THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MASS OPINION 
ABOUT EUROPEAN LEVEL POLICYMAKING

Leonard Ray

Department of Political Science
240 Stubbs Hall
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803

lray2@lsu.edu

* Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco Aug 29- Sep. 1 2001.  

Abstract

This paper will examine the relationship at the mass level between support for European integration and ideology.  Both left-right ideology and variants of a “new politics” second dimension of ideology will be considered.  Two possible formulations of this second dimension will be considered.  The first is the familiar post-materialist index.  The second is an index constructed to parallel the GAL/TAN ideological dimension analyzed by Marks and Hooghe.  Exploratory factor analysis suggests that the “New politics” cleavage is multi-dimensional.  Both affective and utilitarian support for the EU are more closely related to the “new politics” dimensions than they are to the traditional left-right ideological cleavage.  However, affective support for the EU is found to be more closely related to the “new politics” dimension than is utilitarian support.

	The relationship between ideology and support for EU level policymaking and is relevant for a number of reasons.  Ideology serves as an important organizing principle of democratic politics.  It helps to structure political debate and provides the lines along which most democratic parliaments are organized.  It allows voters and leaders to discuss complex bundles of policy proposals in a kind of political shorthand.  Given the very real cognitive constraints on individuals, it would be very difficult for representative democracy to function in the absence of ideology.
	Ideology does, however, have its limitations.  When political issues do not map neatly onto the underlying ideological dimensions which structure politics, when there are ideas which correspond to no symbols in the ideological shorthand, then the normal mechanism of politics loses traction on these issues.  They may be debated and discussed, but only in the demanding language of policy, rather than the more convenient one of politics.  One of the central questions in the study of the politics of the European Union is whether European integration has become incorporated into the political language of Europe.  If European issues are not associated with European ideologies, then the politics of the EU will remain opaque for voters and their representatives.

Measuring Support for the European Union

	The analyses presented in this paper are based on data from Eurobarometer #47.1 which was conducted in March and April of 1997.  This particular survey was selected because it offered a number of questions appropriate for measuring alternative specifications of the “new politics” dimension.  As usual, a number of questions were asked which tap into respondents’ attitudes towards the European Union.  These questions were used to create two measures of support for European integration.
In the literature on public opinion about European integration, a distinction is often made between utilitarian and affective support.  Utilitarian support, described by Inglehart, Rabier and Reif as “a calculated appraisal of the immediate costs and benefits of membership in the Community”(1987, p. 140), has often been interpreted as an evaluation of the institutions of European integration as they currently exist.  I measured this type of support with an additive index constructed from two questions, one asking whether a country’s membership in the EU is a “good thing”, the other asking whether a country has benefited from membership in the EU.  These are identical to the items used as indicators of utilitarian support by Matthew Gabel   (1998b, Chapter 2) and the index is scaled to range from 0 to 100.  Affective support, described by Gabel as “an allegiance, attachment, or loyalty to governing institutions and policies” (1998b p. 17) is measured by a survey question asking respondents whether they see themselves as primarily nationals, Europeans, or having some combination of national and European identities.  Again, this variable is rescaled to range from 0 to 100.  This question is similar, though not identical to one of Gabel’s three measures of affective support.  The actual wording of all of the survey questions used in this paper is reproduced in the Appendix A.
	In much of my previous work, I have found few significant differences between affective and utilitarian support.  A footnote indicating that the results held irrespective of the measures used was generally sufficient.  However, in these analyses, utilitarian and affective support behave quite differently.  This shift may be due to the use of the European identity question rather that the “support for efforts to unify” question as an indicator of affective support.  In any case, these two measures are clearly tapping into different concepts given their very low (though significant and positive) correlation of .275.

Support for European Integration and the Left-Right Ideological Dimension

Since the French revolution the left-right dimension has been a central line of political cleavage, and the basic shorthand for political conflict in Europe.  Scholars have naturally attempted to locate the European Union in this left-right political space, with mixed results.  In the 1970’s, Inglehart and Rabier argued that “the electorates of the Left consistently make less favorable assessments of membership than do those of the Right” (1978: 85.)   However, they also noted that the relationship between left-right ideology and support for integration was complex and that support for the European Community drove a wedge between the revolutionary and reformist left.  (ibid pps. 93-95.)  Given the persistent weakness of the linear relationship between left-right ideology and support for the EU, it is not surprising that Inglehart, Rabier and Reif ultimately dismissed class-based explanations of support for European integration (1987 p. 144.)  Other observers have also described these dimensions as orthogonal or independent (Gabel and Hix 1999.)  
Another possibility is that the apparent absence of a relationship is an illusion induced by the curvilinearity of the relationship.  Given the conventional wisdom that extremist parties tend to oppose European integration, one would expect support for the EU to drop at the far left, and the far right, with support concentrated in the center of the political spectrum.  A quadratic function has generally been found to fit this parabolic relationship both for political parties (Ray 1998) and at the mass level (Hix 1999; 163.)  
For this paper, I measured left-right ideology using the respondent’s self placement on a 10 point scale, where 1 was the extreme left, and 10 the extreme right.  In order to test for a curvilinear relationship between ideology and EU support, I created a dummy variable for each position on the ideological scale, as well as a variable for ideological extremity, which is simply the squared distance from the midpoint of the scale.  By estimating three OLS regression models for each of the dependent variables, I can test both for the nonlinearity of the relationship, as well as the adequacy of a quadratic formulation of this curvilinearity.  The results are presented in Table 1.
As the results for Model 1 indicate, there is no evidence of a linear relationship between left-right ideology and utilitarian support for the EU.  With an R Squared of .000, and an insignificant F statistic, a linear relationship explains none of the variance in the dependent variable.  Model 2 suggests that an unconstrained nonlinear model fares somewhat better.  By allowing each position on the ideological scale its own intercept, almost half of a percent of variance can be accounted for.  The parameters for these dummy variables do suggest a curvilinear relationship, with the lowest support levels at the far left and far right.  Model 3 indicates that the quadratic formulation fits reasonably well, with a significant negative parameter for ideological extremity indicating that utilitarian support is higher in the center of the left-right space.  The small and insignificant coefficient for left-right ideology suggests that the parabola described by this model is relatively symmetric around the Y axis, with little differentiation between the center left and center right.  

Table 1.  Predicting support for the EU with left-right ideology

	Utilitarian Support	Affective Support	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	
Left-Right	.285
(.187)		.178
(.945)	-.886**
(107)		-.868**
(.107)	
Extremity			-.351**
(.068)			-.058
(.039)	
Dummy Variables							
Far left 1		-5.008*
(2.140)			5.085**
(1.232)		
2		-1.549
(2.054)			3.466**
(1.151)		
3		2.975
(1.606)			3.978**
(.911)		
4		5.252**
(1.585)			2.543**
(.903)		
5		4.474**
(1.344)			-.098
(.762)		
7		4.699**
(1.643)			-.473
(.936)		
8		3.952*
(1.737)			-.019
(.996)		
9		3.957
(2.602)			-2.720
(1.478)		
Far right 10		-3.516
(2.438)			-3.488*
(1.396)		
Constant	63.458**
(1.044)	62.114**
(1.131)	65.578**
(1.121)	26.349**
(.594)	20.852**
(.642)	25.998**
(.638)	
Adjusted R2	.000	.004	.003	.005	.006	.005	
N	10617	10617	10617	13123	13123	13123	
* = p < .05    ** = p < .01

The results for affective support demonstrate the much better fit of a linear model of the relationship between left-right ideology and affective EU support.  The parameter for left-right ideology in model 4 is substantial and significant, indicating that leftism is associated with an increased propensity to identify oneself as European. This simple linear model explains affective support better than any of the previous models explained utilitarian support, although at .005, the R square is charitably described as low.  Neither the unconstrained nonlinear model (Model 5) nor the quadratic model (Model 6) offer much of an improvement over the simple linear model.  The differences across this table are striking.  While their low levels of utilitarian support suggest that both ideological extremes are dissatisfied with the contemporary European Union, the far left appears more attached to a “European ideal” and more willing to place a European identity before a national one.

New Politics and European Integration I: Postmaterialism

It has become quite common to argue that the left-right ideological dimension is being supplemented with, if not supplanted by, new lines of political cleavage associated with emerging ideologies.  Proponents of this view have not, however, come to a consensus on the appropriate label for, or precise meaning of, this new dimension.  Perhaps the best known candidate for this second dimension is a set of value priorities which have been under the label post-acquisitive (Inglehart 1971 p. 8) post-bourgeois (Wilgden and Feld 1976) and now post-materialist (Inglehart 1977, Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1987. p.152)  According to Inglehart’s now familiar argument, individuals whose material (economic and physical) needs have been met tend to focus on nonmaterial issues such as self expression and self actualization.  According to Inglehart, the link between this new set of values and support for European integration lies in the association of post-material values with a “cosmopolitan” rather than “parochial” identity (Inglehart 1977 p. 322.)  
	Post-materialism was identified early on as an important predictor of support for European integration.  Writing of postmaterialism in 1971, Inglehart states that “it is clear that value priorities are a stronger predictor of support for European integration than any other single variable included in our analysis.”(p. 28)  However, the role of post-materialism was soon questioned.  As early as 1976, Wilgden and Feld were casting doubt on the usefulness of post-materialism as a predictor of support for European integration. (p. 323)  By 1987, Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif were to document a secular decline in the euro-enthusiasm of post-materialists from 1970 to 1986.  They argued that “the European Community was increasingly perceived as a set of huge, hierarchical and remote bureaucracies.” (p.152.)  The actual trajectory of the EC was apparently not taking it toward the kind of participatory cosmopolitan entity that post-materialists envisaged.  By 1989, Janssen concluded that the (weak) relationship between post-materialism and EU support was spurious, and argued that “More and more the nation state seems to be the shepherd of non-economic goals while the EC appears to be a purely economic construction.” (p. 468.)  More recently, Gabel (1998a) has found mixed and contradictory effects of post-materialism.  (p. 346)
	For this analysis, post-materialism is measured using the familiar eurobarometer battery of four “goals” for the nation, two materialist ones- fighting rising prices, and maintaining order, and two post-materialist ones- giving people more say and protecting freedom of speech.  The results obtained here support the view that post-materialism has little to do with utilitarian support for the European Union.  As Table 2 indicates, both a linear (Model 7) and a nonlinear (Model 8) formulation yield a statistically significant relationship between post-materialism and utilitarian support, but the R square indicates that very little of the variance in support has been accounted for.  

Table 2.  Predicting support for the EU with Post-materialism.
	Utilitarian Support	Affective Support	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	
Post-materialism Scale	3.251**
(.578)		6.409**
(.319)		
Mixed		-2.058*
(1.032)		-7.477**
(.587)	
Materialist		-6.214**
(1.175)		-13.135**
(.654)	
Constant	61.508**
(.639)	67.226**
(.919)	15.615**
(.346)	29.144**
(.525)	
Adjusted R2	.002	.003	.025	.025	
N	12361	12361	15650	15650	
* = p < .05    ** = p < .01

	When we turn to affective support, we find that in the linear model (Model 9) the parameter for post-materialism is statistically significant, and explains over ten times more variation than it did for utilitarian support.  The linear model is a good fit, as the nonlinear specification (Model 10) produces almost exactly the same results.  The results suggest that, while perhaps disenchanted with the current state of the European Union, post-materialists have not completely lost their affection for “Europe.”

New Politics and European Integration II: Alternatives to Postmaterialism

	Other students of the “new” dimension in European politics have come up with somewhat different conceptions of the content of this new (these new) dimension(s).  One common thread to these alternative “new politics” dimensions is their focus on questions of personal freedom and participation rather than on economic and physical security.  In an explicit critique of Inglehart’s post-materialist dimension, Flanagan argued that “there are two distinct kinds of value change taking place in the advanced industrial democracies and that Inglehart has obscured this distinction by collapsing indicators of both into a single scale”(Inglehart and Flanagan 1987 p.1303).  Flanagan proposed two new dimensions, a materialist one which “taps the priority a respondent attaches to economic issues as opposed to non-economic, value issues.” (p. 1305).  A second “value cleavage” distinguished “those falling on the libertarian side” from the “authoritarians.” (p. 1305).  His factor analysis of Japanese survey data yielded three dimensions, a “materialist” one, an “authoritarian” one, and a “libertarian” one.
Herbert Kitschelt’s analysis of European social democracy contrasted the old economic left-right dimension with a “left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian cleavage”  (p. 131)  This dimension is similar to Inglehart’s post-materialism, which Kitschelt at times used as one indicator of left-libertarianness (1994, p. 137).   However, his relatively modest factor loading for post-materialism suggests that it is far from completely capturing the “libertarian-authoritarian” cleavage.  In analyzing contemporary far right parties in Western Europe, Kitschelt allows for the existence of multiple ideological dimensions alongside the old socialist left vs. capitalist right and the new left-libertarian/ right authoritarian dimensions.  His exploratory factor analyses generally find an ecology vs. production dimension, while his confirmatory analyses test the existence of a parochialism vs. cosmopolitan dimension (Kitschelt 1995).
	This analysis will focus on a formulation of the authoritarian-libertarian dimension which was designed explicitly to for use in the study of orientations towards European Union politics.  In their analysis of the positions taken by European parties on European issues, Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson deploy their own formulation of the “New Politics” dimension which they baptize the GAL/TAN cleavage, an acronym drawn from the orientations which characterize parties at the extremes of this dimension- Green, Alternative and Libertarian versus Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist.  (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2000).  As I will attempt to analyze the same dimension at the mass level, it is worth revisiting the wording of the question their expert survey employed to measure this dimension at the level of political parties.  Their experts were given the following instructions:

Another way parties are sometimes classified is in terms of their views of democratic freedoms and rights.  “libertarian” or “post-materialist” parties tend to favor expanded personal freedoms and rights.  Such parties, for example, support abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, same sex marriages.  They favor increased democratic participation and freedom of speech.  At the same time, they oppose discrimination on ethnic, religious, and political or sexual grounds.  In sum, these parties want government to stay out of the life choices that people make and they promote widespread democracy.  “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas.  These parties believe that government should be a firm authority that expresses moral voice.  To these parties, order is preferable to unbridles participation and freedom.  On the scale below, please indicate where parties are located in terms of their ideological views of freedoms and rights. (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2000, fn1)

	I have attempted to identify a set of survey items which tap into the same concepts mentioned in the instructions to experts cited above.  Table 3 presents a breakdown of the essential concepts involved in the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson “New Politics” dimension, and the variables I use which correspond to each of these concepts.  While the wording of the survey questions is reproduced in Appendix A of this paper, a brief description of these items is in order.  
One set of survey questions is drawn from a battery of items which asks respondents whether certain rights and freedoms are conditional or absolute.  Respondents who state that a certain right should be respected in all circumstances are coded 1, those advocating conditional protection of a right are coded 0.  These rights and freedoms are freedom of speech (the speech variable), freedom of association (association), religious liberty and freedom of conscience (religion), equality before the law (equality), The right to vote and be a candidate in political elections (vote) and the right to legal protection against discrimination (discrimination 1.)  discrimination 2 measures a respondent’s willingness to see discrimination against minorities outlawed.  Two items, maintaining order (order) and giving people more say in government decision (more say) are extracted from the standard post-materialism battery.  Two items measuring a respondent’s interest in gender equality are drawn from a set of questions about the desirability of government involvement in a set of issues (gvt. gender equality) and personal involvement in those issues (ind. gender equality.)  Concern about the loss of traditional values is indicated by a set of questions eliciting a respondent’s greatest and least worries. National pride was measured by a standard questions asking how proud the respondent was to be of his/her nationality.  

Table 3.  Measures for each concept in the GALA/TAN ideological dimension:

Concept from Hooghe, Mark and Wilson 
Expert Survey Question	Mass Survey question from EB 47.1	GAL/TAN
Expectation	
democratic freedoms and rights 	Speech	+	
personal freedoms and rights	Association	+	
Freedom of speech			
unbridled freedom			
oppose discrimination [generic]	Discrimination1	+	
	Equality	+	
oppose discrimination on religious grounds	Religion	+	
oppose discrimination on ethnic grounds	Discrimination2	+	
oppose discrimination on sexual grounds	Gvt. Gender Equality	+	
	Ind. Gender Equality	+	
increased democratic participation		+	
unbridled participation	More Say		
widespread democracy	Vote	+	
“Traditional” “Moral voice”	National Pride	-	
	Traditional Values	-	
order preferable	Order	-	
			
Support for abortion.	No analogous survey		
Support for doctor-assisted suicide.	questions		
Support for same sex marriages.			
Government stay out of life choices			
Oppose discrimination on political grounds			

	As Table 3 indicates, all but three of these items were expected to be positively related to the GAL/TAN ideological cleavage.  As a crude test of the relationship between the GAL/TAN dimension and support for the EU, I simply summed each respondent’s scores for the first ten items, and subtracted the scores on the last three items.  The regression of EU support on this simple additive index is reported in Table 4.  The results are striking.  The GAL/TAN index is significantly and positively related to utilitarian support, but the effect is modest, and the explanatory power weak.  Affective support, however, shows a much stronger relationship to the “new politics’ dimension as measured here.  The explanatory power of this additive index is greater than that of the left-right or post-materialism models presented in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 4. Predicting EU support with a simple additive index of GAL/TAN survey items.

	Utilitarian Support	Affective Support	
	Model 11	Model 12	
Additive GAL/TAN scale	.825**
(.148)	1.627**
(.086)	
Constant	64.621**
(.567)	18.173**
(.327)	
Adjusted R2	.003	.030	
N	9753	11832	
* = p < .05    ** = p < .01

	The simple additive index does incorporate by fiat a number of testable assumptions.  The survey items may not all load onto an underlying GAL/TAN dimension in the expected direction, and they probably should not all be weighted equally.  In order to test these assumptions, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the GAL/TAN index.  Using principal components analysis restricted to a one factor solution, I generated the factor loadings reported in Table 5.  All but one of the items (national pride) load in the expected direction.  However, this one factor solution explains under a fifth of the variance in the survey items, suggesting that a uni-dimensional solution is not a very good representation of the underlying data.  All of the items from the battery of questions on personal rights and freedoms load above .5 on the extracted dimension, and only one other item loads above .1,which raises the suspicion that we have here an artifact of survey wording.  The extracted GAL/TAN factor is clearly dominated by the items on freedoms and rights, with the measures of support for gender equality, order and participation, national pride and traditional values contributing very little to this dimension.

Table 5.  Confirmatory factor analysis of GAL/TAN survey items.
(Principal Component extraction, restricted to one factor)

Survey question	Factor Loading	
Discrimination1	.654	
Religion	.642	
Association	.595	
Equality	.585	
Vote	.578	
Speech	.575	
Discrimination2	.353	
National Pride	.098	
More Say	.083	
Ind. Gender Equality	.025	
Gvt. Gender Equality	.021	
Traditional Values	-.038	
Order	-.174	
Variance Explained	18.2%	
Loadings over .5 highlighted.

The behavior of this factor when used to predict EU support is the inverse of the results for the additive index.  By identifying the extensive commonality between the measures of support for rights, and weighting these items most heavily, the confirmatory factor analysis produces a dimension which predicts utilitarian support much better than the simple additive index.  As table 6 indicates, the R squared for the prediction of utilitarian support with the extracted GAL/TAN factor is over five times larger than the corresponding statistic for model 11.  This improvement in prediction suggests that not all of the elements of the GAL/TAN additive index are related to utilitarian support, and that for some items the relationship may be the inverse of our expectation.  When the extracted factor is used to predict affective support, it seriously underperforms the additive index.  The R squared for model 12 is only a fourth that of model 12.  The items which were down-weighted as a result of the confirmatory factor analysis are clearly important predictors of affective support.

Table 6. Predicting EU support with index of GAL/TAN survey items extracted from confirmatory factor analysis.
	Utilitarian Support	Affective Support	
	Model 13	Model 14	
GAL/TAN factor	5.068**
(.400)	2.189**
(.523)	
Constant	66.810**
(.398)	22.568**
(.523)	
Adjusted R2	.016	.007	
N	9753	11832	
* = p < .05    ** = p < .01

Exploring the GAL/TAN dimensions

	Since the results of the confirmatory factor analysis suggest that a one factor solution leaves much of the variance in the survey unexplained, one may reasonably wonder whether these items actually cluster on a number of different dimensions.  At this point, I turn to exploratory factor analysis to discern the factor structure of the GAL/TAN dimension.  Again I used principal components, but now extracted all factors with eigenvalues above the default cutoff values of 1.0.  The result was a five factor solution which explained over half of the variance in the survey items, a threefold increase in explanatory power.  Exploratory factor analysis provides an unambiguous indication of the amount of information lost when a set of variables are described in terms of a limited number of underlying dimensions.  However, the substantive meaning of these dimensions is not always clear.  By rotating the axes identified in factor analysis, the loadings of each variable on the underlying dimensions changes, and one can produce an infinite number of different five factor solutions which will fit the present data equally well (Kim and Mueller 1978, p.38). Some of these rotated solutions will be more easily interpretable than others, and the choice among alternative factor solutions can be as much an art as a science, since there is no simple statistic which allows us to distinguish among these models.
	In Appendix B, I present the factor matrix from the un-rotated five factor solution alongside three different rotations for this five factor model.  The two orthogonal rotation methods used were varimax rotation which “attempts to minimize the number of variables that have high loadings on a factor,” and equamax rotation which “is a combination of the varimax method which simplifies factors and the quartimax method which simplifies variables.”  (Norusis 1990,p328-329). These rotation methods are orthogonal because they retain the assumption that the factors are uncorrelated.  An oblique (oblimin) rotation was also estimated in order to test the stability of the rotated factor solutions once the underlying factors were allowed to correlate.  (Norusis 1990 p335).
	By construction, the first factor extracted by the un-rotated factor solution is identical to the single factor from the confirmatory factor analysis presented in table 5.  The second factor is clearly an order vs. participation factor with a high positive loading for “maintaining order in the nation” and a negative loading for “giving people more say.”  The third factor reflects support for gender equality, with high loadings for both of the gender equality questions.  The fourth factor is positively associated with freedom of speech and association, but negatively associated with protection from discrimination.  A tentative interpretation of this factor could be as an equality vs. liberty dimension, but its meaning shifts once the factor solution is rotated.  The fifth factor is a nationalism and tradition factor, with high loadings for concern over the loss of traditional values and national pride.
The three rotated solutions yielded remarkably similar solutions, and the oblique rotation indicated very little correlation across the factors.  The only factor loadings to change significantly from the non-rotated to the rotated solutions are those for the freedom and rights questions.  In all of the rotated solutions, support for the classic civil liberties of freedom of speech and association loaded together on one factor, which I choose to interpret as negative rights, or freedom from state interference.  Most of the other elements form the rights and freedoms battery, items such as protection from discrimination which may require state action in their defense, loaded most highly on another factor which I interpret as positive rights.  This pair of factors was identified by the oblique rotation as having the highest intercorrelation at .2.  The stability of this result across rotations is encouraging, and the fact that questions from the same rights and liberties battery load across multiple factors suggests that these factors are not simply artifacts of similar question wording.
	The choice among rotated solutions is trivial, as they all yield similar results.  In the interest of simplicity and replicability, I have elected to use the varimax rotated solution as the basis for factor scores on the five dimensions which seem to compose the GAL/TAN ideological cleavage.  I then regressed utilitarian and affective support on these five factors, as well as the measures of left right ideology and ideological extremity.  These results, presented in Table 7, demonstrate why the additive GAL/TAN index was such a good predictor of affective support, and a poor predictor of utilitarian support.  Affective support is positively related to the positive rights, negative rights, gender equality, and participation factors, and negatively related to the nationalism and tradition factor.  This parallels the construction of the additive index, and the more sophisticated weighting of survey questions produced by the five factor solution only improves the explanatory power of the additive index slightly from .030 (Model 12 ) to .034 (Model 17.)  

Table 7.  Predicting EU support with the exploratory factor analyses of GAL/TAN survey items.  
(Principal Components extraction with varimax rotation, all eigenvalues over 1.0 retained.)

	Utilitarian Support	Affective Support	
	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	
GAL/TAN Factors					
  Positive Rights	5.726**
(.397)	5.529**
(.429)	2.350**
(.232)	2.223**
(.249)	
  Negative Rights	1.237**
(.399)	1.499**
(.423)	.309
(.231)	.337
(.246)	
  Participation	-1.193**
(.395)	-.994*
(.422)	2.635**
(.231)	2.578**
(.248)	
  Gender Equality	.878*
(.395)	1.133**
(.421)	.647**
(.232)	.612*
(.248)	
  Nationalism/ Tradition	1.394**
(.396)	1.073*
(.427)	-3.115**
(.233)	-3.057**
(.251)	
Left-Right		.392
(.208)		-.549**
(.122)	
Left-Right Extremity		-.343**
(.074)		.113*
(.043)	
Constant	66.814**
(.397)	66.609**
(1.233)	22.595**
(.232)	25.186**
(.723)	
Adjusted R2	.024	.025	.034	.038	
N	9753	8571	11832	10238	
* = p < .05    ** = p < .01

	The GAL/TAN factors break in opposite directions when used to predict utilitarian support.  While positive rights, negative rights, and gender equality factors are all positively related to utilitarian support, the participation factor is negatively related to utilitarian support, while the nationalism factor shows a positively relationship.  The contradictory effects of these factors drive down the explanatory power of the simple additive index to .003 (Model 11) while allowing for their disparate effects boosts the R squared eightfold to .024 (Model 15).  The positive result for the nationalism and tradition factor is puzzling at first.  One explanation is that utilitarian support is an assessment of the benefits of membership, rather than a projection of the possible future effects of a deeper and ever closer union.  The contemporary EU may not threaten national identities.
	Adding left-right ideology to the models does not change the effects of the GAL/TAN dimensions substantially.  The effects of left-right ideology are, however, somewhat larger that they were in the models which did not include the GAL/TAN factors (Models 3 and 6.)  Again, the contrast between utilitarian and affective support is striking.  Utilitarian support is highest on the right, although the relationship is curvilinear, with support dropping off at the far right, and diving on the far left.  Affective support is highest on the left, and the very slight curvilinearity is in the opposite direction, indicating that the rate of increase in affective support is highest on the far left, and the decrease in affective support basically flattens out on the far right.
		At this point, one is faced with two rather different portraits of the Europhile and euroskeptic, depending on the type of support under consideration.  As regards utilitarian support, the Europhile is a center-right supporter of traditional civil liberties and freedoms who has an expansive and absolutist conception of civil rights.  This patriot is also concerned with gender equality, traditional values, and is willing to trade off some popular participation in exchange for the maintenance of order.  The affective Europhile is a leftist who values participation above order, is not attached to traditional values or national identity, and supports a diverse set of claims for rights and equality.  This difference in the ideological profile of the utilitarian and affective Europhile suggests that the two types of support are very different indeed, and may not even refer to support for the same object or project.  The results below reinforce that suspicion.

Support for EU Policymaking
	Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2000) have examined the relationship at the level of political parties between the left-right and GAL/TAN dimensions and support for specific EU policies.  Their analysis focused on six major policy areas, the powers of the European parliament, EU fiscal policy, employment policy, cohesion policy, environmental policy, and asylum policy.  They generally find a strong association between the GAL/TAN cleavage and support for EU policy, and a weaker one between the left-right dimension and these same policies.  Interestingly, while parties on the right are slightly more in favor of European integration (r = .17) they are more opposed to each of the policy options listed (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2000: Table 3).  In general, parties on the GAL side of the GAL/TAN cleavage are more supportive of EU policy than are parties at the TAN end of that dimension. 

	In order to replicate that analysis as closely as possible, I attempted to measure public support for the same six policy areas.  Indicators of support for specific EU level policies were drawn from two sets of questions.  From a set of propositions about possible EU policies, I pulled an indicator of support for the single currency and a measure of support for giving the European Parliament equal standing in the legislative process with the Council of Ministers.  From a battery of questions about the appropriate level (National or European) for policymaking, I took indicators of support for European policymaking in the areas of employment, aid to poor regions, environmental protection, and political asylum.  The correlations between these policy level measures and the ideological dimensions are presented in Table 8.
	The results for left-right ideology are particularly interesting given our findings above about utilitarian and affective support.  Despite the positive relationship between the right and utilitarian support for integration, support for these specific policies is associated with the left, echoing our finding about affective support.  Likewise, the pattern of relationships across the GAL/TAN dimensions is also closer to that observed for affective than for utilitarian support.  For the questions about the preferred level of policymaking (employment, regional aid, environment, and asylum) the participation factor is positively related to EU level policymaking, while the national tradition factor is negative related to these items. Most policy items correlate positively with both the positive rights factor and the negative rights factor.  Interestingly, increased rights for the EP is negatively (though not significantly) correlated with the participation dimension, suggesting at the least that the European Parliament is not viewed as a viable venue for “giving people more say” in important decisions.

Table 8.  Correlations of support for euro-policies with ideology and overall support measures.

	Greater EP Rights	Common Currency	Employment	Regional Aid	Environmental policy	Asylum policy	
GAL/TAN Factors							
1 Positive Rights	.093**	.113**	.067**	.099**	.078**	.009	
2 Negative Rights	.064**	.082**	.030**	.009	.000	.038**	
3 Participation	-.014	.003	.047**	.032**	.041**	.026**	
4 Gender Equality	.014	.017	.011	.015	.017	.031**	
5 National Tradition	-.008	-.017	-.062**	-.040**	-.098**	-.042**	
							
Left-Right Ideology	-.048**	-.022*	-.026**	-.007	-.033**	-.035**	
Postmaterialism	-.016	.032**	.055**	.070**	.087**	.013	
							
Support for EU							
    Utilitarian Support	.234**	.469**	.220**	.244**	.209**	.114**	
    Affective Support	.123**	.271**	.130**	.175**	.188**	.129**	
							
* = p < .05    ** = p < .01

However, these results cannot be interpreted to mean that support for specific EU policies is more closely related to affective than to utilitarian support.  Table 8 also reports the correlations between these policy indicators and the indices of utilitarian and affective support.  With the exception of asylum policy, utilitarian support always has the larger correlation with each policy item.  Nonetheless, to sum up the results of this table, the greatest support for this set of EU policies is to be found on the participatory left, among those who value democratic freedoms and rights, and have a nontraditional and cosmopolitan orientation.

Caveat and Conclusion
Before engaging in speculation about the implications of these findings, a word of caution is in order.  The positive association of the nationalism factor with utilitarian support is provocative, but one must consider the wording of the survey questions used to measure utilitarian support.  The first question reads “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?.”  The second is posed as follows: ”Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the European Union is ...?”[a good thing, bad thing, etc.]  This explicitly naming of the respondent’s nation in the survey question may be influencing the responses of interviewees.  It is possible that nationalists may be prompted to approve of anything their country does (including EU membership) and may be disinclined to believe that the nation they are so attached to is engaged in an enterprise from which there is no benefit.
That warning aside, what do these results mean for the future of European Union politics?  One of the major results is that the new politics dimension(s), especially as measured by the GAL/TAN factors, is a much more powerful predictor of support for the EU than is the traditional left-right dimension.  This is the case even when the curvilinear nature of the relationship with left-right ideology is taken into consideration.  The predominance of the GAL/TAN dimensions is clear both for affective and for utilitarian support, as well as for specific EU policy areas.  To the extent that national political conflict is structured along the left-right dimension, it will be difficult for national political systems to address European issues.  Conversely, realignment along GAL/TAN lines may ease the integration of national and European political discourses.
The likelihood of such a realignment at the national level is may seem doubtful given the apparent multiplicity of GAL/TAN dimensions.  However, it is not necessary for GAL/TAN ideology to be completely uni-dimensional in order for it to an effective political shorthand for issues of European integration.  The association of European issues with basic political orientations such as the defense of individual rights, or the maintenance of order, may allow voters to infer positions on European issues from leaders’ stances on these basic questions.  If so, then ideology will be able to play its information processing role, even if the political landscape is not neatly divided between pro and anti European parties.

Another of the striking findings from this research is the difference between the ideological loading of utilitarian and affective support for the European Union.  Indeed, one may wonder whether the indicator of affective support is truly measuring affective support for the EU itself, or perhaps affective support for an alternative supranational state- one which is not the current European Union.  The high utilitarian support of nationalists noted above, and the large difference in the left-right loading of utilitarian and affective support suggest that the connection between supranational institutions and a supranational identity is weak at best.  Indeed, a glance at the websites of a number of “euroskeptical” parties reveals few calls for the abolition of the EU, or the withdrawal of any of its 15 members.  This suggests that even Euroskeptics admit that their nation’s membership in the EU is a “good thing.”  Perhaps this growing divorce between affective and utilitarian support will leave the “TAN” right in the position of defending the current institutional arrangements of the EU against attempts to reform the institutions in a more supranational direction.  If so, this will add an ideological brake to the national divergences which have complicated the negotiations of the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.  It will also, paradoxically, signal the breadth of support for the EU, and the solidity of its institutions.

References

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Gabel, Matthew J. and Simon Hix.  1999  "One or two Dimensions in EU Politics?  An Empirical Study of the European Elections Manifestos, 1979-1990"  Paper prepared for presentation at the conference on "Contestation in the European Union: European Integration as a New Issue."  University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 30-31 August 1999.

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Appendix A: Operationalization of variables

Utilitarian Support for the European Union
Q.16 Taking everything into consideration, would you say that
(OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a
member of the European Union?

Q.15 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S)
membership of the European Union is ...? (READ OUT)
1. A good thing
2. Neither good nor bad
3. A bad thing 

Affective Support for the European Union
Q.19 In the near future do you see yourself as ...? (READ
OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)
1. (NATIONALITY) only
2. (NATIONALITY) and European
3. European and (NATIONALITY)
4. European only

Left-Right Ideology 
Right is derived from D.1 “In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the
right". How would you place your views on this scale?” 1 = left, 10 = right.
Extreme = (5-right)2

Post Materialism is measured using the standard index of postmaterialism constructed from Q.4a and Q4b. “There is a lot of talk these days about what (OUR COUNTRY)’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most important in the long run?  And what would be your second choice?”
Respondents naming both “Maintaining order in the country” and “Fighting rising prices” are coded as Materialist, and given a 0 on the postmaterialism scale.  
Respondents naming both “Giving the people more say in important government
decision” and ”Protecting freedom of speech” are coded as Postmaterialist, and given a 2 on the postmaterialism scale.  
Others are coded as Mixed and given a 1 on the postmaterialism scale.

Elements of the New Politics index
Order  from Q.4a and Q4b. There is a lot of talk these days about what (OUR COUNTRY)’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most important in the long run?  And what would be your second choice? (SHOW CARD - ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Respondents naming “Maintaining order in the country” as most important coded 2, those naming it as a second choice coded 1, others coded 0.

More Say  from Q.4a and Q4b. There is a lot of talk these days about what (OUR COUNTRY)’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most important in the long run?  And what would be your second choice? (SHOW CARD - ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Respondents naming “Giving the people more say in important government decisions” as most important coded 2, those naming it as a second choice coded 1, others coded 0.

National Pride.  Q.40 Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very
proud, not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY AS SPECIFIED IN
QUESTION 1 OF QUESTIONAIRE)?

Traditional Values.  This measure is based on Q.43a.  “I am going to read out a list of some of the big political and social issues of our time. Could you please tell me which three you are most worried about?  And which three are you are least worried about?”  Respondents selecting “The loss of traditional values” as one of their top 3 concerns were coded 1.  Respondents selecting “The loss of traditional values” as one of their least worries were coded –1.

Gvt. Gender Equality.  Q44a Could you please tell me which three of the following
aims you think the (NATIONALITY) governments should address as
a priority? (SHOW CARD - THREE ANSWERS MAXIMUM)
Respondents naming “Equality of men and women” scored 1, others 0

Ind. Gender Equality.  Q44b, a continuation of Q44a above.  “And which are the three aims you personally would be most willing to commit yourself to?”  Respondents naming “Equality of men and women” scored 1, others 0

The following variables are derived from a battery of questions about civil and political rights.
Q.46 For each of the following rights and freedoms, could you please tell me whether you think they should be respected under all circumstances, or whether this depends on the circumstances? (SHOW CARD) Respondents answering “All circumstances” are coded 1, all others are coded 0.
Speech: Freedom of Speech
Association: Freedom of Association
Religion: Religious liberty and freedom of conscience
Equality: Equality before the law
Vote: The right to vote and be a candidate in political elections
Discrimination1: The right to legal protection against discrimination

Discrimination2.  From Q. 49 For each of the following opinions, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?  Discrimination in the job market on grounds of a person’s race, religion or culture should be outlawed.  Respondents who “Tend to agree” score 1, respondents who “Tend to disagree” score –1, all others score 0.

European Policy Preference questions
From Euro proposal battery: Q.22 What is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it.
Currency Q.22_1 There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Union (M)
EP rights  Q.22_6 In matters of European Union legislation, taxation and expenditure, the European Parliament should have equal rights with the Council of Ministers, which represents the national governments

From level of governance battery: Q.23 Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?
Employment: “the fight against unemployment”
Regional Aid: “supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties”
Environmental policy: “protection of the environment”
Asylum policy: “rules for political asylum”

Appendix B:  Rotated five factor solutions for GAL/TAN survey items.  

	Loadings for Unrotated Solution		Loadings from Varimax Rotation		
Survey question	Factor 1	Factor 2 	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Survey question	Factor 1	Factor 2 	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	
Traditional Values	-.038	.209	-.170	.256	.634	Traditional Values	-.126	.051	-.117	-.092	.717	
National Pride	.098	.277	-.014	.026	.683	National Pride	.129	-.024	-.088	.056	.725	
Gvt. Gender Equality	.020	-.113	.778	.068	.139	Gvt. Gender Equality	-.033	.040	-.036	.799	.023	
Ind. Gender Equality	.025	-.165	.763	-.021	.084	Ind. Gender Equality	.022	-.017	.022	.783	-.058	
Order	-.174	.816	.132	-.137	-.108	Order	-.038	-.075	-.855	-.027	.081	
More Say	.083	-.818	-.178	.076	.202	More Say	.019	-.049	.867	-.006	-.003	
Speech	.575	.081	.055	.465	-.198	Speech	.115	.761	.002	.029	-.060	
Association	.595	.128	.002	.507	-.122	Association	.112	.792	-.006	-.016	.040	
Religion	.642	.071	-.024	-.099	.036	Religion	.554	.343	.005	-.015	.058	
Equality	.585	.047	-.063	-.266	-.071	Equality	.609	.203	-.018	-.072	-.077	
Vote	.578	.018	.010	.073	.089	Vote	.398	.409	.078	.037	.122	
Discrimination1	.645	.021	.014	-.326	.048	Discrimination1	.710	.179	.017	.029	.010	
Discrimination2	.343	-.068	.005	-.593	.118	Discrimination2	.653	-.242	.044	.033	-.010	

Loadings from Equamax Rotation		
Structure Matrix from Oblique Rotation (OBLIMIN)	
Survey question	Factor 1	Factor 2 	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Survey question	Factor 1	Factor 2 	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	
Traditional Values	-.134	.041	.011	-.092	.716	Traditional Values	-.118	.019	-.104	.047	.715	
National Pride	.126	-.018	-.087	.056	.726	National Pride	.125	.109	.046	.004	.728	
Gvt. Gender Equality	-.035	.038	-.004	.799	.023	Gvt. Gender Equality	-.020	-.004	.798	.032	.012	
Ind. Gender Equality	.023	-.016	.023	.783	-.058	Ind. Gender Equality	.028	.034	.784	-.019	-.070	
Order	-.026	-.076	-.855	.027	.081	Order	-.064	.859	-.038	-.082	.105	
More Say	.014	-.050	.867	-.059	-.003	More Say	.031	-.866	.004	-.042	-.033	
Speech	.069	.767	-.005	.005	-.057	Speech	.203	-.024	.031	.768	.025	
Association	.062	.797	-.004	-.004	.043	Association	.203	-.012	-.016	.801	.077	
Religion	.532	.377	.011	.011	.063	Religion	.590	-.032	-.009	.414	.087	
Equality	.596	.241	-.012	-.012	-.072	Equality	.627	-.012	-.062	.280	-.050	
Vote	.370	.432	.083	.083	.126	Vote	.444	-.098	.041	.459	.146	
Discrimination1	.697	.222	.024	.024	.016	Discrimination1	.726	-.048	.038	.270	.036	
Discrimination2	.666	-.202	.049	.050	-.006	Discrimination2	.621	-.062	.044	-.155	-.005	
56.3% of the variance in the survey questions is explained by a five factor solution.  All loadings over .5 highlighted.