Gli effetti dell'allargamento sui processi decisionali del Consiglio dell'UE

Abstract

We propose a framework to analyze the effects of enlargement of the EU on decisions in the Council of the European Union. We focus on understanding the collective choices that would be made if countries were to vote sincerely. We regard these hypothetical collective choices as important inputs into the negotiations that determine the actual decisions. In particular, we examine the set of stable (i.e.. undominated) outcomes for a particular decision rule. We show how the size and location of the set of stable outcomes is changed by including a set of new members whose interests have means and/or variances different from those of the original members. We illustrate these effects using data on three particular issues, involving gender equality, energy use, and the environment. We suggest that there may be many issues where the new countries have different means and wider variances than the original countries; in which case, the most important effect of adding the new countries is to expand the range of stable outcomes and thereby make it more difficult for the EU to act. Finally, we show that replacing the present qualified majority rule with a newly proposed rule that requires a majority of the countries including at least 60% of the population would tend to counteract some effects of adding the new countries.