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Eric Voegelin Society Meeting 2009
The
Relationship Between Greek Philosophy and Christianity
in
Eric Voegelin's Political Philosophy
Copyright
2006 Jeremiah H. Russell
One
does not have to read far into Eric Voegelin's work to realize that for him
Greek philosophy and Christianity have an intimate relationship.
One does not have to read much further to see that this relationship is
quite complex.
[1]
Voegelin recognized
the fundamental importance of Christian revelation in the history of human
understanding. He regarded it as
"philosophy in its state of perfection."
[2]
And yet, in spite of
this acknowledgment, Voegelin often gave primacy to Greek philosophy.
This deference is seen in both his reliance on the Greeks in his
therapy of order and his critique of Christian revelation.
This complex relationship leads to the question of this presentation:
why would a thinker who acknowledges the epochal significance of Christian
revelation give this primacy to Greek philosophy in his discussion of human
consciousness and political order? This
presentation will suggest that Voegelin gave this primacy because he believed
politics could be restored through a "noetically-controlled Christianity."
By "noetically-controlled," I mean an expression of Christianity
that takes into account the differentiation, or clarification of reality, of
Christian revelation, yet guards against potential imbalance by giving primacy
to Greek philosophy.
Voegelin
certainly recognized the fundamental importance of Christian revelation for
human consciousness and political order. For
him, Christianity provided increased insight into reality (God and man, world
and society), even beyond that of Greek philosophy.
For example, Christian revelation illuminated the universality of man.
[3]
Voegelin writes, "The
Platonic-Aristotelian man is the man of the polis and is, even for Aristotle,
tied to the omphalos [belly-button]
of
Even
still with this maximal differentiation of Christian revelation, Voegelin gave
primacy to Greek philosophy in his "new science" of political order.
Almost without exception, Voegelin's work dealt with transcendence
and its implications for human existence, including the polis.
In his correspondence, he comments to friend Alfred Schtz that
the "philosophical problems of transcendence [are] the decisive problems of
philosophy."
[6]
His
work was animated by a sense of political crisis, which he traced back to a
spiritual crisis in the soul of modern man.
This focus on transcendence was necessitated by a "decapitation of
being," a rejection of transcendence in modern politike
episteme. This recovery of
transcendence became Voegelin's project.
Yet he attempted this therapy of order, not by reliance on
Christianity, but rather on Greek philosophy.
Again and again, we find Voegelin used the latter as his touchstone.
This
deference to Greek philosophy is nowhere more evident than in his theory of
consciousness, particularly his recovery of the Platonic-Aristotelian account
of the soul.
[7]
Voegelin believed that
this order of being, articulating the hierarchical levels of reality (e.g.
animals, man, and the divine), could not only provide clarity and insight into
reality but could also penetrate deep into the spiritual disorder of the age.
Thus, Voegelin not only diagnosed the modern problem (i.e. a rejection
of transcendence) but also prescribed a recovery of transcendence without much
mention of Christianity at all. This
is not to say that Voegelin believed that Christianity could not provide a
recovery of transcendence, nor is it to say that Voegelin made no advances
beyond Greek philosophy. I am
simply making the observation that Voegelin in his theory of consciousness
gave primacy to Greek philosophy.
Voegelin's
philosophy of history also demonstrates deference to Greek philosophy.
By emphasizing the movement of history towards a telos, Christianity (at least its Pauline expression) was much more
interested in providing a meaning of history,
than Greek philosophy. Voegelin
writes, "The classic [or Greek] meaning in
history can be opposed by Paul with a meaning of
history, because he knows the end of the story in the transfiguration that
begins with the Resurrection."
[8]
Christianity
emphasized "the movement in the
structure," in contrast to Greek philosophy's emphasis on "the structure
in the movement."
[9]
That is to say,
Christianity highlighted the eschatological direction of history towards its telos,
whereas Greek philosophy focused on the constant human experience or
condition.
Voegelin
himself provided the meaning in history, a recovery of the structure
in the movement. And it is
this focus that demonstrates his deference to Greek philosophy.
Two of the clearest examples are his attempt to identify the constants
of human experience and his theory of equivalence.
He sought to reclaim the human
condition in its fullness that had been distorted by modern psychopathologies.
By the removal of transcendence, modern man attempted to murder God and
become "super-man," driven by his libido
dominandi (the lust for power).
[10]
But Voegelin
demonstrated that man is "In-between" (metaxy),
literally in between the animal and the divine.
This is the human condition.
And against those who attempted to divide history between a before and
an after, culminating in their philosophy, Voegelin emphasized the equivalence
between the human experience being symbolized. He
writes, "the enthusiasm of renewal and discovery can be so intense that it
will transfigure the new truth into absolute Truth--an ultimate Truth that
relegates all previous truth to the state of pseudos,
a lie."
[11]
He continues, "[T]he
enthusiasm can also be tempered by awareness that the truth emerging from the
process is not entirely new . . . but a differentiated and therefore superior
insight into the same reality." For
example, man's "search for the ground," or an existential pull towards
his source of existence, is a constant human experience.
Though this expression has been demonstrated in a variety of ways (e.g.
Heraclitus's "love, hope, and faith," or
Not only did Voegelin give primacy to the Greeks at crucial points in
his political philosophy, he also critiqued Christianity using Greek
philosophy. The most well-known is
the critique of Paul's interpretation of his vision.
In short, he accused Paul of being overly fixated on history's
movement toward its telos.
[13]
That is to say, Paul
had a certain expectation that the eschaton
would break in time in the not too distant future.
Unlike the Platonic expression, Voegelin believed that Paul did not
maintain the balance necessary to guard against this expectation.
By imbalance, I mean an ability to keep the tension between the
constant structure of the order of reality and the movement of history toward
transfiguration in check from an excessive fixation on the eschaton.
Instead of clouding the future transfiguration in mystery (as Plato
did), Paul articulated his vision in explicit fashion and even expected the
event to occur within his lifetime. Voegelin
focused on Paul's treatment of phthora
(perishing).
[14]
According to Voegelin,
Greek philosophy maintained the balance between genesis
(birth) and phthora (perishing)
by leaving the future immortality of man in mystery.
Yet due to Paul's apocalyptic ferocity, he allowed the balance of
life and death, the constant human experience, to be distorted by arguing that
man will be transfigured without death: "we shall not sleep, but we shall
all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet.
For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable,
and we (who have not yet died) shall
be changed [italics added]." Voegelin's
deference to the Platonic balance (and thus Greek philosophy), over and
against the Pauline imbalance, is certain.
This deference is so much the fact that some commentators have accused
Voegelin of forcing Christian revelation into Greek categories.
[15]
This tension in Voegelin's thought between the superiority of
Christianity and the deference to Greek philosophy brings us back to our
initial question. Why would a
thinker who acknowledges the epochal significance of Christian revelation give
this primacy to Greek philosophy in his discussion of human consciousness and
political order?
Given the superiority that Voegelin ascribes to Christianity, perhaps
Voegelin used Greek philosophy to build a philosophic foundation, ultimately
seeking to restore political order through Christianity.
Michael Federici suggests something to this effect:
Voegelin
is primarily concerned with building a philosophical foundation on which to
support a spiritual revival. He
believes that the preliminary task is to recover the meaning of experience.
With this as a precondition, Voegelin hopes to restore the primacy of
meaningful spiritual conversion.
[16]
In
order for such a revival to take place, a Greek philosophic foundation must be
laid. This relationship is
reminiscent of Voegelin's statement in "The Gospel and Culture:" "[I]t
will be necessary . . . to recover the question to which, in Hellenistic-Roman
culture, the philosopher could understand the gospel as the answer."
[17]
It seems reasonable to
conclude that Voegelin sought to use Greek philosophy as a preparation
evangelica. Since the insights
gained by Greek philosophy and Christianity have been distorted by modern
psychopathologies, Voegelin believed it necessary to open up the soul to the
order of Greek philosophy, so that in time Christianity could be viewed once
again as an answer.
In
this view, Voegelin's deference to Greek philosophy would not be a rejection
of Christian revelation but rather its affirmation.
Perhaps, in an earlier correspondence, Voegelin was getting at
something similar to this, "Sometimes I have the feeling that my
intellectual accomplishment for the church's problematic cultural situation
(Kulturproblematik) is greater than
the accomplishments of the professionals, whose job it is supposed to be."
[18]
Even though this hypothesis highlights the epochal significance of
Christian revelation, it has one weakness: it overlooks the significant
criticism that Voegelin gave of Christianity itself.
As a matter of fact, if Voegelin would have been given the opportunity
to boil Christianity down into one word, it possibly would have been dangerous. It is
somewhat presumptuous then to argue that Voegelin attempted to pave the way
for a Christian "spiritual revival," while at the same time he suggested
that it is one of the major factors in the "deforming of humanity."
[19]
This criticism of Christianity brings us to a second hypothesis
suggested by Murray Jardine, namely that Voegelin believed that the modern
disorder is "not a rebellion against Christianity but precisely a more
complete realization of Christianity's own essence."
[20]
In this answer,
Voegelin would have given primacy to Greek philosophy over Christianity
because in fact the latter is the spiritual root of the modern political mass
movements. It would stand to
reason that any recovery of order would avoid incorporating the foundation of
the problem into the solution.
There
is no question that for Voegelin Christianity is much to blame for the modern
disorder, as Jardine brings to our attention.
Voegelin writes, "[T]he modern revolt is so intimately a development
of the Christianity' against which it is in revolt."
[21]
Ever since the Christ
event, Christians have misinterpreted, distorted, and even manipulated its
revelation. The deformations
provide much justification for Voegelin's deference to Greek philosophy.
However, this hypothesis goes too far.
It does not adequately account for the advancements beyond Greek
philosophy that Christianity brings for Voegelin.
So, how are we to reconcile this tension in Voegelin's reading of
Christianity? Though at times
Voegelin did argue for a connection between Christianity and the modern
disorder, he also distinguished between the two.
He writes, "For it must not be forgotten that Western society is not
at all modern but that modernity is a growth within it, in opposition to the
classic and Christian tradition."
[22]
It is at this point
that a distinction must be made between the Christian revelation, or "essential
Christianity" as Voegelin called it, and the distorted interpretations of
that vision.
[23]
This very distinction
is made in Voegelin's discussion of the Paul's vision.
[24]
Voegelin argues that
the valid expression of the vision is the feeling of the eschatological
movement of history, yet Paul's interpretation goes awry when it is "used
to anticipate the concrete process of transfiguration within history."
[25]
Thus, Voegelin argued
that Christian revelation, as experienced by Jesus and his followers (e.g.
Paul), gave insight into reality, yet Christianity,
that is interpretations of the event, are often mistaken and imbalanced.
Voegelin believed that the Christ event must be a part of the
restoration of order, and he acknowledged the superiority of the event.
However, Christian revelation is one thing; its derailment is something
else. It is more proper then to
say that Voegelin believed that some
interpretations of Christianity contributed to the modern psychopathologies
but that Christian revelation (as Voegelin interprets it) does not necessary
have to lead to disorder.
Jardine does not ignore this distinction I have just made, yet
struggles to account for it adequately because he rejects Voegelin's
interpretation as authentic Christianity.
Jardine calls Voegelin's Christianity a radical reinterpretation.
He even goes so far as to call it a "new religion."
[26]
Jardine is not alone.
Others have regarded Voegelin as approaching Christianity from a "standpoint
extraneous to it."
[27]
Yet regardless of one's
like or dislike of Voegelin's Christianity, he took great pains to
demonstrate that his reading, even his criticism, was not beyond Christianity
itself. It rather developed within
the Christian revelation. Voegelin
writes in response to Thomas Alitzer, "I am equally conscious of not going
beyond the orbit of Christianity."
[28]
Unfortunately, these two previous hypotheses fall short of adequately
accounting for the tension in Voegelin's political philosophy.
Each interestingly enough emphasizes what the other overlooks.
The first highlights the contribution that Voegelin believed Christian
revelation made for political order, yet does not emphasize enough his serious
criticism of Christianity. The
second brings his criticism to the forefront, while not sufficiently
accounting for Voegelin's affirmation of Christianity.
Thus, an answer is needed that accounts for all of the complexities
found in Voegelin's thought. The
proposed solution--"noetically-controlled Christianity"--does just that.
Again, by "noetically-controlled," I mean an expression of
Christianity that takes into account the differentiation of Christian
revelation, yet guards against potential imbalance by giving primacy to Greek
philosophy. This solution suggests
that Voegelin was a Christian political philosopher, in the sense that he
believed that the Christian revelation was necessary to a proper political
order. And at least in the
intellectual sense, he can be considered nothing less than Christian.
He writes, "I would take it as a principle of philosophizing that the
philosopher must include in his interpretation the maximally differentiated
experiences. . . . Now with Christianity a decisive differentiation has
occurred."
[29]
Thus, Voegelin's
philosophy is just that a "noetically-controlled Christianity."
Yet
he also believed that, because of certain tendencies within the revelation
itself, Christianity has played a significant role in the "deforming of
humanity" and thus needs "noetic-control."
Christianity's tendency toward imbalance by apocalyptic fixation
provides a case in point. The
Greek noetic differentiation maintained the balance between the structure and
the movement; Plato surrounded the "noetic core with his belt of uncertainty"
to guard against an obsession of the eschaton.
[30]
In contrast, Christian
pneumatic differentiation (particularly the Pauline interpretation) abolished
this tension; Paul displays impatience in his apocalyptic assurances.
These assurances later led to "egophanic revolts," attempts to
bring the future transfiguration into history.
Thus, while taking into account the insights of Christian revelation,
Voegelin felt it necessary to provide a "noetic-control" to this tendency
by emphasizing the structure in the movement (using Greek philosophy), rather
than the movement itself. He
provided a means by which this tendency might be controlled and not become an
imbalanced political philosophy.
[1]
For further discussion on Voegelin's reading of Christianity
see Bruce Douglass, "A Diminshed Gospel: A Critique of Voegelin's
Interpretation of Christianity," in Eric
Voegelin's Search for Order in History, edited by Stephen A. McKnight
(
[2]
Eric Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture," in Faith
and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric
Voegelin, 1934-1964, edited by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (
[3] The choice to limit this discussion to Christology in no way restricts the insights of other symbols of Christianity or their political implications. In a fascinating letter written in response to long-time friend Alfred Schtz, Voegelin discusses some of these symbols in relation to their insights into the order of being: Christology (the incarnation), Theology (the Trinity), Mariology, and theological method itself. See Voegelin, "On Christianity (Letter to Alfred Schtz, 1 January, 1953)," in Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness, and Politics, edited by Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 453-56.
[4]
Voegelin, "Letter to Leo Strauss (
[5]
Though concrete political implications are not always spelled
out in Voegelin's work as one might wish, at least two political
implications seem to follow from Christian revelation.
The first is an increased justification to critique political
structures and ideologies. Voegelin
writes, "[T]he tension between the institutions of the polis and the
sentiments of the apolitical groups would recur in a Christian civilization
in a more radical form because the Christian idea of the person in immediacy
to God would prove the permanent irritant against the institutions" (See
Voegelin, History of Political Ideas,
vol. 4: The Renaissance and Reformation, vol. 22, The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by David L. Morse and William
M. Thompson (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1998), 249-50).
This increased justification is in part a result of man no longer
needing mediation to the divine through a political or ethnic group.
The second political implication is universal human dignity and
rights. Though Greek philosophy's
concept of political friendship provided notions of human dignity and
rights, it was Christianity that provided the justification for the
universalization of these notions. If
Plato argued for a theological vision with the intracosmic gods of the
Greeks, then it was impossible to develop a universal man, because the
mediating divinities are bound to
[6]
Voegelin, Anamnesis: On
the Theory of History and Politics, vol. 6, The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by David Walsh (
[7]
See Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," in Published Essays 1966-1985, vol. 12, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Ellis Sandoz (
[8]
Voegelin, Order and
History, vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age, vol. 17, The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Michael Franz (
[9]
Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," in Published Essays 1966-1985, vol. 12, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Ellis Sandoz (
[10]
Voegelin, Science,
Politics, and Gnosticism (
[11]
Voegelin, "Experience and Symbolization in History," in Published Essays 1966-1985, vol. 12, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Ellis Sandoz (
[12]
I acknowledge that it is possible that Voegelin's philosophy
of history is more Christian than previously stated.
There can be no question that Voegelin's philosophy is not
Christian in the Pauline sense (or at least Voegelin's interpretation of
Paul's Christianity). This is
the point made above, but his philosophy of history could still be
Christian. In discussing the
rise of Christianity as a political power, Voegelin writes that a radical
eschatological expectation (Pauline Christianity) would have kept Christian
communities in obscurity. He
argued that Christianity became a social force through two "Pauline
compromises." The first was
the realization that the world, including political powers, was not going to
end next week. The second was
the transformation of the church from its eschatological emphasis to the "historical
[13] Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age, 303-39.
[14] Ibid., 305-06.
[15] Jardine, "Eric Voegelin's Interpretation(s) of Modernity: A Reconsideration of the Spiritual and Political Implications of Voegelin's Therapeutic Analysis," 603; Marion Montgomery, "Eric Voegelin and the End of Our Exploring," Modern Age 23 (1979): 244, n. 9; Gerhart Niemeyer, "Eric Voegelin's Philosophy and the Drama of Mankind," Modern Age 20 (1976): 35; Stephen Tonsor, "The God Question," Modern Age 35 (1992): 66.
[16] Michael Federici, "Voegelin's Christian Critics," 337.
[17] Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture," 142.
[18]
Voegelin, "Letter to Friedrich Engel-Janosi (11 May, 1951),"
quoted in History of Political Ideas,
vol. 1: Hellenism,
[19] Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age, 66.
[20] Murray Jardine, "Eric Voegelin's Interpretation(s) of Modernity: A Reconsideration of the Spiritual and Political Implications of Voegelin's Therapeutic Analysis," 600-01.
[21] Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age, 336.
[22] Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 176. See also "Configurations of History," in Published Essays 1966-1985, vol. 12, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University, 1990), 107-08.
[23] Voegelin, "On Christianity (Letter to Alfred Schtz, 1 January, 1953)," 452.
[26] Jardine, "Eric Voegelin's Interpretation(s) of Modernity: A Reconsideration of the Spiritual and Political Implications of Voegelin's Therapeutic Analysis," 585.
[28] This response was to two points raised by Thomas Alitzer: (1) Voegelin's preference for translating the Greek word theotes as divine reality, instead of godhead, and (2) his use of the Christian medieval phrase, fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding), to include every faith, not only Christianity. Concerning his translation of theotes as divine reality, he writes, "I have preferred divine reality because it renders best the author's intention to denote a nonpersonal reality which allows for degrees of participation in its fullness while remaining the God beyond the In-Between of existence [italics added]." In dealing with the equivalence of faith (properly understood), Voegelin again attempts to develop his interpretation from within Christianity, not from without. He writes, "Even this expansion of the fides, however, to all of the experience of divine reality in which history constitutes itself, cannot be said to go beyond Christianity.' For it is the Christ of the Gospel of John who says himself, Before Abraham was, I am' (8:58); and it is Thomas Aquinas who considers the Christ to be the head of the corpus mysticum that embraces, not only Christians, but all mankind from the creation of the world to its end." Voegelin, "Response to Professor Alitzer's A New History and a New but Ancient God?," in Published Essays 1966-1985, vol. 12, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University, 1990), 294. See also "The Gospel and Culture," 158.
[29] Voegelin, "On Christianity (Letter to Alfred Schtz, 1 January, 1953)," 450.
[30] Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age, 298-99.
