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Eric Voegelin Society Meeting 2009
Copyright
2009 Sarah Shea, Ph.D. Candidate
Contents
Abstract
Introduction
I. The Dark Psychology of
Nietzsche
a. Evil, Ressentiment,
and Bad Conscience
b. Evil as Necessary
c. Evil in Modernity
II. Voegelin on the Sensitivity of
Nietzsche: Nietzsche as a Profound Pneumopathologist
a. Ressentiment
Reevaluated
b. Nietzsche's Platonism
c. Zarathustra as Attempting the
Impossible
Conclusion
Abstract
According to
Voegelin's interpretation of Nietzsche, which heavily rests in a Platonic
reading of him, the problem of evil arose out of a particular spiritual
disillusionment that that came with the advent of Christianity, but was not
there prior to it. Because Christianity has unique and unprecedented insights
into the nature of the human condition,
recognizing death and suffering as the two greatest problems of man,
Christianity offers salvation and redemption through the fully man-God, Jesus
Christ, as a way out of the problem. Nietzsche rightly identifies the problem
of evil itself to be false, therefore, acknowledging that no true solution can
be offered to a false problem; the false problem being the sickness itself,
Christianity.
Nietzsche's
most political figure, Zarathustra, overcomes the problem of evil in the three
metamorphoses of the spirit, only further recognizing the problem to be a "war
of the spirits." As it is typical of scholars to interpret Zarathustra as
radically individualistic because of his loss of transcendence and faith in
society, on the contrary, given Voegelin's reading of Nietzsche and the
Platonic emphasis on the spirit, it is possible to argue that Zarathustra is
not as resigned in spiritual solitude as he is typically portrayed, rather,
there is a greater care for the Politeia.
This is made palpable by Zarathustra bringing the tablet to the demos
and the desire for love that is apparent, arguably so, throughout the text.
Drawing on
Voegelin's interpretation of Nietzsche, this paper will argue that
Zarathustra successfully overcomes the problem of evil through a reevaluation
of values, that does not leave him merely godless and isolated as it has often
been suggested, but with an entirely new perspective that touches on a
Platonic attitude of the Politeia
with an emphasis on the order of the will as inextricably parallel to the
order of society. However, given that society is always its dominant human
being type writ large, Zarathustra fails to convince the herd. As a result,
Christianity and the problem of evil continue to pervade the spirit of Western
civilization.
Judgments,
value judgments concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never
be true: they possess value only as symptoms, they come into consideration
only as symptoms - in themselves such judgments are stupidities.
-
(http://www.losanjealous.com/nfc/)
This paper will address Nietzsche and the problem of evil as it is
generally interpreted in his critique of morality and epitomized in ressentiment;
however, this paper will also challenge the traditional interpretation of ressentiment
by turning to Voegelin's analysis of Nietzsche in Nietzsche,
the Crisis and the War. By challenging the general interpretation of evil
using Voegelin's insights, the intent is not to deconstruct the previous
work done by scholars on Nietzsche and evil, which is counterproductive, but
to raise questions and provoke dialogue regarding evil as it continues to
effect modern society through valueless nihilism. Furthermore, Voegelin
credits Nietzsche with having predicted evil as "to come," illuminating
Nietzsche's profound insight into the future because of his keen sight and
sensitivity to the current spiritual decay of his age. Zarathustra, who is
Nietzsche's most prominent political figure, embodies what is necessary to
overcome the evils of the future, which is made clear in the three
metamorphoses of the spirit and in his delivery of the message of the overman
to the herd. But, the apparent ambiguity in Nietzsche's text does not
provide enough of a solid prescription to stand up to the hardness of his
diagnosis and the souls of moderns are still left without a proper home.
The grand scale which the topic of evil and modernity is addressed in
this paper is barely penetrated, let alone exhausted. Nevertheless, it is my
hope that this paper raises further questions regarding Nietzsche and evil, as
well as Voegelin's interest in Nietzsche and his political thought.
I. The Dark Psychology of
Nietzsche
a. Evil, Ressentiment
and Bad Conscience
For
Nietzschean scholars, it is commonly perceived and repeatedly taken for
granted, that Nietzsche's understanding of evil is derived from his critique
of morality.
[1]
Prior to the advent of Christianity, there was no "problem" of
evil; in fact, with Christianity and the rise of the priestly type of human
beings, there has been a great inversion of the values of good and evil.
Nietzsche introduces the priestly class by describing them as: "the
most evil enemies -- but why? Because they are the most impotent. It is
because of their impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny
proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred."
[2]
The monstrous and spiritual hatred to which Nietzsche is referring
is ressentiment. Ressentiment is the edifice of Nietzsche's moral psychology
regarding evil. Max Scheler, for example, has attempted to "correct"
Nietzsche's history of morality and his understanding of ressentiment by arguing that the Christian love of neighbor is at
the "spiritual core" of man. Scheler argues ressentiment
cannot be the true spirit of a Christian because it ultimately contradicts the
Christian virtues.
[3]
However, Scheler in spite of his failed attempts to champion
Christianity over Nietzsche's critique rightly defines the two
characteristics that epitomize ressentiment.
In
the natural meaning of the French word [ressentiment]
I detect two elements. First of all, ressentiment is the repeated experiencing
and reliving of a particular emotional response reaction against someone else.
The continual reliving of the emotion sinks it more deeply into the center of
the personality, but concomitantly removes it from the person's zone of
action and expression. It is not a mere intellectual recollection of the
emotion and of the events to which it "responded" -- it is a
re-experiencing of the emotion itself, a renewal of the original feeling.
Secondly, the word implied that the quality of this emotion is negative, i.e.,
that it contains a movement of hostility. Perhaps the German world "Groll"
(rancor) comes closest to the essential meaning of the term. "Rancor" is
just such a suppressed wrath, independent of the ego's activity, which moves
obscurely through the mind. It finally takes shape through the repeated
reliving of intentionalities of hatred or other hostile intention, but it
nourishes any number of such intentions.
[4]
In Scheler's understanding of ressentiment,
it is an emotional response to something that has occurred in the past, but is
constantly being re-lived and re-experienced in the present. Time and
situation is critical in understanding the magnitude of ressentiment.
Still, in Scheler's definition, ressentiment
appears to be nothing more than harboring a grudge, or the German "Groll"
as he calls it. The seriousness of ressentiment
as being a spiritual and psychological phenomenon that provokes Nietzsche to
question conventional morality and the condition and health of Western society
is diluted and reduced to insipid epiphenomenalism.
b. Evil as Necessary
Nietzsche's
interpretation of evil is multi-layered, however. Nietzsche stresses the
importance of recognizing one's evil impulses in order to become master of
himself. Since the will to power is a type of "creative Eros" as Kaufmann
calls it, man requires knowledge of both the good and beautiful, and the evil
and ugly in order to perfect himself.
[5]
Once man becomes conscious of his evil impulses, he becomes
schizophrenic -- divided against himself; his rational consciousness on one
hand, and on the other, his irrational consciousness.
[6]
Man is constantly battling his rational and irrational passions.
Nevertheless, in spite of this ongoing war of the spirits, man is not to
sublimate his passions; self-overcoming is accomplished through man "burning
a No into his own soul."
[7]
Man must recognize his impulses as "evil" and contemptuous and
ought to become cognizant of the contradiction between good and evil.
This
secret self-violation, this artist's cruelty, this desire to give form to
oneself as a piece of difficult, resisting, suffering matter, to brand it with
a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a no', this uncanny,
terrible but joyous labor of a soul voluntarily split within itself, which
makes itself suffer out of the pleasure of making suffer, this whole active
bad conscience' has finally -- we have already guessed -- as true womb
of ideal and imaginative events, brought a wealth of novel, disconcerting
beauty and affirmation to light, and perhaps for the first time, beauty
itself. . . What would be beautiful',
if the contrary to it had not first come to awareness of itself, if ugliness
had not first said to itself: I am ugly'?
[8]
Nietzsche interprets "bad
conscience" as a sickness, but insofar as pregnancy is like a sickness.
[9]
The term "sickness" implies that something is to be overcome
-- an overcoming of ressentiment,
of evil, of the sickness that man's consciousness is plagued with. Bad
conscience is a necessary evil for man; in order to fully appreciate beauty,
man must appreciate pain and suffering.
[10]
Moreover, bad conscious is not a negative concept. It is
intrinsically linked to Nietzsche's notion of agon.
[11]
c. Evil in Modernity
It appears as
though Nietzsche's critique of morality is straightforward, in fact, it is
twofold: Western society's conception of evil is based on the negative and
poisonous elements of ressentiment
epitomized through the inversion of the values of good and evil. The "problem
of evil" is a careful construction created by the priestly class; a great
lie meant to distort the reality of the noble-minded for control. To the
contrary, Nietzsche interprets ressentiment
in-itself as the true problem. The intellectual dishonesty that plagues such
negativity has become easier to sustain within Western society because all
traces of a healthy world have washed away, leaving our current state of
morality in chaos and confusion. Nietzsche writes: "the man of ressentiment
is neither upright nor nave nor honest and straightforward with himself. His
soul squints; his spirit loves
hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his
world, his security his
refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to
wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. All races of such
men of ressentiment are bound to
become eventually cleverer than any
noble race."
[12]
Ressentiment
is a psychological phenomenon; since it takes form as dialectic, it has given
birth to a set of values that sit as the foundation for Western morality as it
is practiced today. The longer ressentiment
is left to fester within society, it completely undermines valuation.
Considering the problem of evil has been described as twofold, the common
response is twofold as well. Either human beings are to overcome the challenge
posed by ressentiment through the
difficult and arduous process of the reevaluation of values, or they are to
ignore it and bask in the mediocrity of their existence in nihilism. The
former response is challenging and difficult; essentially it is asking human
beings to rise above their mediocrity and face the challenge of ressentiment
head-on, guns blazing, and hopefully with the strength of soul able to create
new values once the old ones are destroyed. Moral relativism is a constant
threat to society if the challenge is not met in all seriousness, however. If
new values cannot be created, then human beings are plunged head-first into
moral relativism, again the consequence resulting in nihilism. Also, nihilism
is a silent-response to ressentiment.
Human beings always have the option to turn away from false ideologies by
nature, yet since turning away from these things is messy and complex, and the
intellectual lies created by society have become more cunning, convincing, and
elaborate, human beings are often content to leave things as they are.
The general
understanding of Nietzsche's interpretation of the problem of evil is
multifaceted and intricate. Nietzsche and evil is a topic that has been
pursued by many scholars, including Susan Neiman and Richard J. Bernstein, who
have traced the origins of this problem back to Christianity and ressentiment; undoubtedly their influence is apparent in the
analysis above. An exegetical reading of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals provides excellent insight into the nature and
psychology underlining the source of the problem of evil and how it continues
to influence the course of Western thought. Since the problem of evil is
something that has been created by man and his sickly spirit, it is up to man
to decide to overcome it. Still, man must first acknowledge what he has
initially perceived to be evil is false. The true problem is acknowledging
what has been falsely defined "the problem of evil," thus realizing there
is no "problem" per se, but evil is epitomized in the spiritual attitude
of ressentiment. At the same time, evil is necessary in order to
understand the good and beautiful. It is imperative that man's bad
conscience recognizes his intimations are evil, therefore removing the
negative connotations associated with the term evil, but not defining it as
"positive," but necessary. Nevertheless, if evil is not a negative concept
for Nietzsche, how can ressentiment
be generally defined as "evil?" If ressentiment
is interpreted as "evil" in the negative sense as intentionally doing
harm, ressentiment is defined by the
traditional morality from which it is created. How can ressentiment be the epitome of evil for Nietzsche? Part of the
reason why Nietzsche carefully chose to use the original French term, ressentiment
and why it has not been translated from its French origins is because
there is no English or German equivalent. Scholars are incorrect to assume
that "evil" is merely a synonym for ressentiment
and the two are interchangeable.
The
premises which Voegelin structures his study of Nietzsche in Nietzsche,
the Crisis and the War builds on the general interpretation of Nietzsche's
critique of morality but furthers it by recognizing that the problems that
began with ressentiment have shifted
and modernity now faces the challenges posed by nihilism. Modern interpreters
of Nietzsche and evil have frequently limited the seriousness of ressentiment by reducing it to a conscious confusion, but in doing
so; have overlooked Nietzsche's emphasis on the spirit. Voegelin recovers
the importance of the spirit for Nietzsche by reading his work through a
Platonic lens, thus recapturing the essence of ressentiment
as a spiritual problem. However, ressentiment
has changed form and Voegelin must now combat nihilism; for Voegelin the
reality of modernity is nihilism.
Consequently, the meaning of evil has altered and modern souls are all deeply
affected, confronted, and lost.
II. Voegelin on the Sensitivity of
Nietzsche: Nietzsche as a Profound Pneumopathologist
Voegelin is
correct to point out the effectiveness of Nietzsche's work. Indeed,
Nietzsche's philosophy is dark, riveting, and profoundly disturbing.
His ironic rhetoric and aphoristic style of writing has kept
interpreters of Nietzsche successful and content in their attempts to capture
their audience by emphasizing the provocative dark-nature of his thought. Yet,
the care and concern that Nietzsche demonstrates in his writing of Western
society is frequently set-aside, most likely because the darkest corners of
the human psyche are much more tantalizing than say, discussing the
sensitivity that surrounds Nietzsche and his critique of modernity.
Interestingly enough, Nietzsche, the
Crisis and the War does not directly address the problem of evil or ressentiment. In fact, Voegelin's study is to a large extent, a defense of Nietzsche's philosophy as it
has been unjustly criticized and often misinterpreted. Voegelin primarily
focuses on Nietzsche's prediction of the event of nihilism as it has become
the crisis in modernity and how the reevaluation of all values is a potential
solution to the crisis. Moreover, Voegelin's concern with Nietzsche is on a
political level. He interprets Nietzsche to be of a Platonic temperament,
therefore emphasizing a greater care for the Politeia
that is generally absent in scholarship that addresses Nietzsche's
politics.
[13]
Voegelin looks to Zarathustra, arguably Nietzsche's most
prominent political figure, who preaches the gospel of the overman to the
people with the hope of provoking a conscious turnaround. In bringing the
message of the overman, Zarathustra's care and concern for society is made
palpable in spite of his resolution to solitude.
The sensitivity
that is apparent in Nietzsche's critique of modernity and carried out in
Voegelin's analysis, easily lends Nietzsche to the name of pneumopathologist,
another description to add to the complex and unique character of Nietzsche
himself. Generally, any human being who investigates and makes serious
inquires into the nature and condition of mankind and his relationships will
be honored with many titles throughout his life and career. "Pneumopathologist"
is an additional title that adds to the overall significance and meaning to
Nietzsche's philosophical oeuvre. Since Voegelin focuses his argument on the
spiritual decay of modernity and interprets Nietzsche as understanding the
crisis to be spiritual, not only does this emphasize Nietzsche's
sensitivity, but his Platonism as well.
a. Ressentiment
Reevaluated
"Sickness
is a powerful stimulant -- but one has to be healthy enough for it."
[14]
Nietzsche's sensitivity and keen sense provides him with the gift
of foresight. As predicted by Nietzsche, the advent of nihilism has become the
apparatus which sustains human beings' relationships. Nonetheless, because
nihilism is like an abyss, mankind's relationships are weak and pathetic;
their passions run wild and smother their best insights and intuitions, and
their actions are unforgiveable, shameless and inhuman. The supposed "evil"
that is epitomized in ressentiment
is on a much smaller scale in comparison to the evils that are wrought from
nihilism.
[15]
The man with a soul of ressentiment
is still within the framework of metaphysics and conventional morality.
Although his mind is full of lies and confusion, the good and beautiful are
still present in him, combating his spirit for a proper home. Conversely, the
nihilist no longer feels the pangs of his conscience; his passions consume his
rationality and his spirit becomes licentious. Because the soul's home for
the nihilist is an abyss, nothing can be created. The nihilist interprets life
as valueless and bereft of meaning, therefore he is limitless in what he can
do.
[16]
Totalitarianism is an inevitable outcome of such a disordered and
insatiable soul. Genocides such as the horrific events of Cambodia, Rwanda,
and Auschwitz are all a result of modernity's nihilism.
b. Nietzsche's Platonism
What sets
Voegelin's interpretation aside from the general understanding of Nietzsche
and evil is his critique of nihilism and the focus on time. Whereas, evil has
been thus far epitomized in ressentiment
as something that is of the past, but as still profoundly affecting the
present in various psycho-spiritual pathologies, Voegelin stresses that
Nietzsche recognizes the true evils of our time as "to come." Voegelin
quotes the preface to European Nihilism,
"What I have to tell is the history of the next two centuries. I describe
what is coming, and what can but be coming in this way: the
advent of Nihilism. This history can be told today, for necessity itself
is here at work."
[17]
With Voegelin's
emphasis on "what is to come" and the advent of nihilism consuming Western
culture, the meaning of evil alters and becomes more critical. "Nietzsche is
unrestrained in the use of such inappropriate deprecatory language when he
speaks of certain evils of the age, because he is not touched in his
sentiments by the transcendental experiences which are the foundation of the
Christian conception of man."
[18]
The probability of overcoming nihilism is weak, however. With
Nietzsche's lack of light in the transcendent idea and faith in society,
there is no hope for mankind to overcome the crisis. Nevertheless, Voegelin's
criticism of Nietzsche's deficiencies does not take away from the sound
nature in his analysis of modernity. According to Voegelin, Nietzsche's
Platonism has been broken and vitiated:
It
was broken by the despair to find the human substance for a spiritual order of
society; and it was
vitiated through the unique structure of Nietzsche's spiritual life; his
soul was closed to
transcendental experiences and suffered in the vivid consciousness of this
demonic limitation. If we formulated Nietzsche's problem in this manner, the
outline of a possible further development becomes visible; the
Platonic attitude of Nietzsche can be
resumed if a new hope should awaken that the human substance is present
which would make
possible an overcoming of the crisis.
[19]
The "new hope" to which
Voegelin is referring is a revival of Nietzsche's Platonism. By this,
Voegelin does not imply that Nietzsche's solution to the crisis is for
modernity to return to antiquity, but that by looking to the ancients like
Plato and Aristotle, there might be something that can help the Western world
better articulate their relationships, anxiety, and their souls' longing for
a proper home. Like Heidegger in Being and Time who asks the question, "What is Being?" perhaps
moderns also need to re-address this taxing question as a starting point
before overcoming can take place.
Voegelin's reading of Santayana's Egotism
in German Philosophy points out two distinct periods where Nietzsche
demonstrates Platonic thought; the periods before and after 1876. Voegelin
describes Platonism in politics as, "the attempt, perhaps hopeless and
futile, to regenerate a disintegrating society spiritually by creating the
model of a true order of values, and by using as the material for the model
realistically the elements which are present in the substance of society."
[20]
Additionally, Voegelin explains that Plato created the Politeia out of the "best materials of Hellenic society", from
tyrants to peasants, craftsman and traders, are all "wrought together in a
glowing order with the spiritual light that pervades it from the mystical
source in the Idea of the Good."
[21]
For Santayana, the period before 1876 is the height of Nietzsche's
Platonism, where his politics mirror Plato's understanding the Politeia is its dominant human being type writ large. During this
period, there is a hope in Nietzsche to overcome the current despiritualized
condition of society though a model human being, like Wagner or Goethe.
However, after 1876 Nietzsche's Platonic temperament fades and he no longer
has hope in man. As a result, Nietzsche resolves himself to analyzing the
crisis; his own weariness is apparent in the dreary and hopeless aura of his
diagnosis; this is the position of Santayana. Even so, according to Voegelin,
there are still traces of Nietzsche's Platonism after 1876.
Though it is not clear at first glance in his diagnosis of Western
culture, Zarathustra, while struggling with his own daemons,
has not fully resigned himself to the idea of the dying polis.
The very fact Zarathustra descends from his mountain top to share the gospel
of the overman is an act of the Platonic man attempting the impossible. To an
extent, Voegelin's Zarathustra is akin to Plato's philosopher-king, but
arguably a complete inversion of the Platonic virtues.
There is still much work to be done in regards to "Nietzsche's
Platonism," however, to fully engage on the level Nietzsche's philosophy
demands in regards to his Platonic tendencies is perhaps best left for another
project that solely focuses on Nietzsche and his Greek thought. Though it is
not arbitrary to mention Nietzsche's Platonism in this paper; given Voegelin's
comparisons between Nietzsche's and Plato's political thought throughout Nietzsche,
the Crisis and the War, Voegelin further illuminates the care and
sensitivity of Nietzsche and of Zarathustra, through the shared idea that a
well-ordered soul produces a well-ordered society.
c. Zarathustra as Attempting
the Impossible
Voegelin's sparse and yet insightful observations of Zarathustra
are incredibly dense, but malleable. He is interested in the message of the
overman as it is a direct protest against the despiritualization of society.
Zarathustra warns the people of the "last man," but his message is
received by icy laughter and goes unheard. Yet in the attempt itself,
Zarathustra demonstrates love and care for the polis.
By giving a name to the crisis: Christianity, ressentiment,
nihilism, gravity; Zarathustra is challenging the people to overcome their
current situation. This is only possible because Zarathustra has overcome
these challenges through the three metamorphoses of the spirit. There is much
debate as to whether or not Zarathustra is an overman, however. Although he
has been successful in his spiritual transformation, there is an inherent
ambiguity that surrounds the text. Also, the three metamorphoses of the spirit
cannot be understood and interpreted separately from the will to power, the
eternal return of the same, or the message of the overman. The
interconnectedness of Nietzsche's philosophy is intricate and
well-formulated; it requires rigorous investigation and an open mind.
Zarathustra overcomes the false problem of evil as originally
incorrectly and cleverly articulated by the priestly types of human beings. In
order to fully appreciate the genius of Nietzsche's Zarathustra,
how Zarathustra overcomes "evil," and predicts evils to come, as per
Voegelin's insights, Nietzsche's' original text must be explored in its
raw and fragile form. Essentially, the three metamorphosis of the spirit is
the key to overcoming the problem of evils to come, by first overcoming
nihilism.
***
The first transformation in the three metamorphoses of the spirit is
something that cannot be taught, consequently emphasizing a deterministic
element found in some, if not all, Nietzsche's concepts involving the will.
The camel is a heroic, labor-bearing spirit that asks heroes what heroic
labors are in order to perform the labors itself and prove to itself that it
has qualities it deems worthy; the initial quality is a gift of the spirit
that Zarathustra cannot give to the people.
[22]
It is with the camel that a beginning is possible as it is the
first step towards the overman. Bearing the weight of traditional metaphysical
history: the history of good and evil,' the camel finds the truth hard
and difficult to bear, and does not find solace or comfort in traditional
wisdom or the polis. Nevertheless,
it is quite natural for the camel to willfully and unsurprisingly bear its
burden.
[23]
Because the camel bears the weight of tradition, it also has the
heaviest burden of "destroying what it has come to revere."
[24]
The heaviness of the camel, exuded in its humps and epitomized in
its burdens, separates itself from the polis
(the "herd" in Nietzsche's words), and goes into the lonely desert.
There, the second metamorphosis of the spirit occurs: from the spirit of the
camel, to the weary and ravenous spirit of the lion. The lion conquers his
freedom and becomes master of the desert. It is tantamount that the spirit of
the lion consciously and willfully destroys values that come out of the past,
insisting on a reevaluation of all
values. However, the danger and threat to life that comes with the
reevaluation of all values is nihilism. In the cognizant and soulish process
of destroying values, the lion spirit's soul loses its home and becomes, "nihilist
par excellence."
[25]
This need for the spirit to have a home becomes the essential and
necessary reason for the metamorphosis itself. By destroying all previous
worlds and horizons, the third and final transformation occurs and the lion
spirit turns into the child spirit.
Zarathustra describes the child spirit as a beautiful conglomeration of
"innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel,
a first movement, a sacred Yes.' For the game of creation, my brothers, a
sacred Yes' is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had
been lost to the world now conquers his own world."
[26]
Like the Christian God who creates ex
nihilo, the child creates new values and brings a new tablet to the
people. Nonetheless, the values created by the child will eventually be
destroyed, new ones created, and the cycle will continue eternally. In a world
of Heraclitean flux, creation and destruction is a continual process. This
does not mean, however, that all old traditions and values are abandoned
entirely. Although a reevaluation of all values is a necessary process for
Nietzsche, at the same time, if values are destroyed and new ones are not created (resulting in nihilism), totalitarianism becomes much
more than a mere possibility, but a reality. Nietzsche recognizes that the
past is important in order to move towards the future wiser and more prepared
for the unexpectedness of Life herself.
In delving into Nietzsche's Zarathustra
and the process of the three metamorphoses of the spirit, the crisis of
modernity gets into focus: moderns have reevaluated values to the deadening
state of nihilism. Since moderns are constantly caught up in the present with
science and technology, there is no time for contemplation or to create new
values. Instead, moderns bask in
the comfort of their comforts as unaware, happy nihilists. Zarathustra
preaches the message of the overman, but he is rejected. As a result, the
so-called "evil" that one came from the clever mouths of Christians is
still considered a "problem," and the real problems of evil that come out
of nihilism are almost nameless and taboo because of their inhuman and
devastating nature.
***
Nietzsche is relentlessly subjected to fantastical exaggerations that
often lead to perverted analysis of his thought. Although it is not uncommon
for scholars to mould and shape philosophers' thoughts to fit into their
preconceived ideas and projects, too often the original thoughts and
intentions of a philosopher's work are lost, distorted, changed, or entirely
misconceived due to poor and unsound scholarship. Fortunately scholarship is
in a constant open dialogue of passions and ideas shared between common
interests and pursuits. By engaging in dialogue with various scholars on
familiar subjects, it is possible to move closer towards an author's
original intentions as well as penetrate the richness and complexity of a text
on a heightened level. It is absurd to attempt to limit scholars'
interpretations of a text, however. Good literature gives birth to multiple
interpretations which can either illuminate or obscure a text, depending on
whether or not the interpretation is founded in reality. Nonetheless, dialogue
is a conglomeration of sound and unsound interpretations, and the truth is
sought through language and ultimately decided by its correspondence to
reality.
[1] See Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2008), 103-133 and Susan Neiman, Evil and Modern Thought (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 206-227.
[2] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Carole Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 21.
[3] Scheler writes: "Nietzsche interprets Christianity from the outset as a mere "morality" with a religious "justification," not primarily as a "religion," and he applies to Christian values a standard which they themselves refuse consciously: the standard of the maximum quantity of life. Naturally he must conclude that the very postulation of a level of being and value which transcends life and is not relative to it must be the sign of a morality of decadence. This procedure, however, is completely arbitrary, philosophically wrong, and strictly refutable. . . Nietzsche necessarily erred in another respect. If the Christian precepts and imperatives, especially those which refer to love, are detached from the kingdom of God and from man's spiritual personality by which he participates in this kingdom (not to be mistaken for his "soul," which is natural) there is another serious consequence: those postulates must enter in constitutive (not accidental) conflict with all the laws which govern the development, growth, and expansion of life" Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 107-8.
[4] Scheler, Ressentiment, 29-40.
[5]
Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche:
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist ( London: Princeton University
Press, 1974), 253.
[6] Compare Nietzsche's inner battle of the passions with Socrates's description of the soul in the Phaedrus: "In my analogy, a soul is like an organic whole made up of a charioteer and his team of horses. Now, while the horses and charioteers of gods are always thoroughly good, those of everyone else are a mixture. Although our inner ruler drives a pair of horses, only one of his horses is thoroughly noble and good, while the other is thoroughly the opposite. This inevitably makes driving, in our case, difficult and disagreeable" Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Robert Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28.
[7] Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 252.
[8] Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 64.
[9] "Bad conscience is a sickness, there is not point in denying it, but a sickness rather like pregnancy." Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals,19.
[10] It is interesting to compare Jean-Paul Sartre's meaning of "bad conscience" with Nietzsche's. In Being and Nothingness Sartre says that bad conscience is consciousness directing its negation outwards and then turns it towards itself. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Henry E. Barnes (Washington Square Press: New York, 1965), 89. It is interesting that Nietzsche's understanding of "bad conscious" entails honestly looking within oneself, whereas for Sartre, "bad conscience" is more like the consciousness of the priestly type or the attitude of ressentiment.
[11] "Agon" is the Greek "contest" which is a proponent of self-overcoming and characterizes the agonal instinct of the Greeks.
[12] Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 23.
[13]
See Don Dombowsky Nietzsche's
Machiavellian Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Diago
von Vocano The Art of Power ( New
York: Lexington Books, 2007).
[14] Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276.
[15] See Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, 23, 83-6, 116-120, 138, 146, 148-149,150, 152, 180, 205, 217-219, 220,225, 243, 248, and 265.
[16] Similarly, Martin Buber's "capricious" man's relationship to reality is like the nihilist:
But the unbelieving marrow of the capricious man cannot perceive anything but unbelief and caprice, positing ends and devastating means. His world is devoid of sacrifice and grace, encounter and present, but shot through with ends and means: it could not be different and its name is doom. For all his autocractic bearing, he is inextricably entangled in reality; and he becomes aware of this whenever he recollects his own condition. Therefore he takes pains to use the best part of his mind to prevent or at least obscure such recollection. But if this recollection of one's falling off, of the deactualized and the actual I, were permitted to reach down to the roots that man calls despair and from which self-destruction and rebirth grow, this would be the beginning of the return. Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 110. Nietzsche's nihilist and Buber's capricious man, both divest themselves, to borrow a phrase from Voegelin, in ersatz realities.
[17] Voegelin, Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War, 178.
[18] Ibid, 202.
[19] Ibid, 198.
[20] Voegelin, Nietzsche, the Crisis, and the War, 195.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Lawrence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Yale University Press, 1986), 33-ff.
[23] See Greg Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria: A Commentary to Nietzsche's "Also Spake Zarathustra (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1990), 58.
[24] Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, 34.
[25] Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, 61.
[26] Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), 27.
