

# **Institutional Power and Public Opinion about EU Institutions\***

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines individual level support for three of the most important institutions of the European Union- the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. We posit that support for these institutions is a function of the power of a person's nation within each of these bodies. We measure national power using the Bhanzaf power index, and test for the effects of a measure of absolute power, of potential power outside of the EU, and of proportional power (power per capita). Examining data from the 1980's and 2000's, we find that potential power outside of the EU and power per capita generally influence support for institutions as hypothesized in 2000 and 2002, but that the opposite results hold in 1988. We then examine the effects of support for these three institutions on opinion about possible reforms to the institutional structure and policy-making authority of the Union. Our results suggest that trust in specific institutions is related to differences in opinion over institutional reform, and that support for the European Parliament is particularly stable, and influential.

## **Introduction**

With another process of treaty revision underway, the institutional architecture of the European Union is again in question. Both the balance of powers among these institutions, and the relative influence of each member state within these institutions are subject to negotiation. This paper examines individual level support for three of the most important institutions of the European Union- the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. We look to the relative power of each member nation within these institutions for an explanation of variation in support for these bodies. We then examine the implications of support for these institutions for possible reforms to the institutional structure and policy-making authority of the Union.

The distribution of power within the institutions of the European Union is the result of ad hoc negotiations, and only roughly corresponds to differences in population. In this paper we argue that this disproportionality of representation has important implications for support of European integration. Those who are better represented by the European supranational political institutions are more likely to support the integration of Europe. However, representation is evaluated relative to a normative standard of one person one vote, rather than relative to the other members of the Union. In the next section of this paper we review the literature of support for European integration. Then we lay out our specific hypotheses. The fourth section goes over the results. The fifth section discusses the implications of these findings and concludes.

### **Review of the Literature:**

Support for the integration of Europe has been the focus of much research, with various research focusing on different sources of support. One tradition has emphasized the importance of political values on support for integration. Early work by Inglehart (1970, 1971) emphasized the importance of changing values of the peoples of Europe and how a “post acquisitive” shift has led them to be less nationalistic. Inglehart’s subsequent work has backed up this general assertion regarding the changing nature of nationalistic tendencies (Inglehart 1997).

Work focusing on economic aspects of support has been perhaps the most influential. Work by Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1987) demonstrates that personal economic standing plays a large role in support for European integration. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) come to a similar conclusion regarding objective economic conditions on both the national and international level. This research uses aggregate level data to demonstrate that good economic conditions lead to good political evaluations. Gabel (1998) has also focused on the importance of economic factors in driving support for the integration of Europe. Using Easton's (1965) model of general public support for governing institutions, he finds that personal utilitarian concerns outweigh affective attachments toward Europe. Contrary to the findings of Eichenberg and Dalton, Gabel finds this support is largely subjective – one's perceptions of utilitarian benefits are more important than objective economic conditions (see also Gabel and Whitten 1997). Subsequent work on economically based support for integration looking beyond the traditional scope of EU member countries to potential future EU countries has come to a similar conclusion (Tucker, Pacek and Berinski 2002, Christin and Trechsel 2002). Those supporting market integration and who perceive economic gains from integration are more likely to support joining the EU.

Notable research has pointed out the importance of political factors in driving support for the integration of Europe. As well as outlining the importance of economic factors, the work of Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1987) and Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) demonstrate the importance of national context in support for integration, with support being highest in the original countries affected by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. With regards to specific supranational institutions, in their study of the European Court of Justice Gibson and Caldeira (1995) find that satisfaction with a specific European political body can lead to support for the empowerment of that political body. More generally, Rohrschneider (2002) shows that feelings of being represented by the European Union leads to support for European democracy. Conversely, Carey (2002) demonstrates that strong feelings of attachment to one's national are associated with lower levels of support for overall integration within EU countries. In their study of Swiss public opinion

Christin and Trechsel (2002) also demonstrate that support for joining the EU within potential EU countries is negatively associated with affect toward national institutions and traditions. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) proposes that the support for current pace of integration is based on a combination of views about the quality of national political institutions and positive perceptions of supranational (EU) ones. He finds that corruption of national government and positive perceptions of EU supranational political bodies are associated with support for the perceived tempo of European integration. Clearly, both economic and political factors are important for political support, though which plays a more important role is subject to much discussion (see e.g. Lewis-Beck 1988, Norris 1999, Evans and Whitefield 1995, Mishler and Rose 1995, 1997 for arguments regarding national level institutions).

Most of the literature on European integration focusing on political sources of support has looked at subjective evaluations of performance. There has been little focus on how objective political factors affect support (with Sanchez-Cuenca [2000] being the obvious exception). And though the “democratic deficit” has been the focus of much attention among these scholars (e.g. Rohrschneider 2002, but also see Crombez 2003), as has the balance of power between national actors within Europe, there has been no discussion that we know of the “democratic imbalance” that exists in the EU’s political bodies. We refer to a representational anomaly within the supranational institutions of Europe. The make up of these bodies is roughly based on the population of each country – it is not perfectly so. In short, in an attempt to make for a more even playing field between the countries of Europe, countries with the lowest populations have the highest per capita representation. Table one demonstrates this disproportionality. This disproportionality is largely an artifact from the early days of European political integration, a process that started in the late 1950s.<sup>1</sup> This unintended consequence of attempting to give each country some clout in the supranational politics of Europe is the focus of this study. What are the effects of this disproportionality in representation on support for the integration of Europe?

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<sup>1</sup> See Pierson (1996), Moravcsik (1998), Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) and Hooghe and Marks (2001) for differing theoretical accounts of how this process came about.

## **Relative representation in the institutions of the European Union**

Much of the literature on public opinion and the European Union has focused on attitudes towards the EU as a single entity or towards the process of European integration in general. However, broad indicators of support for the EU in general are not particularly illuminating in the current debate over reform of the EU. It is perhaps more interesting to look at support for the individual institutions which comprise the Union, since much of the contemporary discussion of treaty revision is cast in terms of altering the balance of relative influence of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. We argue that individuals will support these institutions to the extent that their nation is relatively powerful or influential within the institution. While the notion that relative power is desirable may not be controversial, there are a number of different ways to conceive of and measure this notion of relative power. The three possibilities that will be tested in this paper are absolute power within the institutions of the EU, relative ability to pursue interests outside of the EU, and power within the EU relative to a normative “one person one vote” standard of representation proportional to population.

If representation within the Union followed the principle of equality among member states, then the analysis of national differences in absolute power would be impossible, as power would be constant across nations. Likewise, if representation was a direct function of population then all nations would fit a “one person one vote” standard equally well. In fact, none of the three institutions adhere strictly to either principle of representation. The departures from proportionality vary greatly across institutions, and are often extreme. Tables one and two present the representation of each EU member within the Commission, Council and EP for the two time periods covered in this paper. For example, Germany currently has a member of the European Parliament for about every 830,000 people. Luxembourg has one for about every 74,000 (see table two). Many European political elites have called for a common European identity, transcending the centrifugal forces of nationalism. Yet, despite this call for a more common identity among the peoples of Europe, it is apparent that, within the EU’s supranational political bodies, some Europeans are more European than others.

[Insert tables one and two about here]

Looking at tables one and two one can see the inequality that exists in representation. What are the effects of this disproportionality? Before examining the consequences of differences in representation, we must measure the actual power which results from a given level of representation. From this we will draw conclusions about future political alignments of the EU's institutions, which are currently in the process of being reformed.

### **Measuring Power in the EU**

Who benefits most from the existing EU institutions? Several scholars have measured the unequal power afforded to each country within the EU using power indices. Power indices to measure the likelihood an actor will be able to cast the decisive vote that makes or breaks various possible coalitions. Most popular among these is the Banzhaf power index which measures the probability of a given actor casting the deciding vote 1) assuming all coalitions are equally possible while allowing for 2) unequal voting power between the actors, and 3) various voting thresholds (e.g. supermajorities).<sup>2</sup> Previous research has computed the Banzhaf power score for EU members in both the European Parliament (EP) (Lane, Maeland and Berg 1995) and the Council of Ministers (Lane and Maeland 1995, Felsenthal and Machover 1995). Scores for the commission are calculated by the authors using the Banzhaf Power Calculator from Temple University.

Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) have brought the applicability of power indices into question as predictors of EU policy outcomes. They argue that such indices cannot take into account the complexity of politically relevant actors in the EU, and oversimplify the processes by which they make their decisions.<sup>3</sup> However, they do not address the use of power indices for other purposes. We use the Banzhaf power index to measure the power or influence of each nation within each of the three institutions studies here. The power

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<sup>2</sup> For a full description of the Banzhaf power index as applied to the EU see Lane and Maeland (2000).

<sup>3</sup> For a rebuttal of these criticisms see Lane and Berg (1999).

of any nation within the EU system as a whole is the result of the interaction of all of the EU institutions, and is not what we are attempting to measure.

Tables three and four show each nation's Banzhaf power scores for the three European political bodies (the EP, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission) for the time periods covered here. We also computed a measure of power per capita by dividing the power score of a nation by its population (in 1,000s). These measures of power relative to other nations (the raw scores) and relative to national population (per capita scores) are used to test the hypotheses which we present below.

[Insert tables three and four about here]

## **Hypotheses**

We argue that an individual's support for European integration will be contingent on his/her relative political power within the supranational political bodies of Europe. Those who are better represented in specific European bodies should demonstrate greater support for those bodies than those who are less represented. Our first hypothesis is a straightforward application of this intuition.

*Hypothesis one:* Support for an EU institution will be a direct function of the power of the respondent's nation within that institution. Thus support for the Council of Ministers will be a function of the power index (described above) for a respondent's nation in the Council. Support for the Commission will be a function of the power index as calculated based on the number of commissioners, and support for the European Parliament will be a function of national power in the EP as measured by each nation's power index for the EP.

Of course, relative power can be measured using other baselines as well. Nations may find that membership in the EU restricts their ability to pursue policies. If larger nations have greater scope for independent policy-making outside of the EU then there will be a negative relationship between national size and support for specific EU institutions. Since power within the institutions does correlate strongly with population,

This relationship could produce a negative effect of raw power on support (the inverse of hypothesis one).

*Hypothesis two:* Since larger nations can more realistically pursue national policies outside of the EU, support for the institutions of the EU will be a decreasing function of national population. We would expect that for each of the EU institutions, respondents from more populous nations will show lower levels of support than respondents from smaller nations.

Finally, power may be evaluated not in absolute terms, but in relation to a normative standard. People may be concerned with whether their state is represented “fairly.” If fairness is thought of in terms of power in proportion to population, then it is a measure of per capita power which should matter.

*Hypothesis three:* Those citizens whose nations have disproportionate power in a given European political body will be more likely to support that body. For each of the three institutions studied, support for that institution should be positively related to the per capita power of the respondent’s nation within that body.

## **Data and Methodology**

We are interested in predicting support for three specific institutions of the European Union: the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament. Three Eurobarometer surveys have asked a battery of questions regarding these institutions. Eurobarometer 29, conducted in March and April of 1988, asked respondents whether they felt that each of these institutions should play a “more important role”. Eurobarometers 54 and 57.1 repeat that battery of questions, but change the wording to ask respondents whether they “tend to trust” each of these institutions. While there are differences between trusting an institution and wanting its empowerment, we argue that these questions are both tapping into an underlying notion of support for the institution in question. These survey questions provide our dependent variable of support for the three specific institutions we investigate.

As the dependent variables are dichotomous, we will use logistic regression to test for the relationship between relative power and support for each of these institutions. For each dependent variable, the regression is estimated three times, once testing the effect of the raw power scores, once testing the effect of population, and once testing the effect of per capita power. The results are reported separately for each of the three years for which we have data (1988, 2000, and 2002.)

A number of control variables are included in the regression models to capture the effects of factors which have been shown by previous work to influence support for European integration. We also control for specific, or utilitarian support for the EU by including controls for perceived personal and national benefits from EU membership. Since Luxembourg is an outlier on each measure of relative power (see tables three and four), it is possible that any results are driven by this outlier. Therefore, each analysis will be run both with and without respondents from Luxembourg.<sup>4</sup>

## **Results:**

Our tests of the first hypothesis produces a very mixed set of results for the effect of a nation's power within a European institution on support for that institution. As indicated in Table 5, for 1988 we find a significant positive effect of the Banzhaf power scores on support for the European Parliament and for the European Commission. Conversely, the effects are negative and significant for the Council and Commission in the 2000 and 2002 data.

[Insert table five about here]

Our second hypothesis holds that nationals of larger nations may be less supportive of EU institutions since these nations could more easily pursue independent policies outside of the EU framework. Again, the results are mixed, and generally the inverse of the results for Hypothesis one. As reported in Table 6, population has the

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<sup>4</sup> Results of these analyses without Luxembourg are presented only when they depart substantially from the results for the full sample.

expected negative and significant effect on support for the Commission and Council, but only in 2000 and 2002. In 1988, the effect on support for the EP is actually positive and significant. While somewhat inconsistent, these results do favor hypothesis two (four consistent parameters) more than hypothesis one (only one consistent hypothesis.)

[Insert table six about here]

The results strongly support hypothesis three for 2002, with significant effects of per capita power on support for all three institutions. As table 7 indicates, the effects are much weaker for 2000, with a significant positive effect only on support for the Council. For 1988, the only significant effect of per capita power is negative.

[Insert table seven about here]

Unlike the previous analyses, the results in Table 7 are sensitive to the presence of outlying values for Luxembourg. Table 8 presents the results without Luxembourg. When the analysis is repeated without Luxembourgers, the positive effect for the Commission in 2000 increases substantially, while the unexpected negative effect for the Council in 1988 becomes significant and the positive effect for the EP in 2002 vanishes.

[Insert table eight about here]

As mentioned above, the dependent variable for 1988 is a question about increasing the importance of the EU institutions, while the 2000 and 2002 batteries ask about “trust.” There is also a 12 year gap between the 12 member EU of 1988 and the 15 member EU of 2000. Either of these factors could account for the striking difference between the results for 1988 and the 2000 and 2002 results. The results for the 1988 data are often the inverse of the results for 2000 and 2002. In table 5, the results for 1988 generally support hypothesis one, with two significant positive effects of power scores. The 2000 and 2002 results generally contradict hypothesis one. In table 6 there is an unexpected significant positive effect in 1988, contradicting hypothesis two, while we see

the expected negative effects in 2000 and 2002. The odd nature of the 1988 results reappears for power per capita. In our 1988 results for tables 7 and 8, the primary explanatory variable, disproportionality of representation, is significant in the direction opposite of that hypothesized in half of the analyses – in both analyses of the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers excluding Luxembourg. On the other hand, the 2000 and 2002 data offer stronger support for hypothesis three. By 2002 our analysis of the EU 15 finds significant positive effects across the board, though these effects are weaker when Luxembourg is excluded.

This marked discrepancy between time periods does not appear for the control variables. The measures of specific support, - whether measured in terms of economic benefits, satisfaction with EU democracy, or perceptions of personal and national benefits – has a positive and highly significant association with support for all the supranational bodies in all time periods. Across the board we find that women systematically mistrust EU institutions, while respondents with higher incomes are more likely to trust them.

While the effects of other control variables do fluctuate somewhat across institutions and over time, there are no dramatic sign reversals for age, education, and ideological extremism. Only for the linear effect of left-right ideology do we find a significant sign change with right wing opposition to empowerment of the EP in 1988, and leftist mistrust of the Commission and Council in 2002. The overall consistency in the behavior of the control variables makes the results for the theoretical variables even more puzzling.

Three possible explanations for the difference between 1988 and 2000-2002 come immediately to mind. Firstly, the survey question is worded differently in 1988. Secondly, the composition of the EU changes as three members join in 1994. Thirdly, the nature of the EU and of the public debate over European institutions may have changed dramatically since the late 1980's. The stability of the effects of our control variables suggests that the difference in survey wording has not produced dependent variables which are vastly different from each other, since they behave similarly with

respect to specific support for the EU, gender, and income. The second possibility can be tested by reanalyzing the data from 2000 and 2002 without the three new members from the 1994 accession. Such a reanalysis shows that the results for 2000-2002 are substantially similar with or without the three new members. The difference between 1988 and 2000-2002 cannot be explained as a straightforward result of the expansion of the EU in 1994.

This leaves the third possibility, that of profound changes in the nature and public perception of the EU, as the most likely explanation of the differences observed between 1988 and 2000-2002. These dates do bracket a particularly dynamic period in the evolution of the EU. 1988 precedes the reunification of Germany and the fall of communism. The treaty of Maastricht, with its accompanying referenda and public debate, the launch of the single currency, the debates surrounding the treaty of Nice, all have raised public awareness of the EU and of the internal structure of EU institutions. Europeans are now much more likely to be familiar with the relative power of their nation after watching the Irish debate over Nice turn on the questions of re-weighting of votes in the Council and the composition of the Commission.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

In 2000, the European Council of Nice proposed a debate on the future of the European Union, and an intergovernmental conference to consider revision of the treaties establishing the EU. Our findings about support for specific European institutions are relevant to this debate in a couple of ways. Firstly, we find that the distribution of power within EU institutions does have an effect on support for those institutions. Any constitutional reform which alters the relative powers of nations can be expected to alter levels of public support. At this point, even the adoption of institutions which produce a distribution of power strictly proportional to population can be expected to affect opinion, as it will decrease support in those nations which enjoy disproportionate power.

A second important implication of these findings is that we can expect to see national differences in preferences over EU reform. Since Europeans have been shown to

differ in their support for each of the three institutions studied, we can expect corresponding differences in preferred outcomes from the 2004 IGC. The data from 2002 are very suggestive in this regard. One question included on Eurobarometer 57.1 asked respondents how they wanted to see the President of the Commission chosen. The three responses permitted were, “nominated by the heads of state or governments of the European Union,” “elected by the majority of the European Parliament,” and “directly elected by the citizens of the European Union.” Clearly we would expect respondents who trust the European Parliament to be more likely to opt for election by that body. As table 9 indicates, a plurality (almost 40%) of those who trust the EP name election by the EP as their preferred means for choosing a Commission president. Interestingly, the results are similar for those who trust the Commission, with over 39% support for EP election of the president of the Commission. Intriguingly, a plurality of individuals who trust the Council of Ministers would have the president of the commission chosen not by the heads of state or governments, but by direct election.

[Insert table nine about here]

Another aspect of the EU which is up for discussion is the scope of EU policymaking. All legal authority for EU policy stems from treaty provisions, and a treaty revision may narrow or broaden the range of policy areas where the EU is authorized to act. Trust in the institutions of the EU is related to a respondent’s tolerance for greater EU policymaking authority. Eurobarometers 54.1 and 57.1 contain a battery of questions regarding the desirability of EU level policymaking in over 20 different issue areas. From this suite of questions, we created an index of support for the expansion of EU policymaking. As the OLS regression reported in Table 10 suggests, trust in the institutions of the European Union is very strongly associated with support for increased EU level policymaking. Interestingly, in both 2000 and 2002 it is trust in the EP which has the largest substantive impact on the desired scope of EU policymaking, while trust in the Commission and Council has only about 60% of the impact of trust in the Parliament.

[Insert table ten about here]

These results also highlight the importance of the European Parliament. Trust in the EP is relatively insensitive to differences in national power. Both raw power and per capita power do not strongly affect support for the EU. This suggests that other factors influence how people feel about the European Parliament. It is, for example, elected by proportional representation, something that most all Europeans (excluding those in the United Kingdom) are familiar with. It also represents a concept of popular election (if not by a “one man-one vote” standard) that is normatively appealing to those who support the concept of democracy. The EP is not seen as an arena for competing national interests where relative power is relevant. Instead, it may possess a legitimacy and ability to transcend national interests and divisions.

It also appears that a key to the future of the European Union and its empowerment lies with the European Parliament. It is the institution that Europeans trust the most (with 55% trust in 2002 compared to 50% for the Commission and 44% for the Council). As noted above, it is trust in the EP which has the greatest effect on public support for the empowerment of the EU. In any event, the future of the European Union is clearly intertwined with the EP. Intriguingly, few proposals in the current debate have suggested radically altering the structure of the EP. It may indeed be the institution in least need of reform.

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Table 1. Representation in EU and representation per capita (1987-1994).

Country	European Parliament		European Commission		Council of Ministers		Population
	Total Seats	Per Capita	Members of Commission	Per Capita	QMV Votes	Per Capita	Total
Belgium	25	412,583*	1	9,902,000	5	1,902,000	9,902,000
Denmark	16	320,625	1	5,130,000	3	1,710,000	5,130,000
France	81	689,925	2	27,942,000	10	5,588,400	55,884,000
Germany	81	964,370	2	39,072,000	10	7,814,400	78,144,000
Greece	24	418,208	1	10,037,000	5	2,007,400	10,037,000
Ireland	15	235,380	1	3,530,700	3	1,176,900	3,530,700
Italy	81	699,123	2	28,314,500	10	5,662,900	56,629,000
Luxembourg	6	62,217	1	373,300	2	186,650	373,300
Netherlands	25	590,400	1	14,760,000	5	2,952,000	14,760,000
Portugal	24	415,333	1	9,968,000	5	1,993,600	9,968,000
Spain	60	644,850	2	19,345,500	8	4,836,375	38,691,000
United Kingdom	81	705,654	2	28,579,000	10	5,715,800	57,158,000

\*This indicates, for example, in the case of Belgium in 1988, there was one member of the European Parliament for every 412,583 people.

Table 2. Representation in EU and representation per capita (1995-2004).

Country	European Parliament		European Commission		Council of Ministers		Population
	Total Seats	Per Capita	Members of Commission	Per Capita	QMV Votes	Per Capita	Total
Austria	21	387,586	1	8,139,300	4	2,034,825	8,139,300
Belgium	25	412,388	1	10,309,700	5	2,061,940	10,309,700
Denmark	16	335,525	1	5,368,400	3	1,789,467	5,368,400
Finland	16	324,681	1	5,194,900	3	1,731,633	5,194,900
France	87	682,085	2	29,670,700	10	5,934,140	59,341,400
Germany	99	832,730	2	41,220,150	10	8,244,030	82,440,300
Greece	25	439,520	1	10,988,000	5	2,197,600	10,988,000
Ireland	15	258,847	1	3,882,700	3	1,294,233	3,882,700
Italy	87	647,483	2	28,165,950	10	5,633,190	56,331,900
Luxembourg	6	74,017	1	444,100	2	222,050	444,100
Netherlands	31	519,256	1	16,105,300	5	3,221,060	16,105,300
Portugal	25	413,424	1	10,335,600	5	2,067,120	10,335,600
Spain	64	631,395	2	20,204,650	10	5,051,162	40,409,000
Sweden	22	404,959	1	8,909,100	4	2,227,275	8,909,100
United Kingdom	87	677,338	2	29,464,200	10	5,892,840	58,928,400

Table 3. Power in EU institutions and power per capita (1987-1994)

Country	European Parliament		European Commission		Council of Ministers	
	Power Score	Power Per Capita	Power Score	Power Per Capita	Power Score	Power Per Capita
Belgium	.037	1.2092	.062	2.0261	.064	2.0915
Denmark	.027	1.7089	.062	3.9241	.040	2.5316
France	.166	.9618	.129	.7474	.134	.7764
Germany	.166	.8709	.129	.6768	.134	.7030
Greece	.037	1.1935	.062	2.0000	.064	2.065
Ireland	.025	2.2936	.062	5.6881	.040	3.670
Italy	.166	.9491	.129	.7376	.134	.7662
Luxembourg	.004	3.6364	.062	56.3636	.024	21.8182
Netherlands	.037	.8222	.062	1.3596	.064	1.4035
Portugal	.037	1.2013	.062	2.0130	.064	2.0779
Spain	.134	1.2134	.129	1.0795	.107	.8954
United Kingdom	.166	.9405	.129	.7309	.134	.7631

Table 4. Power in EU institutions and power per capita (1995-2004)

Country	European Parliament		European Commission		Council of Ministers	
	Power Score	Power Per Capita	Power Score	Power Per Capita	Power Score	Power Per Capita
Austria	.031	1.44	.049	2.27	.048	2.224
Belgium	.037	1.353	.049	1.792	.067	2.158
Denmark	.024	1.686	.049	3.442	.046	2.529
Finland	.024	1.742	.049	3.557	.036	2.613
France	.144	.915	.102	.648	.112	.712
Germany	.166	.759	.102	.467	.112	.512
Greece	.037	1.27	.049	1.682	.059	2.025
Ireland	.022	2.137	.049	4.759	.036	3.497
Italy	.144	.964	.102	.683	.129	.75
Luxembourg	.009	7.643	.049	41.611	.023	19.532
Netherlands	.044	1.03	.049	1.147	.059	1.382
Portugal	.037	1.35	.049	1.788	.059	2.153
Spain	.106	.989	.102	.952	.092	.859
Sweden	.032	1.35	.049	2.074	.048	2.032
United Kingdom	.144	.922	.102	.653	.112	.717

Table 5 Support for specific institutions regressed on raw power scores.

Variables	European Parliament			Council of Ministers			European Commission		
	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002
Power score	.995**	-.155	.053	1.1	-3.186^	-3.284^	1.942*	-1.943^	-2.799^
Specific support (economic)	.526***	n/a	n/a	.467***	n/a	n/a	.517***	n/a	n/a
(satisfaction with EU democracy)	n/a	.725***	n/a	n/a	.619***	n/a	n/a	.751***	n/a
(perception of national benefit)	n/a	1.344***	1.16***	n/a	1.28***	1.11***	n/a	1.3***	1.17***
(perception of personal benefit)	n/a	n/a	.74***	n/a	n/a	.623***	n/a	n/a	.674***
Ideology	-.048***	.012	.013	-.017	.005	.018*	.01	.002	.017*
Extremism	.005	.003	.004	.005	.002	-.001	.01*	.003	.004
Female	-.383***	-.13***	-.073*	-.32***	-.23***	-.19***	-.18**	-.16***	-.105**
Age	.005*	-.016	.016	.004*	.011	.065***	.003	-.002	.033**
Education	.23***	.003	.002	.141***	.011***	.004*	.165***	.003	.005*
Income	.186***	.093***	.122***	.091**	.081***	.128***	.06*	.078***	.142***

Results are logit coefficients.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at .05, .01 and .001 one tailed respectively.

^ indicates significance at <.01 one tailed in opposite direction hypothesized.

Results were similar with Luxembourg excluded.

Table 7 Support for specific institutions regressed on population.

Variables	European Parliament			Council of Ministers			European Commission		
	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002
Population (per million)	.004 <sup>^</sup>	-.001	.000	.002	-.004***	-.004***	-.001	-.003***	-.003***
Specific support (economic)	.524***	n/a	n/a	.467***	n/a	n/a	.53***	n/a	n/a
(satisfaction with EU democracy)	n/a	.725***	n/a	n/a	.617***	n/a	n/a	.749***	n/a
(perception of national benefit)	n/a	1.34***	1.16***	n/a	1.27***	1.105***	n/a	1.289***	1.151***
(perception of personal benefit)	n/a	n/a	.74***	n/a	n/a	.626***	n/a	n/a	.667***
Ideology	-.047***	.011	.014	-.018	.005	.019*	.005	.001	.017*
Extremism	.005	.003	.004	.003	.002	-.001	.01*	.003	.004
Female	-.384***	-1.3***	-.073*	-.32***	-.226***	-.193***	-.175**	-.162***	-.102**
Age	.005**	-.016	.016	.004*	.011	.065***	.003	-.001	.033**
Education	.23***	.003	.002	.141***	.011***	.005*	.163***	.003	.006*
Income	.187***	.093***	.122***	.091**	.082***	.128***	.059*	.078***	.133***

Results are logit coefficients.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at .05, .01 and .001 one tailed respectively.

<sup>^</sup> indicates significance at <.01 one tailed in opposite direction hypothesized.

Table 7 Support for specific institutions regressed on power per capita (including Luxembourg)

Variables	European Parliament			Council of Ministers			European Commission		
	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002
Power per capita	-.258 <sup>^</sup>	.01	.057***	-.014	.013**	.028***	-.001	.003	.013***
Specific support (economic)	.523***	n/a	n/a	.468***	n/a	n/a	.528***	n/a	n/a
(satisfaction with EU democracy)	n/a	.724***	n/a	n/a	.612***	n/a	n/a	.746***	n/a
(perception of national benefit)	n/a	1.35***	1.15***	n/a	1.298***	.115***	n/a	1.313***	1.161***
(perception of personal benefit)	n/a	n/a	.738***	n/a	n/a	.626***	n/a	n/a	.668***
Ideology	-.044***	.012	.013	-.018	.011	.022**	.005	.005	.02**
Extremism	.006	.003	.004	.003	.002	-.001	.010	.004	.004
Female	-.386***	-1.3***	-.074*	-.32***	-.223***	-.191***	-.176**	-.160***	-.1**
Age	.005**	-.016	.016	.004**	.010	.063***	.003	-.003	.031**
Education	.228***	.003	.001	.141***	.012***	.005*	.164***	.004	.006*
Income	.189***	.093***	.122***	.091***	.082***	.129***	.059*	.077***	.134***

Results are logit coefficients.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at .05, .01 and .001 one tailed respectively.

<sup>^</sup> indicates significance at <.01 one tailed in opposite direction hypothesized.

Table 8. Support for specific institutions regressed on power per capita (excluding Luxembourg)

Variables	European Parliament			Council of Ministers			European Commission		
	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002	1988	2000	2002
Power per capita	-.395 <sup>^</sup>	-.019	-.074	-.063 <sup>^</sup>	.059***	.05**	.001	.024*	.024*
Specific support (economic)	.525***	n/a	n/a	.473***	n/a	. n/a	.541***	n/a	n/a
(satisfaction with EU democracy)	n/a	.715***	n/a	n/a	1.294***	n/a	n/a	.729***	n/a
(perception of national benefit)	n/a	1.37***	1.17***	n/a	.605***	.627***	n/a	1.32***	1.172***
(perception of personal benefit)	n/a	n/a	.743***	n/a	n/a	1.118***	n/a	n/a	.671***
Ideology	-.039***	.01	.015	-.014	.005	.02*	.01	.000	.019*
Extremism	.006	.003	.005	.001	.002	-.001	.011	.004	.004
Female	-.389***	-.13***	-.077*	-.32***	-.222***	-.191***	-.184**	-.167***	-.174**
Age	.004**	-.017	.014	.004**	.007	.064***	.003	-.003	.033**
Education	.22***	.002	.001	.134***	.012***	.004*	.176***	.002	.005*
Income	.187***	.098***	.126***	.099***	.079***	.133***	.05	.079***	.14***

Results are logit coefficients.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at .05, .01 and .001 one tailed respectively.

<sup>^</sup> indicates significance at <.01 one tailed in opposite direction hypothesized.

Table 9. Trust in institutions and preferences for reform of the Commission

	Believe President of the European Commission should be chosen by:		
	Heads of state and of government	European Parliament	Citizens of the EU
<u>Respondents who</u> Trust Council of Ministers	.196	.258	<b>.341</b>
Trust European Parliament	.185	<b>.395</b>	.306
Trust European Commission	.191	<b>.392</b>	.308

Table 10. Trust in institutions as predictors of support for greater EU policymaking authority

Variables	2000	2002
Trust in EP	1.576 (.109)*	1.477 (.095)*
Trust in European Commission	1.091 (.076)*	.856 (.056)*
Trust in Council of Ministers	1.001 (.069)*	.859 (.005)*
Specific support (satisfaction with EU democracy)	.473 (.048)*	—
Specific support (personal benefit)	—	1.472 (.095)*
Specific support (national benefit)	2.257 (.137)*	2.691 (.147)*
Ideology	-.181 (-.045)*	-.232 (-.057)*
Extremism	.001 (.000)	.035 (.01)*
Female	-.718 (-.05)*	-.454 (.029)*
Age	-.278 (-.065)*	-.314 (-.07)*
Education	.041 (.04)*	.019 (.011)*
Income	.299 (.038)*	.254 (.03)*
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.125	.161

Numbers shown are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (standardized coefficients in parentheses)

\* Indicates significance at <.001 level

## Appendix: variables used in the analysis

### Dependent variables:

**Support** for empowerment of **specific institutions** (used in the logistic regressions) was measured for 1988 with the following question from Eurobarometer 29:

*And which of these (European institutions), in your opinion, should play a more important role in making and carrying out the policies of the European Community?*

Respondents were shown a list of possible answers, and were allowed to name multiple institutions. Responses were coded 1 if the respondent listed a particular institution (the EP, the Council of Ministers, or the European Commission).

For 2000 and 2002, **support** for empowerment of **specific institutions** was measured by the following question from Eurobarometers 54.1 and 57.1:

*And, for each of them, [European institutions] please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?*

Respondents were then read a list of institutions, including the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Commission. Responses indicating trust were coded 1, all other responses were coded 0.

**Support for expanding EU authority** (used in Table 10) is calculated in the 2000 analysis by summing the responses to the following question from EB 54.1:

*For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (national) government, or made jointly within the European Union?*

*Defense*

*Protection of the environment*

*Currency*

*Humanitarian aid*

*Health and social welfare*

*Basic rules for broadcasting and press*

*Fight against poverty/social exclusion*

*The fight against unemployment*

*Agriculture and fishing policy*

*Supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties*

*Education*

*Scientific and technological research*

*Information about the European Union, its policies and institutions*

*Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union*

*Cultural policy*

*Immigration policy*

*Rules for political asylum*  
*The fight against organised crime*  
*Police*  
*Justice*  
*Accepting refugees*  
*Juvenile crime prevention*  
*Urban crime prevention*  
*The fight against drugs*  
*The fight against the trade in, and exploitation of, human beings*

Responses favoring EU authority in these areas were coded 1, other responses were coded 0. Summing these responses yields an index of ranging from 0-25.

In 2002 the same battery was repeated, with the addition of two new items:

*The fight against international terrorism*  
*Tackling the challenges of an ageing population*  
With these new items the index for 2002 ranges from 0-27.

Preferences about the **selection of the President of the European Commission** were indicated in 2002 by the following question from EB 57.1:

*Which, if any of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? The President of the European Commission should be...*

*Nominated by the Heads of State or governments of the European Union*

*Elected by the majority of the European Parliament*

*Directly elected by the citizens of the European Union*

These are exclusive categories (respondents were only allowed to choose one answer). Responses were coded as having answered one of the three options above. Those answering “don’t know” or giving other (spontaneous) answers were not coded.

Primary Explanatory variables:

**Banzhaf power scores** were obtained from Lane and Maeland (1995) for the European Parliament, Lane, Maeland and Berg (1995) for the Council of Ministers, and were calculated by the authors using Temple University’s Banzhaf Power Index Calculator (2003) for the European Commission.

**Population** is simply the population of a member state in thousands, obtained from the World Development Indicators and Eurostat.

**Disproportionality of power (power per capita)** scores are created by dividing the Banzhaf power scores by the ratio of the population for each country.

Control variables:

For 1988, **Specific support** for the EU was conceptualized as positive evaluations of the economic effects of the Single Market using the following question from EB 29:

*Altogether do you think that the coming into being of the single common market in the European Community in 1992 will be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

Responses indicating the common market is good thing were coded 3, those indicating it was a bad thing were coded 1, with all other responses (neither good nor bad and don't know) coded 2.

In 2000, political aspects of **specific support** were included. Satisfaction with European democracy was measured by observing responses to the following question from EB 54.1:

*(Previous question: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (respondent's country)?*

*And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?*

Responses indicating "very satisfied" were coded 4, "fairly satisfied" coded 3, "not very satisfied" coded 2, and "not at all satisfied" coded 1. "Don't know" and non-cooperative answers were set to 2.387, which was the mean of all other responses.

**Specific support** in the form of perception of national benefits from membership was used in the analyses for 2000 and 2002. It is measured by observing responses to the following question from EBs 54.1 and 57.1.

*Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (respondent's country) has on balance benefitted [sic] or not from being a member of the European Union?*

Positive responses were coded 1, perceptions of no benefit coded 0, and don't know and non-cooperative responses were set to the midrange, 0.5.

**Specific support** was also measured as perceived personal benefits in 2002. This measure used the following question from EB 57.1.

*Do you think that (respondent's country) being a member of the European Union has brought you personally...?*

*Many more advantages (coded 5)*

*More advantages (coded 4)*

*As many advantages as disadvantages* (coded 3)

*More disadvantages* (coded 2)

*Many more disadvantages* (coded 1)

Responses indicating don't know and non-cooperative responses were coded 3, which is the midrange.

**Ideology** for all the analyses was coded 1-10, based on self-placement on an ideological scale, with 1 being extreme left and 10 being extreme right.

**Extremism** was measured by taking a respondent's self-placement on the ideology scale and subtracting it from 5.5 (the midrange of the 1-10 scale), then squaring that value.

**Gender** for all the analyses was coded 1 for female, 0 for male.

**Age** for all the analyses was based on age cohorts as follows: respondents age 15-24 were coded 1, 25-34 coded 2, 35-44 coded 3, 45-54 coded 4, 55-64 coded 5, and respondents 65 and up were coded 6.

**Education** for all the analyses is the total number of years of formal education claimed by the respondent.

**Income** is the income quartile claimed by the respondent. Non-cooperative answers were coded 2.5, which was both the mean and the midrange.