Voegelin's Nietzsche

Meeting Index

Eric Voegelin Society Meeting 2009

Voegelin's Nietzsche: Overcoming the Problem of Evil in Zarathustra

Copyright 2009 Sarah Shea, Ph.D. Candidate

 

Contents

 

Abstract

Introduction

I. The Dark Psychology of Nietzsche

a. Evil, Ressentiment, and Bad Conscience

b. Evil as Necessary

c. Evil in Modernity

II. Voegelin on the Sensitivity of Nietzsche: Nietzsche as a Profound Pneumopathologist

a. Ressentiment Reevaluated

b. Nietzsche's Platonism

c. Zarathustra as Attempting the Impossible

Conclusion

 

Abstract

 

According to Voegelin's interpretation of Nietzsche, which heavily rests in a Platonic reading of him, the problem of evil arose out of a particular spiritual disillusionment that that came with the advent of Christianity, but was not there prior to it. Because Christianity has unique and unprecedented insights into the nature of the human condition, recognizing death and suffering as the two greatest problems of man, Christianity offers salvation and redemption through the fully man-God, Jesus Christ, as a way out of the problem. Nietzsche rightly identifies the problem of evil itself to be false, therefore, acknowledging that no true solution can be offered to a false problem; the false problem being the sickness itself, Christianity.

Nietzsche's most political figure, Zarathustra, overcomes the problem of evil in the three metamorphoses of the spirit, only further recognizing the problem to be a "war of the spirits." As it is typical of scholars to interpret Zarathustra as radically individualistic because of his loss of transcendence and faith in society, on the contrary, given Voegelin's reading of Nietzsche and the Platonic emphasis on the spirit, it is possible to argue that Zarathustra is not as resigned in spiritual solitude as he is typically portrayed, rather, there is a greater care for the Politeia. This is made palpable by Zarathustra bringing the tablet to the demos and the desire for love that is apparent, arguably so, throughout the text.

Drawing on Voegelin's interpretation of Nietzsche, this paper will argue that Zarathustra successfully overcomes the problem of evil through a reevaluation of values, that does not leave him merely godless and isolated as it has often been suggested, but with an entirely new perspective that touches on a Platonic attitude of the Politeia with an emphasis on the order of the will as inextricably parallel to the order of society. However, given that society is always its dominant human being type writ large, Zarathustra fails to convince the herd. As a result, Christianity and the problem of evil continue to pervade the spirit of Western civilization.

 

 

 

 

 

           

 

Judgments, value judgments concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never be true: they possess value only as symptoms, they come into consideration only as symptoms - in themselves such judgments are stupidities.

-        (http://www.losanjealous.com/nfc/)

 

            This paper will address Nietzsche and the problem of evil as it is generally interpreted in his critique of morality and epitomized in ressentiment; however, this paper will also challenge the traditional interpretation of ressentiment by turning to Voegelin's analysis of Nietzsche in Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War. By challenging the general interpretation of evil using Voegelin's insights, the intent is not to deconstruct the previous work done by scholars on Nietzsche and evil, which is counterproductive, but to raise questions and provoke dialogue regarding evil as it continues to effect modern society through valueless nihilism. Furthermore, Voegelin credits Nietzsche with having predicted evil as "to come," illuminating Nietzsche's profound insight into the future because of his keen sight and sensitivity to the current spiritual decay of his age. Zarathustra, who is Nietzsche's most prominent political figure, embodies what is necessary to overcome the evils of the future, which is made clear in the three metamorphoses of the spirit and in his delivery of the message of the overman to the herd. But, the apparent ambiguity in Nietzsche's text does not provide enough of a solid prescription to stand up to the hardness of his diagnosis and the souls of moderns are still left without a proper home.

            The grand scale which the topic of evil and modernity is addressed in this paper is barely penetrated, let alone exhausted. Nevertheless, it is my hope that this paper raises further questions regarding Nietzsche and evil, as well as Voegelin's interest in Nietzsche and his political thought.

 

I. The Dark Psychology of Nietzsche

 

a. Evil, Ressentiment and Bad Conscience

 

  For Nietzschean scholars, it is commonly perceived and repeatedly taken for granted, that Nietzsche's understanding of evil is derived from his critique of morality. [1] Prior to the advent of Christianity, there was no "problem" of evil; in fact, with Christianity and the rise of the priestly type of human beings, there has been a great inversion of the values of good and evil. Nietzsche introduces the priestly class by describing them as: "the most evil enemies -- but why? Because they are the most impotent. It is because of their impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred." [2] The monstrous and spiritual hatred to which Nietzsche is referring is ressentiment. Ressentiment is the edifice of Nietzsche's moral psychology regarding evil. Max Scheler, for example, has attempted to "correct" Nietzsche's history of morality and his understanding of ressentiment by arguing that the Christian love of neighbor is at the "spiritual core" of man. Scheler argues ressentiment cannot be the true spirit of a Christian because it ultimately contradicts the Christian virtues. [3] However, Scheler in spite of his failed attempts to champion Christianity over Nietzsche's critique rightly defines the two characteristics that epitomize ressentiment.

In the natural meaning of the French word [ressentiment] I detect two elements. First of all, ressentiment is the repeated experiencing and reliving of a particular emotional response reaction against someone else. The continual reliving of the emotion sinks it more deeply into the center of the personality, but concomitantly removes it from the person's zone of action and expression. It is not a mere intellectual recollection of the emotion and of the events to which it "responded" -- it is a re-experiencing of the emotion itself, a renewal of the original feeling. Secondly, the word implied that the quality of this emotion is negative, i.e., that it contains a movement of hostility. Perhaps the German world "Groll" (rancor) comes closest to the essential meaning of the term. "Rancor" is just such a suppressed wrath, independent of the ego's activity, which moves obscurely through the mind. It finally takes shape through the repeated reliving of intentionalities of hatred or other hostile intention, but it nourishes any number of such intentions. [4]

In Scheler's understanding of ressentiment, it is an emotional response to something that has occurred in the past, but is constantly being re-lived and re-experienced in the present. Time and situation is critical in understanding the magnitude of ressentiment. Still, in Scheler's definition, ressentiment appears to be nothing more than harboring a grudge, or the German "Groll" as he calls it. The seriousness of ressentiment as being a spiritual and psychological phenomenon that provokes Nietzsche to question conventional morality and the condition and health of Western society is diluted and reduced to insipid epiphenomenalism.

 

b. Evil as Necessary

 

Nietzsche's interpretation of evil is multi-layered, however. Nietzsche stresses the importance of recognizing one's evil impulses in order to become master of himself. Since the will to power is a type of "creative Eros" as Kaufmann calls it, man requires knowledge of both the good and beautiful, and the evil and ugly in order to perfect himself. [5] Once man becomes conscious of his evil impulses, he becomes schizophrenic -- divided against himself; his rational consciousness on one hand, and on the other, his irrational consciousness. [6] Man is constantly battling his rational and irrational passions. Nevertheless, in spite of this ongoing war of the spirits, man is not to sublimate his passions; self-overcoming is accomplished through man "burning a No into his own soul." [7] Man must recognize his impulses as "evil" and contemptuous and ought to become cognizant of the contradiction between good and evil.

This secret self-violation, this artist's cruelty, this desire to give form to oneself as a piece of difficult, resisting, suffering matter, to brand it with a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a no', this uncanny, terrible but joyous labor of a soul voluntarily split within itself, which makes itself suffer out of the pleasure of making suffer, this whole active bad conscience' has finally -- we have already guessed -- as true womb of ideal and imaginative events, brought a wealth of novel, disconcerting beauty and affirmation to light, and perhaps for the first time, beauty itself. . .  What would be beautiful', if the contrary to it had not first come to awareness of itself, if ugliness had not first said to itself: I am ugly'? [8]

Nietzsche interprets "bad conscience" as a sickness, but insofar as pregnancy is like a sickness. [9] The term "sickness" implies that something is to be overcome -- an overcoming of ressentiment, of evil, of the sickness that man's consciousness is plagued with. Bad conscience is a necessary evil for man; in order to fully appreciate beauty, man must appreciate pain and suffering. [10] Moreover, bad conscious is not a negative concept. It is intrinsically linked to Nietzsche's notion of agon. [11]

 

c. Evil in Modernity

 

It appears as though Nietzsche's critique of morality is straightforward, in fact, it is twofold: Western society's conception of evil is based on the negative and poisonous elements of ressentiment epitomized through the inversion of the values of good and evil. The "problem of evil" is a careful construction created by the priestly class; a great lie meant to distort the reality of the noble-minded for control. To the contrary, Nietzsche interprets ressentiment in-itself as the true problem. The intellectual dishonesty that plagues such negativity has become easier to sustain within Western society because all traces of a healthy world have washed away, leaving our current state of morality in chaos and confusion. Nietzsche writes: "the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor nave nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. All races of such men of ressentiment are bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race." [12]  Ressentiment is a psychological phenomenon; since it takes form as dialectic, it has given birth to a set of values that sit as the foundation for Western morality as it is practiced today. The longer ressentiment is left to fester within society, it completely undermines valuation. Considering the problem of evil has been described as twofold, the common response is twofold as well. Either human beings are to overcome the challenge posed by ressentiment through the difficult and arduous process of the reevaluation of values, or they are to ignore it and bask in the mediocrity of their existence in nihilism. The former response is challenging and difficult; essentially it is asking human beings to rise above their mediocrity and face the challenge of ressentiment head-on, guns blazing, and hopefully with the strength of soul able to create new values once the old ones are destroyed. Moral relativism is a constant threat to society if the challenge is not met in all seriousness, however. If new values cannot be created, then human beings are plunged head-first into moral relativism, again the consequence resulting in nihilism. Also, nihilism is a silent-response to ressentiment. Human beings always have the option to turn away from false ideologies by nature, yet since turning away from these things is messy and complex, and the intellectual lies created by society have become more cunning, convincing, and elaborate, human beings are often content to leave things as they are.

The general understanding of Nietzsche's interpretation of the problem of evil is multifaceted and intricate. Nietzsche and evil is a topic that has been pursued by many scholars, including Susan Neiman and Richard J. Bernstein, who have traced the origins of this problem back to Christianity and ressentiment; undoubtedly their influence is apparent in the analysis above. An exegetical reading of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals provides excellent insight into the nature and psychology underlining the source of the problem of evil and how it continues to influence the course of Western thought. Since the problem of evil is something that has been created by man and his sickly spirit, it is up to man to decide to overcome it. Still, man must first acknowledge what he has initially perceived to be evil is false. The true problem is acknowledging what has been falsely defined "the problem of evil," thus realizing there is no "problem" per se, but evil is epitomized in the spiritual attitude of ressentiment. At the same time, evil is necessary in order to understand the good and beautiful. It is imperative that man's bad conscience recognizes his intimations are evil, therefore removing the negative connotations associated with the term evil, but not defining it as "positive," but necessary. Nevertheless, if evil is not a negative concept for Nietzsche, how can ressentiment be generally defined as "evil?" If ressentiment is interpreted as "evil" in the negative sense as intentionally doing harm, ressentiment is defined by the traditional morality from which it is created. How can ressentiment be the epitome of evil for Nietzsche? Part of the reason why Nietzsche carefully chose to use the original French term, ressentiment and why it has not been translated from its French origins is because there is no English or German equivalent. Scholars are incorrect to assume that "evil" is merely a synonym for ressentiment and the two are interchangeable.

 The premises which Voegelin structures his study of Nietzsche in Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War builds on the general interpretation of Nietzsche's critique of morality but furthers it by recognizing that the problems that began with ressentiment have shifted and modernity now faces the challenges posed by nihilism. Modern interpreters of Nietzsche and evil have frequently limited the seriousness of ressentiment by reducing it to a conscious confusion, but in doing so; have overlooked Nietzsche's emphasis on the spirit. Voegelin recovers the importance of the spirit for Nietzsche by reading his work through a Platonic lens, thus recapturing the essence of ressentiment as a spiritual problem. However, ressentiment has changed form and Voegelin must now combat nihilism; for Voegelin the reality of modernity is nihilism. Consequently, the meaning of evil has altered and modern souls are all deeply affected, confronted, and lost.

 

II. Voegelin on the Sensitivity of Nietzsche: Nietzsche as a Profound Pneumopathologist

 

Voegelin is correct to point out the effectiveness of Nietzsche's work. Indeed, Nietzsche's philosophy is dark, riveting, and profoundly disturbing.  His ironic rhetoric and aphoristic style of writing has kept interpreters of Nietzsche successful and content in their attempts to capture their audience by emphasizing the provocative dark-nature of his thought. Yet, the care and concern that Nietzsche demonstrates in his writing of Western society is frequently set-aside, most likely because the darkest corners of the human psyche are much more tantalizing than say, discussing the sensitivity that surrounds Nietzsche and his critique of modernity. Interestingly enough, Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War does not directly address the problem of evil or ressentiment. In fact, Voegelin's study is to a large extent, a defense of Nietzsche's philosophy as it has been unjustly criticized and often misinterpreted. Voegelin primarily focuses on Nietzsche's prediction of the event of nihilism as it has become the crisis in modernity and how the reevaluation of all values is a potential solution to the crisis. Moreover, Voegelin's concern with Nietzsche is on a political level. He interprets Nietzsche to be of a Platonic temperament, therefore emphasizing a greater care for the Politeia that is generally absent in scholarship that addresses Nietzsche's politics. [13] Voegelin looks to Zarathustra, arguably Nietzsche's most prominent political figure, who preaches the gospel of the overman to the people with the hope of provoking a conscious turnaround. In bringing the message of the overman, Zarathustra's care and concern for society is made palpable in spite of his resolution to solitude.

The sensitivity that is apparent in Nietzsche's critique of modernity and carried out in Voegelin's analysis, easily lends Nietzsche to the name of pneumopathologist, another description to add to the complex and unique character of Nietzsche himself. Generally, any human being who investigates and makes serious inquires into the nature and condition of mankind and his relationships will be honored with many titles throughout his life and career. "Pneumopathologist" is an additional title that adds to the overall significance and meaning to Nietzsche's philosophical oeuvre. Since Voegelin focuses his argument on the spiritual decay of modernity and interprets Nietzsche as understanding the crisis to be spiritual, not only does this emphasize Nietzsche's sensitivity, but his Platonism as well.

 

a. Ressentiment Reevaluated

 

"Sickness is a powerful stimulant -- but one has to be healthy enough for it." [14]

 

            Nietzsche's sensitivity and keen sense provides him with the gift of foresight. As predicted by Nietzsche, the advent of nihilism has become the apparatus which sustains human beings' relationships. Nonetheless, because nihilism is like an abyss, mankind's relationships are weak and pathetic; their passions run wild and smother their best insights and intuitions, and their actions are unforgiveable, shameless and inhuman. The supposed "evil" that is epitomized in ressentiment is on a much smaller scale in comparison to the evils that are wrought from nihilism. [15] The man with a soul of ressentiment is still within the framework of metaphysics and conventional morality. Although his mind is full of lies and confusion, the good and beautiful are still present in him, combating his spirit for a proper home. Conversely, the nihilist no longer feels the pangs of his conscience; his passions consume his rationality and his spirit becomes licentious. Because the soul's home for the nihilist is an abyss, nothing can be created. The nihilist interprets life as valueless and bereft of meaning, therefore he is limitless in what he can do. [16] Totalitarianism is an inevitable outcome of such a disordered and insatiable soul. Genocides such as the horrific events of Cambodia, Rwanda, and Auschwitz are all a result of modernity's nihilism.

 

   b. Nietzsche's Platonism

 

What sets Voegelin's interpretation aside from the general understanding of Nietzsche and evil is his critique of nihilism and the focus on time. Whereas, evil has been thus far epitomized in ressentiment as something that is of the past, but as still profoundly affecting the present in various psycho-spiritual pathologies, Voegelin stresses that Nietzsche recognizes the true evils of our time as "to come." Voegelin quotes the preface to European Nihilism, "What I have to tell is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, and what can but be coming in this way: the advent of Nihilism. This history can be told today, for necessity itself is here at work." [17] With Voegelin's emphasis on "what is to come" and the advent of nihilism consuming Western culture, the meaning of evil alters and becomes more critical. "Nietzsche is unrestrained in the use of such inappropriate deprecatory language when he speaks of certain evils of the age, because he is not touched in his sentiments by the transcendental experiences which are the foundation of the Christian conception of man." [18] The probability of overcoming nihilism is weak, however. With Nietzsche's lack of light in the transcendent idea and faith in society, there is no hope for mankind to overcome the crisis. Nevertheless, Voegelin's criticism of Nietzsche's deficiencies does not take away from the sound nature in his analysis of modernity. According to Voegelin, Nietzsche's Platonism has been broken and vitiated:

It was broken by the despair to find the human substance for a spiritual order of society;           and it was vitiated through the unique structure of Nietzsche's spiritual life; his soul was    closed to transcendental experiences and suffered in the vivid consciousness of this demonic limitation. If we formulated Nietzsche's problem in this manner, the outline of a     possible further development becomes visible; the Platonic attitude of Nietzsche can be                     resumed if a new hope should awaken that the human substance is present which would      make possible an overcoming of the crisis. [19]

The "new hope" to which Voegelin is referring is a revival of Nietzsche's Platonism. By this, Voegelin does not imply that Nietzsche's solution to the crisis is for modernity to return to antiquity, but that by looking to the ancients like Plato and Aristotle, there might be something that can help the Western world better articulate their relationships, anxiety, and their souls' longing for a proper home. Like Heidegger in Being and Time who asks the question, "What is Being?" perhaps moderns also need to re-address this taxing question as a starting point before overcoming can take place.

            Voegelin's reading of Santayana's Egotism in German Philosophy points out two distinct periods where Nietzsche demonstrates Platonic thought; the periods before and after 1876. Voegelin describes Platonism in politics as, "the attempt, perhaps hopeless and futile, to regenerate a disintegrating society spiritually by creating the model of a true order of values, and by using as the material for the model realistically the elements which are present in the substance of society." [20] Additionally, Voegelin explains that Plato created the Politeia out of the "best materials of Hellenic society", from tyrants to peasants, craftsman and traders, are all "wrought together in a glowing order with the spiritual light that pervades it from the mystical source in the Idea of the Good." [21] For Santayana, the period before 1876 is the height of Nietzsche's Platonism, where his politics mirror Plato's understanding the Politeia is its dominant human being type writ large. During this period, there is a hope in Nietzsche to overcome the current despiritualized condition of society though a model human being, like Wagner or Goethe. However, after 1876 Nietzsche's Platonic temperament fades and he no longer has hope in man. As a result, Nietzsche resolves himself to analyzing the crisis; his own weariness is apparent in the dreary and hopeless aura of his diagnosis; this is the position of Santayana. Even so, according to Voegelin, there are still traces of Nietzsche's Platonism after 1876.

            Though it is not clear at first glance in his diagnosis of Western culture, Zarathustra, while struggling with his own daemons, has not fully resigned himself to the idea of the dying polis. The very fact Zarathustra descends from his mountain top to share the gospel of the overman is an act of the Platonic man attempting the impossible. To an extent, Voegelin's Zarathustra is akin to Plato's philosopher-king, but arguably a complete inversion of the Platonic virtues.

            There is still much work to be done in regards to "Nietzsche's Platonism," however, to fully engage on the level Nietzsche's philosophy demands in regards to his Platonic tendencies is perhaps best left for another project that solely focuses on Nietzsche and his Greek thought. Though it is not arbitrary to mention Nietzsche's Platonism in this paper; given Voegelin's comparisons between Nietzsche's and Plato's political thought throughout Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War, Voegelin further illuminates the care and sensitivity of Nietzsche and of Zarathustra, through the shared idea that a well-ordered soul produces a well-ordered society.

 

c. Zarathustra as Attempting the Impossible

 

            Voegelin's sparse and yet insightful observations of Zarathustra are incredibly dense, but malleable. He is interested in the message of the overman as it is a direct protest against the despiritualization of society. Zarathustra warns the people of the "last man," but his message is received by icy laughter and goes unheard. Yet in the attempt itself, Zarathustra demonstrates love and care for the polis. By giving a name to the crisis: Christianity, ressentiment, nihilism, gravity; Zarathustra is challenging the people to overcome their current situation. This is only possible because Zarathustra has overcome these challenges through the three metamorphoses of the spirit. There is much debate as to whether or not Zarathustra is an overman, however. Although he has been successful in his spiritual transformation, there is an inherent ambiguity that surrounds the text. Also, the three metamorphoses of the spirit cannot be understood and interpreted separately from the will to power, the eternal return of the same, or the message of the overman. The interconnectedness of Nietzsche's philosophy is intricate and well-formulated; it requires rigorous investigation and an open mind.

            Zarathustra overcomes the false problem of evil as originally incorrectly and cleverly articulated by the priestly types of human beings. In order to fully appreciate the genius of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, how Zarathustra overcomes "evil," and predicts evils to come, as per Voegelin's insights, Nietzsche's' original text must be explored in its raw and fragile form. Essentially, the three metamorphosis of the spirit is the key to overcoming the problem of evils to come, by first overcoming nihilism.

***

            The first transformation in the three metamorphoses of the spirit is something that cannot be taught, consequently emphasizing a deterministic element found in some, if not all, Nietzsche's concepts involving the will. The camel is a heroic, labor-bearing spirit that asks heroes what heroic labors are in order to perform the labors itself and prove to itself that it has qualities it deems worthy; the initial quality is a gift of the spirit that Zarathustra cannot give to the people. [22] It is with the camel that a beginning is possible as it is the first step towards the overman. Bearing the weight of traditional metaphysical history: the history of good and evil,' the camel finds the truth hard and difficult to bear, and does not find solace or comfort in traditional wisdom or the polis. Nevertheless, it is quite natural for the camel to willfully and unsurprisingly bear its burden. [23] Because the camel bears the weight of tradition, it also has the heaviest burden of "destroying what it has come to revere." [24] The heaviness of the camel, exuded in its humps and epitomized in its burdens, separates itself from the polis (the "herd" in Nietzsche's words), and goes into the lonely desert. There, the second metamorphosis of the spirit occurs: from the spirit of the camel, to the weary and ravenous spirit of the lion. The lion conquers his freedom and becomes master of the desert. It is tantamount that the spirit of the lion consciously and willfully destroys values that come out of the past, insisting on a reevaluation of all values. However, the danger and threat to life that comes with the reevaluation of all values is nihilism. In the cognizant and soulish process of destroying values, the lion spirit's soul loses its home and becomes, "nihilist par excellence." [25] This need for the spirit to have a home becomes the essential and necessary reason for the metamorphosis itself. By destroying all previous worlds and horizons, the third and final transformation occurs and the lion spirit turns into the child spirit.

            Zarathustra describes the child spirit as a beautiful conglomeration of "innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes.' For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred Yes' is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world." [26] Like the Christian God who creates ex nihilo, the child creates new values and brings a new tablet to the people. Nonetheless, the values created by the child will eventually be destroyed, new ones created, and the cycle will continue eternally. In a world of Heraclitean flux, creation and destruction is a continual process. This does not mean, however, that all old traditions and values are abandoned entirely. Although a reevaluation of all values is a necessary process for Nietzsche, at the same time, if values are destroyed and new ones are not created (resulting in nihilism), totalitarianism becomes much more than a mere possibility, but a reality. Nietzsche recognizes that the past is important in order to move towards the future wiser and more prepared for the unexpectedness of Life herself.

            In delving into Nietzsche's Zarathustra and the process of the three metamorphoses of the spirit, the crisis of modernity gets into focus: moderns have reevaluated values to the deadening state of nihilism. Since moderns are constantly caught up in the present with science and technology, there is no time for contemplation or to create new values.  Instead, moderns bask in the comfort of their comforts as unaware, happy nihilists. Zarathustra preaches the message of the overman, but he is rejected. As a result, the so-called "evil" that one came from the clever mouths of Christians is still considered a "problem," and the real problems of evil that come out of nihilism are almost nameless and taboo because of their inhuman and devastating nature.

***

            Nietzsche is relentlessly subjected to fantastical exaggerations that often lead to perverted analysis of his thought. Although it is not uncommon for scholars to mould and shape philosophers' thoughts to fit into their preconceived ideas and projects, too often the original thoughts and intentions of a philosopher's work are lost, distorted, changed, or entirely misconceived due to poor and unsound scholarship. Fortunately scholarship is in a constant open dialogue of passions and ideas shared between common interests and pursuits. By engaging in dialogue with various scholars on familiar subjects, it is possible to move closer towards an author's original intentions as well as penetrate the richness and complexity of a text on a heightened level. It is absurd to attempt to limit scholars' interpretations of a text, however. Good literature gives birth to multiple interpretations which can either illuminate or obscure a text, depending on whether or not the interpretation is founded in reality. Nonetheless, dialogue is a conglomeration of sound and unsound interpretations, and the truth is sought through language and ultimately decided by its correspondence to reality.



[1] See Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2008), 103-133 and Susan Neiman, Evil and Modern Thought (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 206-227.

[2] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Carole Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 21.

[3] Scheler writes: "Nietzsche interprets Christianity from the outset as a mere "morality" with a religious "justification," not primarily as a "religion," and he applies to Christian values a standard which they themselves refuse consciously: the standard of the maximum quantity of life. Naturally he must conclude that the very postulation of a level of being and value which transcends life and is not relative to it must be the sign of a morality of decadence. This procedure, however, is completely arbitrary, philosophically wrong, and strictly refutable. . . Nietzsche necessarily erred in another respect. If the Christian precepts and imperatives, especially those which refer to love, are detached from the kingdom of God and from man's spiritual personality by which he participates in this kingdom (not to be mistaken for his "soul," which is natural) there is another serious consequence: those postulates must enter in constitutive (not accidental) conflict with all the laws which govern the development, growth, and expansion of life" Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 107-8.

[4] Scheler, Ressentiment, 29-40.

[5] Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist ( London: Princeton University Press, 1974), 253.

[6] Compare Nietzsche's inner battle of the passions with Socrates's description of the soul in the Phaedrus: "In my analogy, a soul is like an organic whole made up of a charioteer and his team of horses. Now, while the horses and charioteers of gods are always thoroughly good, those of everyone else are a mixture. Although our inner ruler drives a pair of horses, only one of his horses is thoroughly noble and good, while the other is thoroughly the opposite. This inevitably makes driving, in our case, difficult and disagreeable" Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Robert Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28.

[7] Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 252.

[8] Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 64.

[9] "Bad conscience is a sickness, there is not point in denying it, but a sickness rather like pregnancy."  Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals,19.

[10] It is interesting to compare Jean-Paul Sartre's meaning of "bad conscience" with Nietzsche's. In Being and Nothingness Sartre says that bad conscience is consciousness directing its negation outwards and then turns it towards itself. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Henry E. Barnes (Washington Square Press: New York, 1965), 89. It is interesting that Nietzsche's understanding of "bad conscious" entails honestly looking within oneself, whereas for Sartre, "bad conscience" is more like the consciousness of the priestly type or the attitude of ressentiment.  

[11] "Agon" is the Greek "contest" which is a proponent of self-overcoming and characterizes the agonal instinct of the Greeks.

[12] Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 23.

[13] See Don Dombowsky Nietzsche's Machiavellian Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Diago von Vocano The Art of Power ( New York: Lexington Books, 2007).

[14] Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276.

[15] See Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, 23, 83-6, 116-120, 138, 146, 148-149,150, 152, 180, 205, 217-219, 220,225, 243, 248, and 265.

[16] Similarly, Martin Buber's "capricious" man's relationship to reality is like the nihilist:

               But the unbelieving marrow of the capricious man cannot perceive anything but unbelief and caprice,                positing ends and devastating means. His world is devoid of sacrifice and grace, encounter and present, but             shot through with ends and means: it could not be different and its name is doom. For all his autocractic          bearing, he is inextricably entangled in reality; and he becomes aware of this whenever he recollects his    own condition. Therefore he takes pains to use the best part of his mind to prevent or at least obscure such             recollection. But if this recollection of one's falling off, of the deactualized and the actual I, were permitted       to reach down to the roots that man calls despair and from which self-destruction and rebirth grow, this           would be the beginning of the return.  Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 110. Nietzsche's nihilist and Buber's capricious man, both divest themselves, to borrow a phrase from Voegelin, in ersatz realities.

[17] Voegelin, Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War, 178.

[18] Ibid, 202.

[19] Ibid, 198.

[20] Voegelin, Nietzsche, the Crisis, and the War, 195.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Lawrence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Yale University Press, 1986), 33-ff.

[23] See Greg Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria: A Commentary to Nietzsche's "Also Spake Zarathustra (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1990), 58.

[24] Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, 34.

[25] Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, 61.

[26] Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), 27.