Meeting Index
- Society Members
- Newsletter No.XXVII
- Annual Meeting Papers 2012
- Annual Meeting Papers 2011
- Annual Meeting Papers 2010
- Annual Meeting Papers 2009
- Annual Meeting Papers 2008
- Annual Meeting Papers 2007
- Annual Meeting Papers 2006
- Annual Meeting Papers 2005
- Annual Meeting Papers 2004
- Annual Meeting Papers 2003
- Annual Meeting Papers 2002
- Annual Meeting Papers 2001
- Annual Meeting Papers 2000
- Annual Meeting Papers since 1985
Eric Voegelin Society Meeting 2008
The
Tension of the Metaxy in Emily
Dickinson's Poetry
Copyright
2008 Glenn Hughes, all rights reserved
[this version
not for quotation or reference]
Of American
poets taught regularly in secondary education, the two most ill-served, it
seems to me, are Robert Frost and Emily Dickinson.
[1]
Students are typically introduced to these poets through their
most-anthologized poems, and the majority of these are chosen in part for
their accessibility--not too undaunting conceptually, and technically fluid--but
also for a sort of charmingness, albeit in both cases of a slightly dark and
eccentric kind. The best-known and most-taught of their poems present the personae
of these two quintessentially American poets as, respectively, a wise,
avuncular, white-haired, cracker-barrel lover of New England country life and
its rugged solitudes, and as the whimsical and ladylike recluse spinster, the
belle of Amherst, prone to occasional morbidity but mostly concerned to
express her delight in bees, flowers, sunsets, and assurances of Eternity.
This image of Frost is not unsettled by acquaintance with his
most-anthologized poems "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening, "Mending
Fences, "The Road Not Taken, and Birches; nor is this caricature of
Emily Dickinson undermined by her poems "I Taste a Liquor Never Brewed, I
Like to See It Lap the Miles, "A Narrow Fellow in the Grass, "A Bird
Came Down the Walk, "I Never Saw a Moor, nor even by "Because I
Could Not Stop for Death or "I Heard a Fly Buzz When I Died or "There's
a Certain Slant of Light. But a truly broad and penetrating familiarity
with the works of these two poets subverts fairly radically the benign
portraits sketched above.
Frost
and Dickinson both, in fact, are in the fullness of their work extremely
difficult poets, and of unusual depth. Both are exceptional as poets of
spiritual struggle, and are experts of the uncanny and inexplicable. Both
radiate an anxious isolation; both are obsessed with death and tragedy; and
both of them are, without question, intimates of agony. Frost, upon close
examination, turns out as well to be surprisingly devious with a slight
sadistic streak, and not infrequently nihilistic. And Dickinson, the focus of
this essay, is revealed by her approximately 1,800 poems and poetic fragments
to be, despite her unquestionable experiences of elation, joy, nature-sympathy
and illuminative transcendence, more typically and generally a poet of doubt,
loneliness, longing, inward struggle, alienation, dread, terror, and
depression--a master, as Harold Bloom puts it, "of every negative affect.
[2]
Also, contrary to her popular image, she is among the most
cognitively demanding poets
Before
exploring the way Dickinson's artistic corpus constitutes an unusually
faithful, extended testimony to this metaxic condition of human existence, we
might briefly consider why a more accurate understanding of the character of
Dickinson's poetry and outlook, and, more important, an appreciation of her
greatness as a poet, are not more common.
First,
there was the long delay in the initial coming to light of her achievement,
due to her life of intense privacy, to the withholding of her poems (no more
than ten of which were published during her lifetime),
[3]
and to their first being published―beginning in 1890, four
years after her death―in small or incomplete editions, with the poems
edited, punctuationally modified, and even linguistically altered, to suit
conventional tastes. It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the full scope
of her accomplishment and her original versions became well known, and that
she entered the mainstream teaching canon and anthologies. And only the last
few decades have shown a careful critical devotion to repairing the changes
inflicted by her early editors, to the compiling of folio and variora
editions, and to making publicly available her work as she wrote and preserved
it.
Second,
there is her poetic originality. Although her forms and meters are often
familiar or even commonplace--especially the hymnal stanza form that she
employs so frequently in her work―her poetic voice is utterly unique,
and, once encountered, is instantly recognizable in its peculiarities of
diction, concision, and metaphoric invention. Harold Bloom, however prone to
enthusiasms and hyperbole, does not overstate in remarking that "[l]iterary
originality achieves scandalous dimensions in
Third,
Emily Dickinson's literary originality, however impressive, is in service of
an even greater gift: what Bloom calls her "cognitive originality. "Cognitive
originality is the capacity for, and the realized expression of, thinking
that breaks new ground. It is the discovery or invention of new, previously
unthought, interpretations and meanings, the forging of new imaginative and
ideational connections. Of
Except
for Shakespeare,
Bloom is not
alone in this assessment.
And fourth, we must take into account that
Now let us point out right away that neither literary power nor
intellectual brilliance are invariably employed in serving an accurate
explication of the truths of existence. Both literary and cognitive
originality may, alas, provide us only with stunningly detailed accounts of
"second realities, to use the term for ideological fantasies that
Voegelin borrows from Musil and von Doderer.
[8]
But in Emily Dickinson's case, intellectual, emotional, and
imaginative power is indeed matched by a severe honesty and perspicacious
openness to reality. Her poems consistently explore and articulate genuine
truths about the human situation in the cosmos; about the intricacies of
consciousness and the ongoing constitution of "self; about the facts,
surprises, and mysteries of the natural world; about the central importance
and yet ultimate impotence of language; and about our human relationship to
the mysterious divine ground. This being the case, it is not surprising to
find in Dickinson's work a recurrent emphasis on the fact that human beings
are, first and last, passionate
questioners and unsatisfiable yearners for a certainty and fulfillment
that remain unavailable to us in this lifetime. In this regard, her poetry
repeatedly echoes Voegelin's analyses of consciousness and existence. For
Dickinson, as for Voegelin, to be human is to be
"the Question―the questioning tension toward that divine ground of
existence that is the origin, deepest identity, and ultimate concern of each
of us―in the enacting of which, as long as we live, "there is no
answer, finally, "other than the [comprehending] Mystery as it becomes
luminous in the acts of questioning.
[9]
We might say that for both writers existence is essentially a
desire, a longing―and Dickinson could well be described as "the poet
of longing par excellence. One critic has indeed described her complete oeuvre
as "a dramatization of a philosophy of desire.
[10]
Taking Dickinson's desire, then, as normative
desire, faithful to the truths of existence, let us examine, now, some of the
evidence for Dickinson being a pre-eminent witness to the metaxic, or "in-between, structure of existence.
The essential experience of human existence, writes Voegelin, is that
of the "in-between,
the
metaxy of Plato, which is neither time nor eternity. . . . [And] let
us recall [that in the human] experience of the tensions between the poles of
time and eternity, neither does eternal being become an object in time, nor is
temporal being transposed into eternity. We remain in the "in-between, in
a temporal flow of experience in which eternity is nevertheless present.
[11]
[Human
existence is thus] a disturbing movement in the In-Between of ignorance and
knowledge, of time and timelessness, of imperfection and perfection, of hope
and fulfillment, and ultimately of life and death.
[12]
To show up the parallel between this description and Emily Dickinson's
poetic vision of existence, let us begin with some verses that indicate her
rejection of an externalized, hypostatized divine being―her
acknowledgement that we experience divine, or eternal, reality, as immediately
present in temporal reality and
consciousness, thus leaving us always in a state of longing for that
divine completeness which is in fact more intimate to us than our own
thoughts. She writes:
The
Blunder is in estimate
Eternity
is there
We
say as of a Station
Meanwhile
he is so near
He
joins me in my Ramble
Divides
abode with me
No
Friend have I that so persists
As
this Eternity
(F1690)
[13]
This notion
of Eternity "dividing his abode with Dickinson―being present, that
is, as the divine partner who dwells with, and indeed co-constitutes, her self―is
not an isolated trope in her work. Her sense of the unimaginably intimate
ontological interpenetration of her finite human longing and the divine
presence who establishes and draws forth that longing is concisely conveyed in
the following short poem, which in its second stanza goes on to suggest how
any intellectual analysis of the paradoxical intersection of time and
timelessness must seem only an artificial linguistic container for the lived
experience, the life-giving organic miracle, of existence in the metaxy:
He
was my host he was my guest,
I
never to this day
If
I invited him could tell,
Or
he invited me.
So
infinite our intercourse
So
intimate, indeed,
Analysis
as capsule seemed
To
keeper of the seed.
(F1754)
More
penetratingly still, from a poem in which the word "awe in the first line
denotes Jehovah, and in which the word "residence refers both to the
divine Beyond and to the human soul:
No
man saw awe, nor to his house
Admitted
he a man
Though
by his awful residence
Has
human nature been.
[]
(F1342)
Even the
metaphor of intersection is used by
Of
All
we know
Is
the uncertain certainty
But
it's vicinity, infer,
By
it's Bisecting Messenger (F1421)
[14]
"Eternity, "Paradise, "Immortality, "Heaven, and
"God are all terms that serve Dickinson as references to what Voegelin
calls the "pole of timelessness experienced in metaxic existence. For
both writers, we may identify, and separately name, this reality, though we
never experience it as "separate or "objective being―and to
uncritically imagine it after the manner of spatiotemporal objects is to
immediately and destructively misconstrue it. We encounter "eternal being
only through the paradox of our consciousness as an ontological "in-between
co-constituted by temporal and eternal reality. Again and again in
[]
Immortality
contented
Were
Anomaly
(F984)
And:
[]
If
end I gained
It
ends beyond
Indefinite
disclosed
[]
(F484)
[15]
On the other
hand, she avers:
The
only news I know
Is
Bulletins all Day
From
Immortality.
[]
(F820)
And:
The
Infinite a sudden Guest
Has
been assumed to be
But
how can that stupendous come
Which
never went away?
(F1344)
[16]
Thus the
immediacy of divine presence.
With the paradox of metaxic consciousness―the ontological
simultaneity of the immediacy of divine presence in consciousness together
with its nonpossessable, unknowable, radically transcendent character―being
constant in Dickinson's awareness, it is not surprising that longing
suffused with doubt is ever-present in her poetry. A glance at her biography
shows that the seeds of this outlook were sown early. The time of her youth in
Richard Wilbur puts the matter of
At
some point Emily Dickinson sent her whole Calvinist vocabulary into exile,
telling it not to come back until it would subserve her own sense of things. .
. . [I]n her poems those great words are not merely being themselves; they
have been adopted, for expressive purposes; they have been taken personally,
and therefore redefined.
[18]
To put this
in Voegelin's language: Dickinson sought and found in her own consciousness
those experiences, insights, and passions for which the great religious
language might be used as evocative symbols, and, in using them as she did in
her poems, revitalized them, making
them transparent for her own spiritual experiences, while destabilizing their
stale, commonplace usages within what was to her a decadent and unconvincing
religious tradition.
We hear
I'm
ceded I've stopped being Their's
The
name they dropped opon my face
With
water, in the country church
Is
finished using, now
And
They can put it with my Dolls,
My
childhood, and the string of spools,
I've
finished threading too
[]
(F353)
Another seems
to link her own rejection to a broader decline of genuine Christian faith, in
a tone reminiscent of Matthew Arnold, or even Nietzsche:
Those
dying then,
Knew
where they went
They
went to God's Right Hand
That
Hand is amputated now
And
God cannot be found
[]
(F1581)
[19]
Some poems on this subject are more expansive, rehearsing
I
meant to have but modest needs
Such
as Content and Heaven
Within
my income these could lie
And
Life and I keep even
But
since the last included both
It
would suffice my Prayer
But
just for one to stipulate
And
Grace would grant the Pair
And
so opon this wise I prayed
Great
Spirit Give to me
A
Heaven not so large as Your's,
But
large enough for me
A
Smile suffused Jehovah's face
The
Cherubim withdrew
Grave
Saints stole out to look at me
And
showed their dimples too
I
left the Place with all my might
I
threw my Prayer away
The
Quiet Ages picked it up
And
Judgment twinkled too
That
one so honest be extant
To
take the Tale for true
That
"Whatsoever Ye shall ask
Itself
be given You
But
I, grown shrewder scan the Skies
With
a suspicious Air
As
Children swindled for the first
All
Swindlers be infer
(F711)
[21]
Noteworthy
here are the facts that human "Life does
require, in its longing, a "Heaven for its proper counterbalance, to "keep
even; that nothing of the sort is assured, no matter how intense and
sincere the longing; that the smiles, dimples, and twinkling of, respectively,
God, the saints, and an anthropomorphized Judgment Day, are not emblems of
tender affection, but condescending amusement at the petitioner's naivete;
and that the final emphasis is on a general suspicion of all religious
presumption.
Again, however, that suspicion
is not a denial of the divine mystery. It is the acknowledgement that the
human condition, first and last, is that of being a questioner―a questioner who, as Voegelin puts it, would "deform
his humanity by uncritically accepting answers and "refusing to
[continually] ask the questions about fulfillment of our yearnings for
communion with that divine mystery which, if we are existentially honest, we
cannot ignore, however difficult it may be to hold onto religious faith
regarding our ultimate relationship to it.
[22]
Thus Dickinson repeatedly, in her work, opens with an affirmation
of the reality of the transcendent pole of the In-Between, and then proceeds
to express the true human relationship to it, which is that of, in her own
words, "uncertain certainty (F1421) and "exquisite Discontent
(F696).
[23]
We find a concise example of this trajectory in "I know that He
exists:
I
know that He exists.
Somewhere
in silence
He
has hid his rare life
From
our gross eyes.
'Tis
an instant's play
'Tis
a fond Ambush
Just
to make Bliss
Earn
her own surprise!
But
should the play
Prove
piercing earnest
Should
the glee glaze
In
Death's stiff stare
Would
not the fun
Look
too expensive!
Would
not the jest
Have
crawled too far!
(F365)
[24]
In this poem
of encompassing possibilities, we traverse the entire human pathway running
between Aquinas's assertion that it is in the natural capacity of reason to
know that God is real (ST I, Q12,
a12) to Macbeth's horrifying vision of life as a cruel and pointless joke.
But, of course, the latter possibility is posed in the subjunctive. The final
word, for
With the foregoing examples and analyses in mind, let us conclude by
considering two poems in which
The first begins with one of her constant themes: that honest insight
into the human condition begins with meditation upon the fact of death, and
that authentic living is, in the sense of Socrates and Plato, the "practice
of dying.
The
Admirations and Contempts of time
Show
justest through an Open Tomb
The
Dying as it were a Hight
Reorganizes
Estimate
And
what We saw not
We
distinguish clear
And
mostly see not
What
We saw before
'Tis
Compound Vision
Light
enabling Light
The
Finite furnished
With
the Infinite
Convex
and Concave Witness
Back
toward Time
And
forward
Toward
the God of Him
(F830)
[26]
If this last poem takes as its principal theme the experience of the
intersection of the temporal and the eternal in consciousness and creation,
the next emphasizes our metaxic situation between total ignorance and absolute
knowledge, our awareness that the human drama takes place within an
encompassing Mystery, whose divine ground is at once our deepest identity and
yet unimaginably and inexpressibly Beyond any human having or knowing:
This
World is not conclusion.
A
Species stands beyond
Invisible,
as Music
But
positive, as Sound
It
beckons, and it baffles
Philosophy,
don't know
And
through a Riddle, at the last
Sagacity,
must go
To
guess it, puzzles scholars
To
gain it, Men have borne
Contempt
of Generations
And
Crucifixion, shown
Faith
slips and laughs, and rallies
Blushes,
if any see
Plucks
at a twig of Evidence
And
asks a Vane, the way
Much
Gesture, from the Pulpit
Strong
Hallelujahs roll
Narcotics
cannot still the Tooth
That
nibbles at the soul
(F373)
[27]
Here we find
most of the key Dickinsonian themes already touched upon: affirmation of the
reality of transcendent being; the impotencies of analytical intelligence in
grasping the mystery of transcendent meanings and of the soul's ultimate
destiny; recognition that the dynamic essence of human consciousness is a
longing for fulfillment through communion with that mystery; the vagaries and
difficulties of true religious faith versus the comedy of smug religiosity, a
contrast wonderfully conveyed by her depictions of pulpit oratory and fervid
congregational hymn-singing as narcotics employed to ward off awareness of the
tension of metaxic existence. The
last word, as usual with Dickinson, lies with "the Tooth / That nibbles at
the soul, the spiritual tension experienced―as by many another
modernist looking to rediscover and rearticulate the metaxic truths of
existence (and Dickinson is unquestionably a modernist)―principally in
the negative modalities of doubt, anxiety, and an alienated and solitary
seeking. But few modern writers, and perhaps none in American letters, have
more vividly and eloquently shown that, whatever the difficulties imposed by
culture and by personal circumstances, the dignity and authenticity of
existence lies precisely in fidelity to that seeking―or, in traditional
language, to the search for God, before resting in Whom we can only remain in
honest restlessness.
[1]
A third candidate might be e. e. cummings, a misrepresented and
sadly underrated poet.
[2]
Harold Bloom, Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds (
3
Marietta Messmer, "Dickinson's Critical Reception, in Gudrun Grabher,
Roland Hagenbchle, and Cristanne Miller, eds., The Emily Dickinson Handbook (Amherst and Boston: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1998), 320n4.
[4]
Harold Bloom, The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages (New York, NY:
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), 295.
[5]
Bloom, The Western Canon, 291, 305; Genius,
350 (emphasis added).
[6]
Richard B. Sewall, The Life of Emily Dickinson (2 vols.) (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1974).
[7]
Robert Weisbuch, "Prisming Dickinson; or, Gathering Paradise
by Letting Go, in Grabher, Hagenbchle, and Miller, eds., The
Emily Dickinson Handbook, 219 (emphasis added); Clark Griffith, The
Long Shadow: Emily Dickinson's Tragic Poetry (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1964), 5.
[8]
On "second realities, see, for example, Eric Voegelin, "The
German University and the Order of German Society: A Reconsideration of the
Nazi Era, in Voegelin, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 12, Published Essays, 1966-1985, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 16, 33-34; Voegelin, "On Debate
and Existence, in Voegelin, Published
Essays, 1966-1985, 36-38, 44, 49; and Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in
Sorcery, in Voegelin, Published
Essays, 1966-1985, 237, 242-54.
[9]
Eric Voegelin, The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 17, Order
and History, Volume IV: The Ecumenic Age, ed. Michael Franz (
[10]
Robert Weisbuch, "Prisming Dickinson, 203. She has been
accorded other catchy titles as well. D. S. Savage has described her as "supremely
the poet of death, and Clark Griffith as "the poet of dread. See D.
S. Savage, "Dickinson―Death: A Sequence of Poems, in Oscar
Williams, ed., Master Poems of the
English Language (New York, NY: Trident Press, 1966), 751; and Clark
Griffith, The Long Shadow, one of
whose chapter titles is "The Poet of Dread.
[11]
Eric Voegelin, "Eternal Being in Time, in The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 6, Anamnesis:
On the Theory of History and Politics, trans. M. J. Hanak, based upon
the abbreviated version original trans. by Gerhart Niemeyer; ed. David Walsh
(
[12]
Eric Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture, in Voegelin, Published
Essays, 1966-1985, 176.
[13]
R. W. Franklin, ed., The
Poems of Emily Dickinson: Reading Edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 608-609. All quotations and
numbering of
[14]
Franklin, ed., Poems, 517; 540; 626.
[15] Franklin, ed., Poems, 222 (from "From Blank to Blank ); 412 (from "Satisfaction is the Agent).
[16]
Franklin, ed., Poems, 361; 517.
[17]
Jane Donahue Eberwein, "Emily Dickinson and the Calvinist
Sacramental Tradition, in Judith Farr, ed., Emily
Dickinson: A Collection of Critical Essays (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996), 89-98; Richard Wilbur, "Sumptuous Destitution,
in Farr, ed., Emily Dickinson: A Collection of Critical Essays, 54-55.
[18]
Wilbur, "Sumptuous Destitution, 53.
[19]
Franklin, ed., Poems, 159; 582.
[20]
Her letters describe a "false conversion in her childhood;
see Jane Donahue Eberwein, "
[21]
[22]
Eric Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture, 175.
[23]
[24]
[25]
Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, 404.
[26]
[27]
