to causes that the United States is seen by many to allegedly violate: protecting the environment, respecting the sovereignty of other nations, ending poverty, etc. Furthermore, we believe those on the right are much

⁵ The factor scores used throughout the paper were generated using a pooled analysis of respondents from both years. The stability of the factor loadings over time argues in favor of this approach. If the data had not been pooled for this analysis, then scores could not be meaningfully compared across years, as factor analysis automatically generates factor scores with a mean of zero.

more likely to be sympathetic to causes the U.S. is seen more to champion: fighting terrorists no matter where they reside, and protecting the interests of markets and capital.

We believe that the fears of Europeans will also play a role in anti-Americanism. Given the American led “War on Terror” we expect fear of terrorism to be negatively associated with anti-Americanism. The justification for the invasion of Iraq was the perceived threat of Iraqi chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One could therefore expect fear of WMD to be negatively associated with anti-Americanism if WMD are seen in light of the struggle against terrorism. We expect right wing Europeans to be more receptive to the Bush administration’s arguments about the spread of these supposed weapons to terrorist groups who would use them in highly populated areas. Conversely, other, less fervently anti-communist Europeans have historically associated the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with the Americans, who were the first nation to use an atomic weapon, and with the deployment of American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe during the 1980s (Hollander 1992). Given this, and European skepticism about the Bush administration’s claims regarding Iraqi WMD, we anticipate that among moderate and left wing Europeans, fear of WMD will be associated with greater anti-Americanism.

Europe is also a continent that has been repeatedly ravaged by war. One could argue that fear of war would reduce anti-Americanism if America was seen as providing an effective defense against threats. However, it is worth noting that the mutual defense clause in NATO has only ever been invoked in response to an attack on America, not on her European allies. The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, and the actions and rhetoric leading up to the invasion of Iraq (e.g. the “Axis of Evil” speech), may lead many Europeans to fear that alliance with America is more likely to drag them into a global conflict rather than to protect them from one. Therefore, we believe that fear of another world war will be positively associated with anti-Americanism.

Haseler (1985) suggests that nationalism is an important factor in anti-American attitudes, and that those exhibiting nationalistic feelings are more prone to exhibit anti-Americanism. Given the deep divisions among European governments over American policy, the effect of nationalism may be more complicated. The relationship may be straightforward in countries whose governments were vocal opponents of

American policy. However, we believe that nationalism may lead individuals to be less anti-American in those countries where the government supported U.S. policy. We therefore think that the relationship between nationalism and anti-Americanism will depend on the likelihood of a respondent's country to support U.S. policy, which we will measure as whether or not they supported U.S.-led action against Iraq.

Besides national attachments, there is also the possibility of a sense of loyalty or attachment to Europe. To the extent that Europe is seen as an alternative to the Atlantic alliance, attachment to Europe may be associated with anti-Americanism. While the EU did not formally take a position regarding American policy, in late January of 2003 the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution opposing the invasion, asserting that such a preemptive strike would violate international law. While we expect attachment to Europe to be positively associated with anti-Americanism, we expect this relationship to be particularly strong for respondents on the left.

Finally, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq should have effects independent of other variables. We have already demonstrated on table three a bivariate relationship between anti-Americanism and points in time before and after the invasion began. We expect this relationship to hold up when controlling for the other factors discussed above. We will test these hypothetical relationships using information gathered from Eurobarometers numbers 58.1 and 59.1.

Predicting Anti-Americanism

We suggest that anti-Americanism should be associated with the political left, although there are some political figures on the far right who also can be relied on for incendiary anti-American comments. Before we model anti-Americanism as a linear function of ideology, it is worthwhile to check for a curvilinear relationship, in case the extremes are both relatively anti-American. Each Eurobarometer survey asks respondents to place themselves on a ten-point ideology scale, with 1 being far to the left and 10 being far to the right. Table 4 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression that demonstrates the effect on anti-Americanism of location at each point on this ideology scale. Each score is represented by a dichotomous variable, and the parameters indicate the mean difference between individuals located at that position, and

the reference set of individuals who did not report an ideology. The results are very consistent with a linear relationship. Those on the far left clearly demonstrate the highest anti-Americanism, and scores decrease fairly consistently as one moves to the right. The results are also remarkably stable between time periods, although the coefficients all increase noticeably, indicating a greater degree of anti-Americanism in 2003. Given these results, we will include ideology as a simple interval scale variable in subsequent analyses.

Table 5, presents the results of a full OLS model predicting anti-Americanism for Fall of 2002, Spring of 2003 and for both times periods combined. Overall, the model predicts anti-Americanism much better in 2003, with a 50% increase in explained variance. Anti-American attitudes are much more structured after the invasion of Iraq. As we expected, ideology continues to have a significant effect on anti-Americanism, with self-placement on the right being associated with less anti-Americanism. The standardized betas suggest that ideology has one of the strongest effects of any of the variables, with the highest beta in the Spring 2003 model and the pooled model, and is comparable to the variables with the strongest effects in the Fall 2002 model.

As we expected, fear of WMD appears to have a positive effect on anti-Americanism for survey respondents who are moderate or left wing. However, in contrast to our expectations, fear of WMD among those on the right does not differ appreciably from moderates and leftist. In fact, in two of the three models, fear of WMD among rightists nears significance in the opposite direction we expect, suggesting they may have a tendency to exhibit even anti-Americanism as fear of WMD increases.⁶ Despite the rhetoric of the Bush administration concerning the role of the United States in protecting the rest of the world from WMD, these results suggest that this rhetoric is either falling on deaf ears, or that U.S. policy is seen as counterproductive.

As we expected, fear of terrorism has a negative relationship with anti-Americanism. These results are consistent across analyses, with fear of terrorism actually having a slightly stronger role just before and during the invasion of Iraq. Given the generally favorable view of the U.S. war on terror (see Table 1) it is not surprising that

⁶ The effects for the Spring 2003 and the pooled models do reach standard levels of significance at the .05 level one tailed, in the opposite direction hypothesized. However, considering the sample sizes we will only consider significance at the .01 level or lower two tailed.

Europeans who fear terrorism are more positively disposed towards the U.S. This is a marked contrast to European attitudes about American policy and the proliferation of WMD.

Fear of another world war has an unexpected negative association with anti-Americanism in 2002, as respondents who feared a global conflict also had slightly more positive evaluations of the U.S. This small effect vanished in 2003, and instead, we find an insignificant positive effect. For decades, any hypothetical world war would have opposed the Communist East and non-communist West. In such a conflict, the Europeans would have welcomed American assistance. Since the end of the Cold War, it is not clear what a new “World War” would look like. Europeans may increasingly fear that their alliance with America is dragging them into a “clash of civilizations” which is broader than the war on terror, and which they would rather avoid. The invasion of Iraq, widely perceived by the people of Europe as a unilateral war of aggression, feeds into the fear that America is widening the conflict.

For 2002, the effects of nationalism largely follow our expectations. In nations which opposed an invasion, nationalism is associated with anti-Americanism in two of the three models, while in the countries which were part of the “coalition of the willing,” nationalism is associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism. As the military action began in the Spring of 2003, the effect of nationalism remained strong and negative for those countries supporting American intervention, with lower levels of anti-Americanism for nationalists in the UK, Spain, and other supporters of the U.S. The association between nationalism and anti-Americanism in those nations opposed to intervention disappears by 2003. Overall nationalism had much more of an effect while the debate over Iraq was ongoing, but once the debate was over the bombs started falling, the effects of nationalism were dulled in those supporting the U.S., and they dropped out in those not supporting the U.S.

Unexpectedly, attachment to Europe among those on the center and right side of the political spectrum is associated with less anti-Americanism, opposite of what we hypothesized. For these respondents, Europe does not seem to be seen as an alternative to the Atlantic partnership. The United States is a traditional ally of the countries of Western Europe and actively promoted the early efforts at European Unification. Given

this, it is certainly not odd that those more attached to supranational Europe who are political moderates or on the right would tend to demonstrate less anti-American sentiments. However, as we hypothesized, Europeans on the left who are strongly attached to supranational Europe are clearly more likely to demonstrate anti-Americanism. Clearly ideology plays a role in how those who identify with supranational Europe feel about the United States and its policies, and ideology probably colors their ideas about what a unified Europe should be.

Finally, consistent with the difference of means test above, the effect of the dichotomous variable indicating whether or not an observation is from spring of 2003, just before and during the invasion of Iraq, has the hypothesized effect. Respondents from 2003 demonstrated significantly more anti-Americanism than in the fall of 2002. The difference (.048) is very close to the simple difference of means reported in Table 3. The addition of a number of control variables does not alter the estimated relationship appreciably. Clearly, anti-Americanism increased between the Fall of 2002 and the Spring of 2003. This time period does, however, cover a number of dramatic developments including the unanimous Security Council approval of resolution 1441, the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq, the presentation and refutation of some American intelligence material, the discovery and destruction of banned al-Samoud missiles, and the American led invasion of Iraq over the objections of a number of Security Council members and the weapons inspectors themselves. It is not possible to specify which aspect of American conduct can account for the change in European attitudes. The timing of the fieldwork for Eurobarometer 59.1 allows us a rare opportunity to test the effect of the actual initiation of combat operations.

Interviewing for Eurobarometer 59.1 started March 18, 2003, three days before the U.S.-led coalition launched pre-dawn missiles attacks on what President Bush called “selected targets of military importance” (National Public Radio Online 2003). While the number of people interviewed before the attacks started is small (101), it does provide a sort of natural experiment for the impact of the beginning of hostilities.

Controlling for all relevant factors from table 5, as well as numerous demographic characteristics, we see that after the invasion anti-Americanism actually *decreases*.⁷ This suggests that it was not the act of invasion itself that led to the increase in anti-Americanism, but other factors. As table 6 demonstrates, that anti-Americanism went down after the invasion started suggests that it was not the spectacle of American military action itself which Europeans found objectionable. The increase in anti-American sentiment in the months preceding the war suggest that the political rhetoric and diplomatic wrangling which preceded the war had provoked European public opinion to the point that there was little room for military operations to increase opposition any further. During these months, the United States was widely perceived as willing to act unilaterally, demonstrating a willingness to take action with or without approval from the United Nations. Finally, many felt that the inspections were not given a chance to work properly, an opinion voiced not only by the leaders of governments opposing military action against Iraq, but also by UN weapons inspectors. Whatever the factors, they clearly lead to a sustained level of anti-Americanism, as demonstrated on tables 2 and 4. Time will tell if this trend of sustained anti-Americanism will continue, or is merely a function of ongoing military action.

Our analyses so far have allowed us to make several inferences as to what leads to anti-Americanism among Western Europeans. Just as interesting and perhaps more pertinent are the effects of this anti-Americanism, and specifically how it relates to opinion about security relations between the United States and the European Union.

Anti-Americanism and the future of European Defense Policy

Given the increase in anti-American sentiment in Europe, one may ask what the consequences of this shift in opinion might be. The European Union is currently in flux, with ongoing negotiations intended to reform the institutions and alter the policy competences and capabilities of the organization. One of the important areas under discussion is the strengthening of the capacity of the EU to make and implement a

⁷ A number of additional control variables were added in an attempt to ensure that any other systematic differences between the respondents surveyed before and after March 18 did not influence the results. This analysis was rerun comparing the effects of the invasion for only three days after the invasion, with no noticeable difference in the results.

common foreign and security policy. Might rising anti-Americanism be associated with an increase in support for an EU based alternative to NATO?

During the Cold War, the threat posed by the Soviet Union provided a powerful incentive for transatlantic cooperation. This has led to a mutual friendship between these western nations stretching across the Atlantic that has been readily visible not only in economic cooperation, but most noticeably (and perhaps most importantly) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For a long time this was not at odds with the European integration process, which from its beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty of Rome has been primarily economic in nature. Even with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Europeans have generally continued to support the NATO alliance.⁸ As mentioned earlier, the member nations of NATO voted unanimously to activate their mutual defense commitments under NATO in response to the attacks of September 11. However, the relationship between the United States and her traditional European allies has been troubled. During the 1990's, there were disagreements on the extent of NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia. The most recent rifts have involved NATO's role in the preparations for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

During the Cold War, attempts by European nations to form a common foreign policy independent of the United States bore little fruit. Activity surrounding institutions and agreements such as the Western European Union of the 1950's, or European Political Cooperation of the 1970's was minimal so long as security policy was subordinate to the overarching East-West conflict. Foreign policy coordination was institutionalized in 1992, when the Treaty at Maastricht created the European Union, and introduced procedures for the definition of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the CFSP does not replace national foreign policies, it would require countries to seek to coordinate their foreign policy positions, though as recent events show, this coordination has been difficult in practice. (See Rees 2000 and Wiessala 2000, for a more descriptive discussion regarding foreign policy coordination in Europe.)

⁸ Even in France, a nation with a reputation as a NATO skeptic, a majority of survey respondents in 2002 viewed NATO membership as "essential ." (German Marshall Fund and Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002: Fig. 5.2.)

This brings to the forefront one obvious problem in adoption of the CFSP: the lack of trans-Atlantic ties. The leaders of many EU countries, most notably the United Kingdom, are deeply committed to a defense arrangement which includes the U.S., and are hesitant to commit to an arrangement that could supercede any pact with them.

Still, the goal of a CFSP is popular among the majority of Europeans. According to a recent Eurobarometer survey, 67% of respondents support a common foreign policy stance, and 74% of respondents want a common defense and security policy, compared to 19% and 15% respectively that oppose such coordination (European Commission 2003b). Intriguingly, between the beginning of 2003 and mid March to late April, overall support for the goal of a common foreign policy stance increased by 4%, while opposition dropped 3%, and support for a common defense force saw an increase in support of 3% and a drop in opposition of 2%. Considering the general opposition to the invasion of Iraq among the people of Europe, one could easily wonder if support for the CFSP is in part a consequence of perceived aggression and caprice by Europe's longtime ally.

Does anti-Americanism affect the relative support for NATO or for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union? In the following section we seek to address this question empirically. In addition to anti-American attitudes, we expect support for the CFSP to be a function of a number of other factors.

Predicting Preferences for European Defense Policy

As noted above, the United States has been a central part of the defense policy of Western Europe since the end of World War II. For this reason we expect attitudes about the U.S. to affect one's preference for decision-making about defense policy.

Eurobarometers 58.1 and 59.1 each asked respondents "in your opinion, should decisions concerning European defense policy be taken by national governments, by NATO, or by the European Union?" This question forces respondents to choose between the EU, NATO, or national level responsibility for defense policy. We believe that anti-Americanism as we have measured it will be negatively associated with support for NATO. Those who demonstrate more anti-Americanism should support the trans-Atlantic alliance less than those demonstrating less anti-Americanism should. Also, we expect anti-Americanism to be positively associated with both support for a more European

defense and a national defense. This is because we expect those who are more anti-American to split between supporting national defense and supporting European defense.

We will control for a number of other relevant attitudinal variables. If security policy is designed to protect against perceived threats, then the fears of Europeans should be relevant. Our earlier results show that the measure of fear of another world war is no longer associated with positive evaluations of the United States. According to our interpretation of that result, Europeans who fear another global conflict may be more concerned that allies will drag them into the conflict rather than protect them from it. Europeans, after all, have good historical reasons for associating alliances with world wars. For this reason we expect fear of another world war to be negatively associated with support for both NATO and the CFSP. Instead, we expect fear of another world war to be positively related to the more isolationist option of support for a strictly national defense policy.

We do not expect a similar aversion toward alliances to apply to individuals who fear terrorism. The transnational nature of terrorist networks, and their propensity to strike targets in a wide variety of geographical locations makes isolationism an unrealistic option. We expect that Europeans who fear terrorism believe that some form of alliance with other countries who can share intelligence, extradite dangerous individuals, and cooperate in other ways is necessary. National level security policy will be far less effective. For these reasons we believe that fear of terrorism will be positively associated with support for both NATO and the CFSP, and negatively associated with support for strictly national defense policy.

We believe that fear of weapons of mass destruction will follow a similar logic. More allies means that an attack using WMD, whether from terrorists or an act of war from another state, is made less likely by having allies, who will both share information and stand together, hopefully preventing such attacks. Therefore, we believe that like fear of terrorism, fear of WMD will be positively associated with support for both NATO and the CFSP, and negatively associated with support for strictly national defense policy.

Table 7 shows us the results from these logistic regressions. Looking at the model predicting support for a NATO-led defense in Europe, anti-Americanism clearly has a negative affect on support for a NATO-led defense in Europe. The higher one scores on

anti-Americanism the less likely he or she is to believe NATO should make defense decisions regarding Europe. Ideology is also associated with support for NATO, with those on the right tending to favor a NATO-led European defense. As expected, fear of another world war was negatively associated with NATO support, with fear of terrorism being positively associated. Fear of weapons of mass destruction, on the other hand, while the coefficient in the hypothesized direction, is nowhere close to statistical significance. Nationalism and attachment to supranational Europe also seem to have no effect on support for NATO. Interestingly however, independent of the increase in anti-Americanism and the other specified variables, support for NATO is significantly smaller in 2003. Even among respondents who continue to evaluate America's role in the world positively, there has been a reduction in support for the Atlantic alliance.

Looking at the model predicting support for an EU-led defense, anti-Americanism again affects the defense policy preference of Europeans, with greater anti-Americanism associated with more support for EU-led defense. Ideology also has an effect, with those on the left preferring EU responsibility for European defense policy. Fear of another world war is negatively associated with support for EU-led defense, with fear of terrorism having a positive relationship, both as we expected. Fear of WMD, though not significant by the standards we have set, approaches significance in the hypothesized direction, and meets most traditional levels of statistical significance (.05 one tailed). Also, as we expected nationalism and attachment to supranational Europe are respectively negatively and positively associated with support for EU-led defense. Finally, independent of all other variables, support for an EU-led defense is greater in spring of 2003 than in fall of 2002.

The model predicting support for a defense arrangement in Europe led by national governments largely does not behave as we expected. The effects of anti-Americanism are positive as we expected but do not approach statistical significance. Also, though all coefficients are in the hypothesized direction, none of the fear variables are significant (though the negative relationship for fear of terrorism on national-led defense does approach significance). Both nationalism and attachment to supranational Europe behave as we expected, with nationalism positively related and "Europeanism" negatively related to support for national-led defense on the continent. Lastly, while the coefficient is

positive, support for a European defense led by national governments does not show to be significantly higher in spring of 2003 than it was in fall of 2002.

These results allow us to make some interesting conclusions. First, as we demonstrated earlier in table two, anti-Americanism is increasing among Europeans. Second, as we have just demonstrated, anti-Americanism has some interesting implications regarding public opinion about the nature of European defense. This increasing anti-Americanism is leading to an erosion of support for NATO and an increase in support for a defense policy led by the European Union. Interestingly, there is little evidence that anti-Americanism affects support for a defense on the continent led by individual nation-states. Furthermore, this increase in anti-Americanism, which leads to less support for NATO, is exacerbated by a decrease in support of NATO and an increase in support for an EU-led defense independent of other factors. Therefore, it appears Europeans who stop supporting NATO do not defect to support for a European defense led by the nations of Europe, but continue to support an alliance leading defense on the continent, only one without trans-Atlantic ties.

However, despite the hesitations and lack of coordination among the countries of Europe, the people of Europe largely support the CFSP. Hill and Hurley (1999) have demonstrated that in the United States, public opinion about foreign policy does not necessarily affect policy outcomes. However, Sobel (2001), who is also looking at the U.S., argues that public opinion about salient foreign policy issues places important constraints on foreign policy decisions. Applying this argument to Europe, if the leaders of the member countries of the EU are unwilling or unable to coordinate foreign policy into a common stance on security and foreign policy issues, it may ultimately be up to the people of Europe to pressure their democratic national governments to adopt the CFSP. If this is the case then it is important to understand the sources of support for the CFSP, as well as sources of support for NATO and the belief that defense should be an issue primarily left up to national governments. We believe the factors leading to support for each of these includes anti-Americanism. This ties in to research regarding support for the integration of Europe – the CFSP is, after all, a major step in that direction, with support for national governments or NATO being responsible for defense precludes strictly European integration regarding defense.

Another conclusion, which we draw more tentatively, involves conduct of the United States on the world stage and its perception among the people of Europe. The increase in anti-Americanism and support for an EU-led defense independent of other factors suggests that U.S. foreign policy is increasing both anti-American sentiments and, independent of that, a defection of support from NATO to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Conclusion

Three findings from this study stand out. The first regards sources of anti-Americanism in Europe. Ideology, nationalism, attachment to supranational Europe, and the security concerns of Europeans are all strong predictors of anti-American attitudes. The behavior of the U.S. on the international stage appears to be significant, though this study suggests that it might not be military action itself that Europeans object to, but rather the appearance of willingness to act unilaterally. The results of the natural experiment suggest that Europeans reacted to American policy preceding the invasion of Iraq rather than to the actual initiation of hostilities.

A second major finding of this study is the increase in anti-Americanism from the fall of 2002 to the spring of 2003. Whether or not this trend continues remains to be seen. However, the findings here suggest that this increase in anti-Americanism is a function of U.S. policy, or at least Europeans' perception of U.S. policy. We have demonstrated that anti-Americanism is responsive to U.S. policy. We can conclude that as anti-Americanism increases as a function of U.S. policy, which many see as unilateral in nature, Europeans will continue to grow more cold towards NATO, transferring their support for a defense alliance to a strictly European one.

Finally, there are important effects of anti-Americanism. As anti-Americanism increases, support for NATO decreases while support for a defense policy led by the European Union rises. This has some important implications for the future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, something that, as we have discussed earlier, already has widespread support from the people of Europe. Being democracies, the governments of the EU may face more domestic pressure to coordinate and "Europeanize" common defense and foreign policy outside of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

Most Europeans supported military action against Afghanistan (Rapporteur 2002), and it is illustrative that this was carried out by a coalition including many European countries, with France and Germany – whose governments strongly opposed invading Iraq – taking prominent military roles. What the people of Europe seem to oppose is willingness to act alone. Whether or not the trend of increasing anti-Americanism continues depends largely on whether future U.S. foreign policy takes on a more multilateral character.

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Table 1

Anti-American attitudes	Negative perceptions of the United States' role regarding				
	Peace in the world	Fighting terrorism	Growth of the world economy	Fighting poverty	Protecting the Environment
Fall of 2002 mean	.136	-.261	-.048	.292	.409
Spring of 2003 mean	.350	-.099	.029	.336	.456
Difference of means	.214	.162	.077	.044	.047
T score	22.7	16.7	8.2	5.2	5.8

Negative responses coded 1, positive responses coded -1, neither positive or negative and don't know coded 0.

Number of cases (weighted to reflect EU population) 16,140 for fall of 2002, 16,410 for spring of 2003

All differences significant at <.001 level two tailed

Table 2.

Factor analysis:

<i>Negative perceptions of:</i>	Fall 2002	Spring 2003	Combined
Peace in the world	.766	.777	.772
The fight against terrorism	.706	.738	.724
Growth of the world economy	.721	.744	.734
The fight against poverty in the world	.813	.833	.822
Protection of the environment	.750	.728	.739
<i>Eigen value:</i>	<i>2.827</i>	<i>2.926</i>	<i>2.881</i>
<i>variance explained:</i>	<i>56.5%</i>	<i>58.5%</i>	<i>57.6%</i>

No other factors loaded with an Eigen value over 1.0

Results reflect cases weighted to represent EU population

Table 3.

T Test.

	Number of cases ^a	Mean Anti-American score
Fall 2002	16,140	-.0853
Spring 2003	16,410	.0839
Difference of means:		.169

T score: 15.32

Significant at < .001 level two tailed

a – Cases weighted to represent EU population

Table 4.
OLS regression

Ideology score (1 = far left; 10 = far right)	Fall 2003			Spring 2003		
	Coefficient (T score)			<i>Standardized Beta</i>		
Ideology: 1	.463	(10.28)	.094*	.452	(10.03)	.090*
Ideology: 2	.335	(7.74)	.071*	.475	(11.78)	.107*
Ideology: 3	.267	(8.67)	.084*	.372	(12.5)	.120*
Ideology: 4	.145	(5.05)	.049*	.182	(6.4)	.062*
Ideology: 6	-.089	(-3.21)	-.032*	-.044	(-1.51)	-.015
Ideology: 7	-.121	(-3.88)	-.037*	-.124	(-4.11)	-.039*
Ideology: 8	-.149	(-4.18)	-.039*	-.129	(-3.82)	-.036*
Ideology: 9	-.319	(-5.31)	-.047*	-.231	(-4.01)	-.035*
Ideology: 10	-.36	(-6.07)	-.054*	-.302	(-5.27)	-.047*
Constant	-.089	(-5.48)*		.029	(1.85)	
Number of cases ^a			12,804			12,987
Adjusted R Squared			.033			.043

Dependent variable: anti-American factor extrapolation
Ideology scores of 5 act as the constant.

* Indicates significance at <.01 level two tailed.

a – Cases weighted to represent EU population

Those answering “don’t know” or refusals not included in the analysis.

Table 5.
OLS Regression

	<i>Fall 2002</i>			<i>Spring 2003</i>			<i>Both periods</i>		
<i>Variables:</i>	Coefficient (T score) <i>Standardized Beta</i>			Coefficient (T score) <i>Standardized Beta</i>			Coefficient (T score) <i>Standardized Beta</i>		
Ideology (1 left – 10 right)	-0.069	(-9.43)	-.121*	-.077	(-11.1)	-.138*	-.074	(14.64)	-.131*
Fear of WMD	.077	(3.87)	.035*	.059	(3.13)	.027*	.064	(4.62)	.029*
Fear of WMD among rightists	.018	(.47)	.004	.081	(2.27)	.021	.051	(1.92)	.013
Fear of Terrorism	-.132	(-5.97)	-.051*	-.141	(-7.08)	-.057*	-.133	(8.93)	-.052*
Fear of another World War	-.085	(-4.83)	-.042*	.024	(1.46)	.012	-.025	(2.06)	-.012
Nationalism in “Willing” countries	-.169	(-11.06)	-.125*	-.055	(-3.97)	-.044*	-.108	(10.51)	-.083*
Nationalism in non-“Willing” countries	.095	(4.63)	.161*	.027	(1.46)	.045	.058	(4.18)	.097*
Attachment to Europe	-.140	(-15.38)	-.127*	-.122	(-14.47)	-.115*	-.129	(20.81)	-.119*
Attachment to Europe among leftists	.039	(4.69)	.052*	.049	(6.12)	.066*	.044	(7.5)	.059*
Spring 2003 dummy							.149	(14.36)	.074*
Constant			1.08 (11.39)*			1.09 (12.5)*			1.0 (15.47)*
Number of cases ^a			16,140			16,410			32,550
Adjusted R squared			.101			.157			.13

Dependent variable: anti-American factor extrapolation

* Indicates significance at < .01 level two tailed.

a – Cases weighted to represent EU population

Coefficients for country dummies not shown

Table 6.
OLS regression

	Coefficient	(T score)	<i>Standardized</i> Beta
Post Attack dummy variable	-.077	(-3.24)	-.024*
Ideology	-.067	(-12.17)	-.121*
Fear of WMD	.066	(3.57)	.03*
Fear of terrorism	-.139	(-6.93)	-.056*
Fear of another world war	.023	(1.34)	.011
Nationalism in “willing” countries	-.052	(-3.71)	-.041*
Nationalism in non-“willing” countries	.028	(1.5)	.047
Attachment to Europe	-.126	(-14.92)	-.119*
Attachment to Europe among leftists	.056	(7.49)	.075*
Gender dummy (female)	.041	(2.72)	.02*
Married dummy	-.072	(-4.51)	-.036*
Employment in agriculture dummy	.131	(1.59)	.012
Employment as manual laborer dummy	-.065	(-2.81)	-.022*
Employment as a professional dummy	.023	(1.31)	.011
Age cohort	-.005	(-1.11)	-.009
Size of town	-.002	(-.2)	-.001
Income quartile	.018	(2.16)	.017
(Constant)	.939	(10.29)*	
Number of cases ^a			16,410
Adjusted R squared			.16

Dependent variable: anti-American factor extrapolation

* Indicates significance at < .01 level two tailed.

a – Cases weighted to represent EU population

Coefficients for country dummies not shown

Table 7.
Logistic regression.

<i>Variables:</i>	“In your opinion, should decisions concerning European Defense policy be taken by...”					
	NATO		The European Union		National Government	
	Logit coefficient (standard error)					
Anti-Americanism	-.115	(.016)*	.113	(.013)*	.018	(.015)
Ideology	.032	(.009)*	-.041	(.007)*	.023	(.008)*
Fear of another world war	-.129	(.035)*	-.169	(.028)*	.019	(.033)
Fear of WMD	.002	(-.115)	.077	(.031)	-.006	(.037)
Fear of terrorism	.185	(.043)*	.143	(.034)*	-.095	(.040)
Nationalism	.028	(.021)	-.286	(.017)*	.289	(.021)*
Attachment to Europe	-.009	(.018)	.478	(.015)*	-.293	(.016)*
Spring 2003 dummy	-.451	(.030)*	.243	(.024)*	.014	(.028)
Constant	-2.93	(.204)*	-.785	(.131)*	-.422	(.147)
Cox and Snell R Squared		.046		.128		.047
Number of cases ^a		32,550		32,550		32,550

* Indicates significance at < .01 level two tailed.

a – Cases weighted to represent EU population

Coefficients for country dummies not shown