2009 Barry Cooper
Eric Voegelin and Alexandre Kojčve were close contemporaries. Voegelin
was born in 1901 in Cologne; Kojčve was born in 1902 in Moscow.
Their relations, however, were remote. Voegelin likely first learned of
Kojčve from Leo Strauss who mentioned him in a letter to Voegelin (15 April,
1949); a little over a year later, Strauss praised Kojčve's book on Hegel
as "in every detail an outstanding interpretation of the Phenomenology of
A few years
later Voegelin wrote to Richard C. Cornuelle of the William Volker Fund, which
had supported Voegelin's own work, regarding potential European participants
in summer conferences supported by the Fund.
He warmly recommended Eric Weil (who was much less favourably viewed by
Strauss and Kojčve) and added: "The other two neo-Hegelians, Alexandre
Kojčve and Jean Hyppolite, unfortunately I do not know personally" so he
could not attest to their English-speaking ability.
He also doubted "that Kojčve, who has an important position in the
Ministry of Economics, would be available."
knew of Kojčve, he knew through his writing.
interpretation of Hegel began in 1933 when he took over a seminar on Hegel's
philosophy of religion that his friend Alexandre Koyré, another Russian
émigré, had been teaching at the Ecole pratique des hautes Etudes.
focussed his seminar on Hegel's "Early Theological Writings" or
so-called "Jena Manuscripts." Kojčve's seminar was on Hegel's Phenomenology.
It continued over the next six years when he ended his commentary on "The
Post-historical Attitude," which he found in Hegel's concluding chapter.
Over the years, Kojčve attracted a brilliant and varied audience, which
included Georges Bataille, Henri Corbin, Raymond Queneau, Gaston Fessard,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Raymond Aron, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Polin, and Jean
Desanti, many of whom became major figures in the intellectual world of
Shortly after finishing his commentary on Hegel, Kojčve was drafted
into the French army but apparently did not see combat.
He may have been involved with the maquis in the south of
France; other reports indicate he had been a KGB recruit since the late 1930s.
murky role in clandestine political activities, after the war Kojčve joined
the French Ministry of Economic Affairs as an assistant to one of his auditors
from the 1930s, Robert Marjolin, who had been an economic advisor to General
Charles de Gaulle during the war and later became an important haut fonctionnaire
in the French civil service. His
initial postwar responsibilities included administering the Marshall Plan in
France. Marjolin and Kojčve were
also instrumental in the creation of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation which later became the OECD. Kojčve
was the chief architect of the "Kennedy Round" of the GATT in 1964 and a
major participant in French negotiations establishing the European Economic
Community. As Voegelin said to
Cornuelle, he was an important (and evidently very busy) bureaucrat.
most obvious thing about the relationship of Voegelin and Kojčve, therefore,
is that they were strangers. About the only obvious connection is that Kojčve
and Voegelin both discussed Strauss' commentary on Xenophon's dialogue Hiero.
Strauss corresponded with both Voegelin and Kojčve, respectively,
asking them for help in getting On Tyranny published and requesting a
review of it. Not surprisingly, Voegelin was of no help, though both wrote
reviews, to which Strauss replied with a "Restatement."
This initial, and indirect, encounter took place in a leisurely fashion
between 1946 and 1954. Unfortunately,
there is no record, so far as I know, of Voegelin's response either to
Strauss' "Restatement" or to Kojčve's discussion of On Tyranny.
as these philological issues are, I have been asked to discuss what Voegelin
made of Kojčve's interpretation of Hegel.
The short answer is given in my title: Kojčve provided the decrypt to
Hegel's encoded argument. Kojčve's lectures on the Phenomenology
included remarks on Hegel's other works, and Voegelin applied them to other
texts of Hegel. But of course matters were more complex than that.
I noted above that Voegelin saw Kojčve as a "neo-Hegelian."
Voegelin has himself been described as a "descendant" or a "dialectical
twin" of Hegel.
might be useful to begin with a sketch of Voegelin's changing understanding
of Hegel. In his dissertation, "Interaction and Spiritual Community"
(1922), Voegelin rejected Hegel's notion of "the continuous progressive
evolution from the beginning of world history to the present day" but he did
so without providing an extensive argument.
A few years
later in his first book, On the Form of the American Mind (1928),
Voegelin noted: "in contrast to projects such as Hegel's, in which the
dialectic was made the core problem of philosophic thought, the efforts of
Peirce and James sought to avoid dialectics and eliminate its various
manifestations from philosophy."
By this reading,
Hegelian philosophy was simply a variation on philosophy, of which William
James provided an equally possible variation. In his 1930 lecture on "National
Types of Mind," he provided a neutral summary of Hegel's "broad
understanding of history." In
1936 he noted that Hegel's philosophy "bears the trait of Averroism."
Nevertheless, Voegelin used the Hegelian term "objective spirit" in
an approximately Hegelian fashion and praised Hegel's analysis of the
English Reform Bill of 1831.
of Political Ideas, written during the decade after 1939, routinely
compared Hegel to other figures in the history of Western political thought.
By 1954, Voegelin noted that although Hegel was a gnostic thinker, he
still had great intellectual appeal; and even as late as 1965, Hegel was
simply a "great thinker."
For most of his
intellectual life Voegelin seemed to be ambivalent about Hegel.
It was not until his 1971 essay "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery" that
he was able to sort out the various dimensions of Hegelian speculation in a
reply to Altizer's view that he was a "descendant" of Hegel, Voegelin
acknowledged that his mature understanding of Hegel "was stimulated and
materially supported" by Kojčve's Introduction.
Voegelin was very much aware of his own relationship to Hegel.
As he said to the editor of the Journal of the American Academy of
Religion, Ray L. Hart, who invited his response to Altizer's remarks
is a story to my relation to Hegel: For a long time I studiously avoided any
serious criticism of Hegel in my published work, because I simply could not
understand him. I knew that
something was wrong, but I did not know what.
There was a thinker whom I admired for the political acumen of his
study on the English Reform Bill of 1831, and for his qualities as a German
man of letters which he displayed in his essay-review of Hamanns Schriften
(1828), a thinker whom I consulted at every step in my own work because of his
vast historical knowledge and his powerful intellect, and who at the same time
baffled all my efforts at following the thought process of his dialectics or
at understanding the experiential premises of his system.
then detailed the assistance he received from other analysts of Hegel, ending
with Kojčve. That Kojčve was not
a simple academic expositor of Hegel is clear enough upon opening the pages of
what Voegelin made of Hegel and of Kojčve in his mature thinking, we might
briefly summarize a few of Strauss' objections to Kojčve's teaching.
Apart from some philological disagreements regarding Xenophon, Strauss'
objection to Kojčve's account of the Hegelian account of history, of
philosophy, and of religion, which ends, according to Kojčve, in the final
regime, which he called the universal and homogeneous state, was both
commonsensical and pragmatic. First, Strauss said, Kojčve had "an
insufficient appreciation of the value of utopias," which were, strictly
speaking, descriptions of "the simply good social order."
More broadly, according to Strauss, "one can speak of the utopia of
the best tyranny." Kojčve, however, "denies our contention that the good
tyranny is a utopia" by pointing to the example of Salazar's Portugal and
alluding to Stalin. Strauss
considered it highly questionable that Stalin was a good tyrant.
Second, Kojčve was of the opinion that tyranny could not be understood
on the basis of classical political science. According to Strauss, however,
Kojčve misconstrued or misinterpreted classical political science so that the
question of its self-sufficiency necessarily remained open.
Strauss agreed with Kojčve that "the desire for honour is the
supreme motive of men who aspire to tyrannical power."
Whereas Kojčve thought that men were attracted to tyranny because it
was a means to accomplish the highest tasks, the classics did not believe one
could accomplish the highest tasks by using the lowest methods, and they knew
that tyranny involved very low methods indeed.
To look upon tyranny as a means, Strauss said, a person must be blinded
by passion. "By what passion? The most charitable answer is that he is
blinded by desire for honour or prestige," which Kojčve called "recognition."
And finally, Kojčve's synthesis of pagan and biblical morality "effects
the miracle of producing an amazing lax morality out of two moralities both of
which made very strict demands on self-restraint."
The result, therefore, was inauthentic: Kojčve encouraged others
through his speech to perform base acts that he himself would never undertake.
He did so, according to Strauss, because he wished to overlook "the
untrue assumption that man as man is thinkable as a being that lacks awareness
of sacred restraints or as a being that is guided by nothing but a desire for
assumption is untrue, the satisfaction that all human beings desire can never
be gained by recognition alone, not even by the universal recognition that
apparently distinguishes the universal and homogeneous state from all other
Strauss and Kojčve both agreed that recognition is sought by tyrants.
Satisfaction, according to the classics, however, was identified with
happiness, at least in the absence of "an omniscient God who demands from
men a pure heart." Since Kojčve's
synthesis was miraculous (and reasonable men do not trust miracles) the
question truly at issue was whether happiness came from recognition (and the
tyrannical life) or from understanding (and the philosophical life).
According to Strauss, there was an inherent conflict -- at one point he
called it a tragic conflict -- between the philosopher and the political man,
including the tyrant: the one sought happiness through his specific desire to
understand the eternal things, the other through his specific desire for
recognition. Moreover, this
conflict would exist within the universal and homogeneous state. In any case,
Strauss said, there were good reasons to oppose the advent of such a state.
There was no guarantee that the leader deserved his position to a
higher degree than others. Equals
treated unequally is a recipe for sedition, as Aristotle pointed out in Book V
of The Politics.
If these objections were not sufficient, Strauss made a last
observation. According to Kojčve's
interpretation of Hegel, fighting and labouring constitute the humanity of
existence. But, according to
Kojčve, there is none in the universal and homogeneous state: all wars are
over; there is nothing new to do. This
seems to mean that the fulfilment of reasonable satisfaction implies the
evaporation of man's humanity. "It is the state of Nietzsche's ‘last
man'," which therefore confirms "the classical view that unlimited
technical progress and its accompaniment, which are indispensable conditions
of the universal and homogeneous state, are destructive of humanity."
objections to Kojčve's interpretation have been raised by Emil Fackenheim
and Stanley Rosen, to say nothing of the criticism of "Hegel-scholars" who
have found in Kojčve's imaginative interpretation nothing more than a
wilful distortion of a great philosopher's teaching.
For Kojčve, these objections could easily be met.
was able to comprehend his critics more or less satisfactorily because, as
Gadamer once observed, he never abandoned the "circle of reflection in which
thought thinks itself."
emphatically than Strauss, Voegelin never entered the hermeneutic circle of
The "story" of Voegelin's relation to Hegel, introduced above can
now be resumed. The coexistence of
the commonsense analyst of the English Reform Bill of 1831 or of the great
German man-of-letters with the individual whose "existential deficiency"
made it exceedingly difficult to understand his "experiential premises"
was what made Hegel a "characteristically modern thinker."
Accordingly, Voegelin wrote:
modernity of Hegel can be characterized as the coexistence of two selves, as
an existence divided into a true and false self holding one another in such
balance that neither the one nor the other ever becomes completely dominant.
Neither does the true self become strong enough to break the system,
nor does the false self become strong enough to transform Hegel into a
murderous revolutionary or a psychiatric case.
Hegel's own language of self-interpretation, he was engaged not so much in
constructing a "magic" circle of self-reflection, but a grimoire
designed magically to master the entirety of history by discovering its
meaning. "The author of the Phänomenologie,"
Voegelin wrote, "suffers so badly from the existential conflict between his
two Selfs that it almost makes no sense to ask what Hegel really meant."
It is necessary, therefore to understand Hegel (and Kojčve) without
turning into a Hegelian or Kojčvian, which is to say, without believing in
magic, which was more or less what Strauss meant by "miracles."
accomplished this analysis of Hegel's "two selves" by using the concepts
of first and second reality developed in a literary context by Robert Musil
and Heimeto von Doderer,
and subsequently deployed by Voegelin in his Hitler
More to the point, magicians do not, as a rule, explain their
magic operations for the perfectly obvious reason that if they did, they would
not be able to perform. Neither,
according to Voegelin, did Hegel.
As a consequence Hegel's "explanatory formulae require translation
to make their bearing intelligible." This problem of "translation" was
what had for so many years made the Phenomenology "unintelligible"
to Voegelin, in the sense that it was designed to cast a spell, and so not
allow the reader to understand what was happening to him or her in the course
of assimilating Hegel's text. Voegelin resisted Hegel's magic initially by
admitting, as he said to Hart, that he could not understand him. And when at
last he did understand Hegel, he understood that he was a sorcerer and so
could resist, because sorcery decoded is sorcery disarmed. In Voegelin's
the present instance, he [Hegel the sorcerer] cannot simply say: I am going to
falsify history in open existence until it fits into my history in closed
existence. Just as in an earlier instance, he could not say: I take symbols of
alienation from various Neoplatonics, Gnostics, and mystics, and shall use
them as the starting point for my magic enterprise of self-salvation.
The effectiveness of the grimoire depends on the transformation
of First into Second Reality as a fait accompli.
The book is written in magic code which the reader, if he does not want
to be taken in, must decipher. This
process of decoding the Phänomenologie, however, is always difficult,
and sometimes next to impossible, especially when political events have been
put into code.
Fortunately Hegel had himself provided an example of a passage in the Phenomenology
that was encoded and a translation of it en clair in a letter to
his friend, F.I. Niethammer (29 April, 1814).
Whether Kojčve was aware of Hegel's correspondence seems
unlikely since it was not published until 1961, which makes his own
achievement in the Introduction -- namely to have completed a decrypt
of Hegel's Phenomenology -- even more remarkable. The difficulties
of translating Hegel's language of consciousness and self-consciousness, Geist
and Gestalt, and all the other magic words into historical and
political events "make it impossible to understand the purpose of the grimoire
without a code at hand." By "code"
Voegelin meant a decrypt.
Such a decrypt, paralleling the "thoughts" of Second Reality with
the persons and events in First Reality that have been converted into "thoughts"
was elaborated, Voegelin said, by Kojčve in the course of his lectures on the
Phänomenologie and published as an appendix on "Structure de la
Phénoménologie" in his Introduction ŕ la lecture de Hegel (1947).
appendix, Voegelin said, correlated events in First Reality with specific
sections of the Phenomenology. It
is, moreover, "indispensable" to every "serious reader" of Hegel's
book. Given its importance, "it inevitably raises the problem: How far back
in Western history must the growth of sorcery be traced that comes to its
climax in the Phänomenologie?" This
was a question Voegelin touched on briefly in "Wisdom and the Magic of the
Extreme" (1983), for example, but never examined systematically.
however, "confined himself to the decipherment of the Phänomenologie
and the construction of the code. As
he was a Marxist, i.e., the disciple of another great sorcerer, he did
not study the problem of sorcery in Hegel.
On the contrary, in 1968 he published a piece of sorcery of his own,
the Essai d'une histoire raisonnée de la philosophie paienne, Tome
1, Les Présocratiques. The
volume is an Hegelian transmogrification of pre-Socratic philosophy. I
recommend it warmly to every student of contemporary sorcery."
Kojčve's dispute with Strauss has received considerable attention.
Not so with Voegelin and Kojčve. Let us begin with the most
obvious observation: despite all that has been written about his
eccentricities and his famous "irony," and leaving aside his possible
connection to KGB, Kojčve's study of Hegel, both the Introduction
and his posthumous publications, are indeed "transmogrifications" of
philosophy. The interesting
question is: why did Kojčve undertake them? how could he both decode Hegel's
grimoire and (apparently) be taken in by it? One answer is obvious:
just as Hegel's motivation was, in the end, the libido dominandi,
so too was Kojčve's.
Strauss may well
have objected to such a crude characterization, which prompts a second, more
Voegelin's friend, Alois Dempf, once pointed out that Voegelin had
analysed the form of Hegel's project under the heading of "historiogenesis."
term was indicated a speculative complex embracing the order of a particular
society, its origin, and its subsequent development. Usually historians
dismiss as legendary or mythical the accounts of the origin of a society --
the foundation of Rome by Aeneas, of Britain by Brutus, and so forth --
without further inquiry as to why anyone would bother to create such legends.
Voegelin argued that "the mythical part of historiogenetic speculation is
not a piece of unhistorical fabulation, but an attempt to present the reasons
that will raise the res gestae of the
pragmatic part to the rank of history." The motives for undertaking the
speculation arise from the experience of historical change and continuity.
This experience is to be distinguished from that of cosmic rhythms for
which suitable rituals and rites may be developed in order to ensure the
arrival of spring, the flooding of the Nile, and so on.
Historiogenetic speculations, however, place events, extending back to
an absolute point of origin, upon a single line of irreversible time where
change is not rhythmic but final. Moreover, the individuals who undertake the
historiogenetic speculation invariably conclude by integrating a manifold of
discontinuous events into a single story, their own.
"To the aggressive overtones...there corresponds an undercurrent of
obsessive anxiety above which the authors attempt to rise by the imaginative
conversion of a temporal gain into a possession forever."
The invention of
a single story is, clearly, an attempt to endow the contingency of historical
change with the dignity and serenity of ultimate order.
Historiogenetic speculations, then, are undertaken in a mood of
anxiety, not trust. Historical
reality is deliberately distorted so that the story comes out right, that is,
in conformity to the imaginative projections of the author.
The object of the projection is to eclipse the unsettling reality of
historical contingency with a second reality, the comforting meaning of which
is the finality of the author's present.
The technical problem Hegel faced concerned the breakdown of the
Christian historiogenetic construction, which proceeded from the creation of
the world through the history of Israel to Christianity, Rome, the Western
sacred empire, down to the present. The
attack by intellectuals during the Enlightenment -- Voltaire, for example --
on the Christian "theology of history" in the name of a secular "philosophy
of history" had the undoubted merits (whatever its shortcomings in other
respects) of putting the Christian historiogenesis into perspective as an
imaginative construction. Henceforth
it would be impossible for a conscientious historian to ignore the
developments of India, China, Islam, or Russia as parallel to, though
independent of Western history. Rather
than abandon what Merleau-Ponty called the "historical authority" of the
West, Hegel undertook to reinterpret Christian historiogenesis in terms of the
dialectical unfolding of the Geist to its maximal articulation in his
own reflections on the final events of his day. Kojčve simply brought Hegel's
speculation up to date.
The grave problem with all such historiogenetic constructions is that
every evocation of an end of history, from that of Voltaire to that of Frank
Fukuyama, soon becomes obsolete, and with obsolescence the discursive
obfuscation and distortions of reality become evident.
By forcing historical events into place along a single line of
meaningful time, by forcing the evidence of common reality to conform to the
second reality of the system of science, first Hegel and then Kojčve could,
for a time (or within an imaginary second reality) appear to gain power over
real history and thereby (again temporarily) overcome anxiety concerning its
dangerous instability. But as
Gerhart Niemeyer once said of ideologists in general, all they have done is to
exchange uncertain truth for certain untruth. Kojčve and Hegel suffered from
analogous anxieties regarding the meaning of history -- or if you prefer, History.
This experiential commonality or equivalence, it seems to me, enabled
Kojčve to construct his decrypt but to use it only within the context of the
second reality of the Hegelian System of Science.
In contrast, Voegelin used the decrypt to decode the Hegelian text but
also to connect it to commonsense reality, thus exposing its status as grimoire.
Reprinted in Faith and Political
Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin,
tr. and ed., Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993),61,69. A second edition of their
correspondence was published by the University of Missouri Press in 2004
without any interpretative essays.
Voegelin to Cornuelle, February 7,
1956. Reprinted in The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol.30, Selected Correspondence:
1950-1984, tr. Sandy Adler, Thomas A. Hollweck and William Petropulos,
ed. with an Introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 2007), 274. For
the opinions of Strauss and Kojčve regarding Weil, see Leo Strauss, On
Tyranny, rev. and expanded edition, including the Strauss-Kojčve
correspondence, ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 234, 265 (Kojčve); 239, 264 (Strauss).
Voegelin and Jacob Taubes exchanged
letters early in 1967 regarding the possibility of a conference in Berlin
that would include Kojčve and Hans Blumenberg, whose The Legitimacy of
the Modern Age, tr. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983)
discussed Voegelin's New Science of Politics (1952). (The German
original of Blumenberg's book came out in 1966).
Kojčve attended but Voegelin was in the US and did not. See Selected
For details see Barry Cooper, The
End of History: An Essay on Modern Hegelianism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1984), or Michael Roth Knowing and History: Appropriations
of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
See Roth, Knowing and History,
See Daniel Johnson, "Europe's
Greatest Traitor," Daily Telegraph (2 October, 1990) A1; "Le KGB
avait identifiée plusieurs agents du KGB parmi lesquels le philosophe
Alexandre Kojčve," Le Monde (19 Septembre, 1999), 1; Matthew
Price, "The Spy Who Loved Hegel" Lingua Franca 10:2 (March,
Thomas J.J. Altizer, "A New History
and a New but Ancient God: A Review Essay," Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 43 (1975), 762-3.
See also Voegelin's response in The Collected Works of Eric
Voegelin, vol.12, Published Essays, 1966-1985, ed. Ellis Sandoz
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 292ff.
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 32, The
Theory of Governance and Other Miscellaneous Papers, 1921-1938, tr. Sue
Bollans, Jodi Cockerill, M.J. Hanak, Ingrid Heldt, Elisabeth von Lochner,
and William Petropulos, ed. with an introduction by William Petropulos and
Gilbert Weiss (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 21.
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. I, On
the Form of the American Mind, tr. Ruth Hein, ed. with an introduction
by Jürgen Gebhardt and Barry Cooper (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1995), 9.
Voegelin, "National Types of Mind"
in Collected Works, vol.32, 434-40; Voegelin, The Authoritarian
State (1936) in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 4, The
Authoritarian State: An Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State, tr.
Ruth Hein, ed. and introduction by Gilbert Weiss with a Historical
Commentary by Erika Weinzierl (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1999), 73, 75; 283-7.
Voegelin, "What is Political Theory?"
in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 33, The Drama of
Humanity and other Miscellaneous Papers, 1939-1985, ed. With an
introduction by William Petropulos and Gilbert Weiss (Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 2004), 60-1; "In Search of the Ground" (1965) in The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 11, Published Essays,
1953-1965, ed. with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2000), 236.
In The Collected Works of Eric
Voegelin, vol. 12, 213-55.
Voegelin, "Response to Professor
Altizer's ‘A New History and a New but Ancient God?'" in The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 12, 297.
Voegelin, "Response," 296.
This is argued at length in Cooper, The
End of History.
208. See also F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New
York: The Free Press, 1992) and Cooper, "The End of History: Déjŕ-vu all
over again," History of European Ideas 19 (1994), 377-83.
See Cooper, The End of History,
"Introduction," and "Epilogue."
H-G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic:
Five Hermeneutical Studies, tr. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1976), 36.
Voegelin, "On Hegel," 217.
Voegelin, "On Hegel," 228.
The difference is that Hegel spoke of
his own magic words (Zauberwörte) and magic power (Zauberkraft).
See Voegelin, "On Hegel," 221, 225, 240, 247-8.
See Voegelin, "The Eclipse of
Reality," in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 28, What
is History? and Other Late Unpublished Writings, ed. with an
introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 111-162.
 The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 31, Hitler and the Germans, tr. and ed. with an Introduction by Detlev Clemens and Brendan Purcell. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 239-56.
Voegelin, "On Hegel," 249.
See the discussion in Cooper, The
End of History, 202ff as well as Voegelin "On Hegel," 250. Briefe
von und an Hegel, ed. J. Hoffmeister, (Hamburg, Meiner, 1961), vol. II,
Voegelin, "On Hegel," 251.
See Voegelin, "Wisdom" in The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 12, 315-375.
Voegelin, "On Hegel," 251 fn 18.
 See: Victor Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics," I-II, The Review of Metaphysics, 32 (1968), 58-84; 281-328; Roth, Knowing and History, 125-46; Cooper, The End of History, 265-72; George Grant, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Collected Works of George Grant, vol. III, 1960-1969, ed. Arthur Davis and Henry Roper (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 532-57; Steven B.-Smith, "Destruktion or Recovery? Leo Strauss' Critique of Heidegger," Review of Metaphysics 51 (1997), 345-78; Roth, The Ironist's Cage, 96-112; Stanley Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 91-140; Robert Pippin, "Being, Time and Politics: The Strauss-Kojčve Debate," History and Theory 32 (1993), 138-64.
Voegelin, "On Hegel," 216-18.
Dempf, "Die aktuelle Bedeutung einer
Korrekten Hegelinterpretation," Bayerische Academie der Wissenschaften,
5 (1971), 17.
Voegelin "Historiogenesis" in The
Ecumenic Age, vol. IV of Order and History in The Collected
Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 17, ed. With an introduction by Michael
Franz (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 113-7.