Online Papers
Please quote unpublished work only with permission. Comments welcome!Abstract: Philip
Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a
conception of explanatory
unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to
wit, that in our drive to
unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world
and consequently
produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that
Kitcher's attempt to
address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to
choose between rival
patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice
having already been
made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not
likely to endorse.
"Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not, " The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2007) 58: 423-450
Abstract: Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and non-naturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's account, on the other hand, appears to be unable to similarly explain the reliability of mathematical practice without violating one of its central tenets. (Link is to published version.)
Abstract:
This
paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics,
codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on
Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception
of
naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of
belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth.
Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of
these commitments.
"On Naturalizing the
Epistemology
of
Mathematics," Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly
(2009) 90: 63-97
Abstract: In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e., that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.
Abstract: In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e., that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.
"Concept Grounding and
Knowledge
of Set Theory," Philosophia (2010) 38: 179-193
Abstract: C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what's the case in arithmetic doesn't rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with 'a priori'. I'm here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins's account beyond arithmetic--in particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins's account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely.
Abstract: C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what's the case in arithmetic doesn't rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with 'a priori'. I'm here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins's account beyond arithmetic--in particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins's account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely.
"A Euthyphronic Problem for
Kitcher's Epistemology of Science," Southern Journal of Philosophy (2009) 47: 205-223
Abstract: Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science which purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not, but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.
Abstract: Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science which purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not, but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.
"Nominalism and Causal Theories of Reference," SATS--Nordic Journal of Philosophy (2010) 10: 51-68
Abstract: According to contemporary nominalism, there are no abstracta. A common way of arguing against the existence of abstracta deploys a causal theory of reference. In short, we have no good reason to believe in what we cannot refer to and, since reference is causal and abstracta are causally isolated, we cannot refer to abstracta. In this paper, I examine just how far this sort of argument takes nominalism.
Abstract: According to contemporary nominalism, there are no abstracta. A common way of arguing against the existence of abstracta deploys a causal theory of reference. In short, we have no good reason to believe in what we cannot refer to and, since reference is causal and abstracta are causally isolated, we cannot refer to abstracta. In this paper, I examine just how far this sort of argument takes nominalism.
"On a Dogma (or Two) of HPC
Naturalism," under revision
Abstract: An important variety of Quinean naturalism, advocated by Richard Boyd and Hilary Kornblith, is based on a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) conception of natural kinds. Two of the most distinctive and striking features of this HPC naturalism are its wholesale rejections of apriority and foundationalist epistemology. These are connected. HPC naturalists understand foundationalism so that it requires a priori beliefs of some sort, either beliefs concerning inferential principles or foundational beliefs themselves or both. Hence, no a priori beliefs implies no foundationalist epistemology. In this paper, I consider the compatibility of HPC naturalism with the a priori and foundationalist epistemology. I contend that wholesale rejections of apriority and foundationalism are inessential to HPC naturalism.
''MAXIMIZE and the Axiom of Choice," under revision
Abstract: A pressing issue in contemporary foundations of mathematics is how to augment Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) with new axioms. Given that there are incompatible augmentations of ZFC, we need a principled way of deciding between conflicting new axiom candidates. Penelope Maddy has proposed an account of the methodology of mathematics, mathematical naturalism, that purportedly provides an account of how to make such decisions. This paper argues that a problem for her account recognized by Maddy, viz., the problem of false negatives, is more acute than she realizes.
Abstract: An important variety of Quinean naturalism, advocated by Richard Boyd and Hilary Kornblith, is based on a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) conception of natural kinds. Two of the most distinctive and striking features of this HPC naturalism are its wholesale rejections of apriority and foundationalist epistemology. These are connected. HPC naturalists understand foundationalism so that it requires a priori beliefs of some sort, either beliefs concerning inferential principles or foundational beliefs themselves or both. Hence, no a priori beliefs implies no foundationalist epistemology. In this paper, I consider the compatibility of HPC naturalism with the a priori and foundationalist epistemology. I contend that wholesale rejections of apriority and foundationalism are inessential to HPC naturalism.
''MAXIMIZE and the Axiom of Choice," under revision
Abstract: A pressing issue in contemporary foundations of mathematics is how to augment Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) with new axioms. Given that there are incompatible augmentations of ZFC, we need a principled way of deciding between conflicting new axiom candidates. Penelope Maddy has proposed an account of the methodology of mathematics, mathematical naturalism, that purportedly provides an account of how to make such decisions. This paper argues that a problem for her account recognized by Maddy, viz., the problem of false negatives, is more acute than she realizes.
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