Meeting Index
- Society Members
- Newsletter No.XXVII
- Annual Meeting Papers 2012
- Annual Meeting Papers 2011
- Annual Meeting Papers 2010
- Annual Meeting Papers 2009
- Annual Meeting Papers 2008
- Annual Meeting Papers 2007
- Annual Meeting Papers 2006
- Annual Meeting Papers 2005
- Annual Meeting Papers 2004
- Annual Meeting Papers 2003
- Annual Meeting Papers 2002
- Annual Meeting Papers 2001
- Annual Meeting Papers 2000
- Annual Meeting Papers since 1985
Eric Voegelin Society Meeting 2005
Copyright
2005 Richard Drew
Barry Cooper's New Political Religions is a searching analysis of the spiritual disfigurement that drives modern terrorism. It clarifies how vulnerable liberal democracies are against an enemy implacably hostile to anything approaching ordinary political life. But the severe pathology Cooper finds behind the new terrorism only sharpens an old question: how does a constitutional state combat such depravity without sacrificing the principles that make it worth defending?
To call this entirely false would be wrong, but it is more false than
true, particularly when applied to
The record that emerges from past anti-terror efforts is, to say the least, uneven. Terror was ultimately victorious in the struggles over Reconstruction. Attachment to traditional constitutional norms helped erode support for protecting the new Southern state governments against white violence. The limited but important successes against the anarchists came with a high cost in the eventually over-broad and unreasonable use of deportation, provoking a reaction that nearly obliterated memory of the very real threat that had existed. The eventual working consensus that emerged on the government's power to act against foreign extremists was unloved and almost unacknowledged.
Integrating the evidence from these episodes with the post-9/11 debates produces several conclusions. Terrorism has the power to throw legal limits designed for ordinary political life into disarray, making them more shields for violence than restraints on arbitrary government power. In these circumstances, to demand unceasing adherence to these rules as the only bulwark against despotism will in fact allow terrorism by private actors to destroy the very ends for which constitutions are established. However, responding to this dilemma with a doctrine of unlimited executive power becomes self-defeating over time. In a polity reared on constitutionalism and limited government, any claim of unchecked power over individuals will draw suspicion and eventually successful opposition. Instead of either a rigid adherence to old legal limits or a resort to unbounded power, successful sustained anti-terror efforts in a constitutional state are based on the creation of new rules adapted to the violent threat while still providing standards that structure and limit governmental power. Unfortunately, the relative eclipse of the contemporary Congress before the waxing strength of both the judiciary and the executive has made it harder for such new rules to be created in any coherent way.
Terror Triumphant: Southern
Violence and the Constitutional
Politics of Reconstruction
If we define terrorism as violence against civilians for political ends, then by far the most extensive American experience of it came during the Reconstruction era following the Civil War. It posed the most agonizing conflict the nation has yet seen between attachment to received constitutional principles and an effective response to terror. In the end, Americans abandoned the South to violence, hamstrung by their initial unwillingness to make wider innovations in the federal system and then by their growing discomfort with the extralegal means needed to sustain the reforms they did make in favor of equal rights.
An earlier generation would have balked at any description of Reconstruction being somehow hindered by overnice constitutional scruples. For many years, Reconstruction was understood as a shameful abandonment of all constitutional principles, in which radical Republicans used military despotism to dominate a prostrate South as a means of revenge and to further their own corrupt control of national politics. [2] The last forty years have wrought a revolution in our historical understanding. We now have better knowledge of what radical Republicans actually wanted, and of how much they had to compromise with moderate Republicans who intended to preserve the antebellum constitutional order as much as possible. Ironically, it was the relative triumph of the moderate wing that produced the extensive military involvement once thought the hallmark of "radical" Reconstruction.
To understand the constitutional dilemma terrorism posed in this
period, it is necessary to go into some detail about the overall
Reconstruction debate. Following the death of
Under
territorialization, the former states would have elected legislatures, but
their executive and judicial branches would be largely selected by the
national government. If needed, Congress would be able to overturn laws passed
by the territorial legislatures, and it would also have authority to set
conditions for the overall operation of their governments, including voting
rights for the freed slaves. By this arrangement, there would be a measure of
local self-government, but the involvement and supervision of the national
government would insure it developed peacefully, with the nation protected
from renewed treason and the freedmen from violent lawlessness. After time,
when the former Confederate states were firmly reattached to the
This was the best developed radical plan, but it had little chance of passage. The postbellum center of political gravity was occupied by moderate Republicans who considered the lengthy territorialization of the rebellious states far too great a departure from the original constitutional framework. The former Confederacy would have to be readmitted as states and readmitted soon. But they could not acquiesce in Johnson's moves to readmit them with only the abolition of slavery as a condition. The results from
the exclusively white Southern state governments Johnson had organized were too troubling. Their laws had denied basic legal rights to the freedmen, and they had been exceptionally lax in protecting former slaves from violent attack. In response, moderates framed the 14th amendment, which secured basic legal rights and equal protection before the law to the freed slaves. Over fierce radical objections, they then made the Southern states' ratification of it the sole practical condition of readmission. [4]
The moderates were confident this would solve the question of
Reconstruction, allowing the states to rejoin while also providing some
protection for the freedmen. They were thus shocked when all the Confederate
states except
To install a system of military government and military justice where
there were functioning civil governments, even if unrecognized, troubled many
observers who pointed to the deep suspicion of military dictatorship in
Anglo-American constitutionalism. Radical Republicans could in fact argue that
their territorialization proposal would have been less obnoxious on this
score, since it would have led to a formal subordination to the national civil
government, instead of a sort of ad hoc military control. Supporter of the
plan responded that states with unrecognized governments were still in the "grasp
of war"; they remained theatres of military operations in which military
control was entirely legitimate.
[6]
Moreover, the entire point of the moderate program was that
military government would serve as a transitory stop-gap, not a permanent
template. It was the quickest means for readmitting the states to their full
rights while also ensuring they were loyal to the
The moderates' confidence in their plan's acceptability was shaken
by Supreme Court decisions that seemed to attack martial law as
unconstitutional outside narrow bounds. In Ex
Parte Milligan,
[7]
the Court in 1866 unanimously overturned the conviction of a man
tried in
Once again Congress was charged with grave constitutional violations,
not only establishing military justice but sustaining it by gutting the
Supreme Court's authority to protect individual rights. Again, Republicans
in Congress could defend themselves by stressing by the temporary nature of
the expedient. Indeed, only a few months after McCardle
the Supreme Court sharply limited its reach and reasserted a power to hear
habeas corpus appeals in a case arising from a military tribunal conviction.
[12]
Congress did not react.
[13]
By then, military reconstruction was winding down. Almost all the
Southern states had crafted new constitutions with equal voting rights,
elected new governments under them and ratified the 14th amendment.
They were already being readmitted as full fledged states in the
There had been serious ongoing violence against the former slaves since emancipation. It was one of the main factors that led moderate Republicans to spurn Johnson's plan for Reconstruction. However, in the early stages it was more sporadic and spontaneous than an organized campaign. This changed in 1868 as the plan for establishing multiracial governments went forward. White Southerners began to band together in groups sworn to violently oppose the formation of these governments. Failing that, they aimed to stifle their operation, demonstrate their powerlessness and finally overturn them. The most famous of these groups was of course the Ku Klux Klan, but there were numerous others throughout the South. [15] In organization the early Klan was less hierarchical than the version that reemerged in the twentieth century. It was instead a set of local groups that drew inspiration from each other and sometimes cooperated, akin to the "network" structure Cooper finds characteristic of modern terrorism.
However, across different groups and states there was a common repertoire of terror. Most commonly, black men active in political mobilization were whipped and humiliated in ways resembling slave punishments. This was also sometimes visited upon whites involved in Republican politics. Dozens of black churches and schools were burned as important meeting political meeting places. From there, groups often advanced to targeted assassinations and lynchings of Republican leaders and party workers. There were hundreds of these killings across the South. [16]
Finally,
in almost every Southern state the white terror between 1868 and 1871
culminated in mass atrocities. Thirty black citizens, including most of the
political leadership, were murdered in a day of mob action in
The effects of this terror campaign put the newly elected state governments under intolerable strain. The logic behind the moderate Republican plan was that voting rights would give the freedmen all necessary means of defense and allow local autonomy to resume on a just basis. But white terrorism sliced through this logic by simply refusing to accept the results of elections, something moderate Republicans schooled in the norms of popular self-government had seemed unable to anticipate or even imagine. Except in the important cities where small numbers of national soldiers remained, violent groups systematically set about killing, intimidating and driving away local officials and prominent supporters of the new governments, rendering their authority an empty shell across much of their territory and making a free vote in future elections almost impossible. [21]
In the deep South, where white Republicans were rare outside the high leadership, officials drew back from even attempting such a response. With reason, they feared sending an overwhelmingly black militia into action would polarize society into outright civil war. They also had solid ground to worry that the poorly armed ex-slaves might have a hard time contending with well-equipped bands of hardened Confederate veterans. Therefore, as terrorism gathered pace in these states, the cry went up for national protection. President Grant finally moved in 1871, calling a special session of Congress to address the problem. [23]
This put the moderate Republicans in Congress in an exceptionally awkward position. The whole justification and aim of their Reconstruction plan was that it protected the freedmen but allowed the states quick readmission and eliminated the need for sustained national power over them. Nevertheless, after much initial reluctance they responded. They passed the so called "Ku Klux Klan Act" making federal crimes of conspiracies and violent acts aimed at suppressing the right to vote. Even more important, as an aid to enforcing this law they authorized the President to use military force and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in areas where he judged violence had made normal civil government impossible. Individuals could be detained at length without their having recourse to the normal legal process for challenging the grounds of their arrest. [24]
Criticism
of this law was immediate and furious. Democrats charged it created a "Kaiser
Ulysses" with arbitrary authority to suspend constitutional limits and
centralize all power.
[25]
Many moderate and conservative Republicans were uncomfortable
themselves and abstained from voting on final passage of the bill. Even the
proponents of the law bowed to these concerns. In his speech introducing the
act to the Senate, James Garfield admitted that "crippling the principle of
local government would be as fatal to liberty as secession would have been
fatal to the
At
first, it seemed like this might be true. Grant
quickly acted by suspending habeas corpus in nine
Yet
many on the ground warned this was a false dawn. The fundamental refusal to
accept the new Southern state governments remained, and when the Grant
administration began dismissing many of the Klan prosecutions that were
clogging the federal courts, the local military commander in
Vulnerable
Republican regimes began to teeter. As a result of voter intimidation, and
some compensatory fraud by the Republican themselves, there were disputed
elections in
Grant
had tried to pursue the most restrained course possible, directly using
military force only in the face of violent revolution in
However, the anti-terror imperative was wearing thin among Northern voters. The means used to fight it were coming to seem just as harmful to constitutional government as the violence itself. To be sure, there were a number of reasons for the North's waning support for Reconstruction. The endurance of racist beliefs, disgust with the supposed corruption of several Southern governments, and deteriorating economic conditions that undermined the national government's popularity all played a role. [35] But with all that, it is beyond doubt that the perceived constitutional irregularity of continual and discretionary military intervention in states supposedly restored to civil control played an essential part in eroding the will to continue the effort. This finally began to determine national policy. In 1875, despite a series of attacks that had killed dozens and driven many black local officials into hiding, Grant refused the request of Mississippi Governor Adelbert Ames to send federal troops and restore order before the state's elections. [36] The Republican majority in the state duly evaporated, and white supremacists "redeemed" the state.
There
remained only the coup de grace. In 1876,
What
explains the terrorist victory? The moderate Republican program of protecting
the former slaves through equal suffrage as a way of returning quickly to the
old federalism was upended by the power of terrorism to make these two goals
incompatible. Consequently, the national Republicans had to fall back on
military intervention to cope with terrorism's effects in the newly restored
states. They had earlier promised this was only a transitory mechanism that
would be dispensed with as soon as the multiracial state governments were in
operation. Instead, they had to
resort first to authorizing habeas corpus suspension and then, as terror
revived, to constant presidential threats of military deployment and
occasionally the actual use of it. As a result, even among those disgusted by
Southern violence, there was a rising chorus of uneasiness with Reconstruction
policy. The use of military power in the restored states seemed effectively
bound by no law. It was a potential tool for partisan manipulation, even
creeping despotism. Military intervention had been acceptable as a passing
means to restore just and loyal governments, and even as a temporary force to
put down insurrection in
Given
the extremely limited use to which military force was actually put in the
South, and the great evils it was directed against, these concerns can seem
now almost frivolous, or even a cover for a lack of real desire to secure
equal rights for the former slaves. But they were in fact entirely consistent
with an Anglo-American constitutional tradition disposed to "augur
misgovernment at a distance and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted
breeze."
[38]
However just its aims,
over time any unchecked power will draw intense suspicion in such a polity.
Thus, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which in reaction to Reconstruction banned
the use of the
In retrospect, the radical Republicans' territorialization plan had a better chance of avoiding this brutal conflict between the forms of constitutional government and its ends. They had had no illusions that simply extending voting rights would give the freedmen all necessary protection against violence and intimidation. But neither did they want to rely simply on untrammeled military power to accomplish their objectives. Taking its legal justification from the constitutional clause guaranteeing a republican form of government, territorialization would have involved the national government in the everyday operations of Southern local government, but in the form of appointed civil officers exercising executive and judicial functions, not ad hoc military interventions. Congress would have had to provide rules for their conduct and fulfill its oversight responsibilities. Local governments backed by such intensive national involvement would have been better able to withstand terrorism, while less liable to charges of governing through arbitrary armed power.
Moreover,
even though such a system would have been a large constitutional innovation
applied to former states, territorialization might actually have made it
possible to preserve something more of traditional federalism than we have
today. After all, the radicals' expectation was that the former Confederate
states would one day return to their full rights in the
Immigration and the Constitution:
The Response to Anarchist Terrorism
The next serious episode of terrorism in
To
further this end, many anarchists began to advocate the "insurrectionary
deed": acts of violence against figures of authority to destabilize state
power. Between 1880 and 1900, anarchist assassins murdered prominent
representatives from virtually every form of government: Russian Czar
Alexander II (1881), French President Sadi Carnot(1894), Spanish Prime
Minister Antonio Cnovas del Castillo(1897), Empress Elizabeth of
The
early American role in all of this was that of a safe haven for anarchists.
Americans had long been proud to offer their nation as a refuge for those
fleeing political persecution. In the first series of statutes putting some
limited restrictions on immigration, the "moral turpitude" provisions
excluding individuals with criminal convictions made explicit exceptions for
political crimes.
[43]
Moreover, there had been early and distinguished arguments that
Congress' power over immigration was limited and that those admitted had
strong constitutional protections against deportation. We tend to think of the
1798-1800 controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts as being mainly about
the free speech issues surrounding the criminalization of "seditious libel."
But in their attacks on the laws, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison devoted
at least as much attention to the Alien Acts, which gave the President
authority to deport resident aliens he judged dangerous to public order.
[44]
In part, they argued such power over immigration was not one of
Congress' enumerated powers. At even greater length they insisted that
summary deportation violated core constitutional rights that protected both
citizens and aliens alike.
This
libertarian perspective dominated American immigration law during the
nineteenth century, though it received a major alteration in series of statues
passed between 1882 and 1891, which first excluded Chinese immigrants and then
mandated the deportation of resident alien Chinese. Driven by a mixture of
economic and racial fears, the acts also authorized deportation hearings
entirely within the executive branch, with almost no opportunity for judicial
review.
[46]
Nevertheless, although full of implications for the future, these
laws were the exception not the rule as the nineteenth century ended. Aside
from a few restrictions, immigration was entirely open, and deportation was
almost unheard of for lawfully admitted aliens. Therefore, anarchists fleeing
increasingly vigilant governments in Europe began filtering in to
The
most important was Johann Most, a German-born orator and newspaper editor who
had finally run afoul of even the tolerant English state with a newspaper
editorial praising Alexander II's assassins. After serving a jail sentence,
he decamped to
The
consequences soon came into public view with the 1886 Haymarket attack, in
which a bomb was thrown at police moving in to disperse a
This
changed after William McKinley was assassinated. The son of Polish
immigrations, Leon Czolgosz first became influenced by anarchist ideas while
working in a
By
banning adherents of a particular set of ideas Congress made a large departure
from traditional American immigration law, which had heretofore given
unconditional refuge for all varieties of political dissidents. By extending
the reach of deportation, which until then had only been extensively applied
against the Chinese, Congress emphasized the disparity between rights of
citizens and rights of aliens, while an earlier generation led by
However,
for the first fourteen years in its operation, the new policy had a limited
impact. The disinclination of immigrating anarchists to proclaim their
ideology at the border, the three year limit on deportation and, above all,
the lack of any real federal enforcement capacity combined to make
applications of the new law sporadic. Partly as a result, anarchist terror was
still able to organize. Far and away the most serious group rose up within the
growing Italian immigrant community, whose homeland was a main nerve center of
anarchism in
In
As
a result of this activity and of rising security concerns as America edged
toward involvement in World War I, Congress in early 1917 strengthened its
anti-anarchist policy, removing the three year time limit on deportation of
alien anarchists and providing more resources to the Bureau of Investigation,
the precursor to today's FBI.
[55]
Since its creation a decade before, the Bureau had been kept on a
short budgetary leash by a Congress intensely suspicious of a centralized
security force as a potential tool of despotism. Now it received more room to
maneuver. Working off evidence from the earlier attacks, Bureau investigators
began to trace those involved back to Galleani and the group around his
newspaper. There was no solid evidence he had directly ordered an attack, but
his role as organizer and instigator was clear. After raiding his offices, the
federal government used the revised 1917 anti-anarchism statute to begin
deportation procedures against Galleani and eight of his associates. Using the
procedures pioneered against the Chinese, these deportation hearings took
place entirely within executive branch, allowing a much faster way of acting
against the anarchists than the slow and uncertain process of trying to
convict them of crimes in court. The men were successfully deported back to
When
it came, its scale was beyond all expectation. Soon after the Galleani
deportation order was publicized, mail bombs began to go off: the office of an
anti-labor mayor in
These bombings understandably enflamed the popular imagination and set off what is rather inaccurately now called the "Red Scare," since it was really sparked by anarchists not communists. Nevertheless, it is true that the recent Bolshevik Revolution was also much in the public mind, and definitional niceties were not always observed. Driven by Palmer, the federal government massively expanded what had been an investigation focused on the Galleanist anarchists into one sweeping in radicals of all type across the nation. Mass deportation orders were filed against the entire membership lists of various organizations judged anarchist or subversive, even when these members had no knowledge of their groups' supposed radical positions. [59]
After initial enthusiasm, unease set in and then a full scale backlash. Labor Secretary Louis Post, who was charged under statue law with providing appellate review of the executive branch deportation orders before they could be enforced, began to overturn them. Civil liberties proponents outside government, already mobilizing to defend the free speech of World War I opponents against prosecutions under the 1918 Sedition Act, turned their attention to the Red Scare deportations as well. Federal courts began to grant habeas corpus petitions challenging the executive branch application of the law. By the early 1920s, the whole effort was discredited. [60] From that time until the present day, the early actions against the Galleanists, the mass deportations that followed the retaliation bombings, and the World War I limits on free speech have usually been treated together as one big "Red Scare" and brought forward as the main exhibit for the "hysteria" model of American civil liberties during times of crisis. What this ignores is that an increasingly successful investigation to break up a very real and dangerous terrorist group was essentially overwhelmed by an overreaching Attorney General.
Still,
the Red Scare backlash did reveal real problems with the framework set up to
fight alien radicals. The deportation hearing process inside the executive
branch was too cursory and too vulnerable to charges of arbitrary executive
power over individual rights. As a response, the hearing process became
increasingly elaborate, finally developing after 1950 into a formal system of
quasi-independent immigration judges within the executive branch charged with
running hearings according to formal rules of due process.
[61]
Nevertheless, with this addition, the basic framework of
immigration law, and federal power over alien extremists, has remained as
Congress developed it in the early twentieth century. After many of old
restrictions on the immigration of anarchist and communists were dropped from
the law in 1990, the power was, as mentioned earlier, revived after 9/11 to
apply to individuals espousing support for terrorism. Although no one is
really happy with how immigration policy works in
The Current Situation
What does the past impact of terrorism on American constitutional history tell us about how the government should act during its current struggle with Islamic extremists?
Past lessons
are applied easiest to the issue of the indefinite military detention of
captured Al Qaeda members either in the
The problems with applying current legal frameworks are fairly
apparent. Treating Al-Qaeda members, who serve no state and obey no laws of
war, as POWs runs up against the fact that prisoner of war rules were designed
precisely for soldiers who do serve a state and do obey the laws of war. The
Geneva Conventions allow for the military trial of those held to have violated
laws of war, but it requires these trials to be held as soon as possible after
capture, which would obviate almost any opportunity to for interrogation. If
they were not tried but instead simply held as POWs, this would have the odd
consequence of mandating indefinite containment, since POWs are held to the
end of hostilities and the war on terror has no obvious end point. Moreover,
POW status carries with it a host of privileges entirely inappropriate for
terrorist detainees, including allowing them to be paid salaries and
respecting rank within the organization. The
problems with treating them as suspects awaiting civil trial are even more
obvious. To apply the full panoply of American constitutional restrictions and
legal rules of evidence to military operations in the
Therefore it might seem that pure executive discretion is warranted for the disposition of these prisoners. There are respectable constitutional arguments and precedents for the President's power to design non-reviewable military commissions to determine both the detainees' status and their ultimate fate. [62] The arguments against executive discretion are best based not so much on technical questions of constitutional law but on the long term realities of political life in a constitutional republic. Claims of unbounded discretion, however just and necessary its ends, will over time draw suspicion and finally intense opposition. The fact that the war on terror is likely to extend for so long is what makes many of the past precedents for executive discretion less applicable: they occurred in wars of only a few years with definite endpoints. There was less of an opportunity for suspicion to gather steam. It might seem that since the detainees are almost all foreign citizens held abroad that this dynamic would not be in play. However, a nation founded on universal human rights will eventually apply at least some of the same standards that apply domestically to our operations abroad. And of course not all the detainees are abroad: Jose Padilla is an American citizen held in military detention on American soil. Finally, the Supreme Court has already begun to move in to substitute its own judgment on the question, though it is unclear where it will finally end up. [63]
The way past either of these dead ends is to create new rules for a new situation, giving the President adequate power to fight terrorism while at the same time structuring and limiting his discretion. A number of possibilities have already been floated. There could be specialized terrorism courts. [64] Alternatively, you could authorize a period of detainment for two years, and then mandate either trial by court martial or release. [65] Whatever the choice, it will require congressional involvement. The greatest difference between the current situation and the past crises I have discussed is the decline of the influence of Congress. Pressed between an executive branch grown massive through generations of constant military activity and a Supreme Court as aggressive as any in our history, Congress in contemporary politics often seems reduced to carping from the sidelines, its historical role little respected by its coequal partners. The plurality opinion in Hamdi for example seems to indicate the Court might be perfectly happy coming up with a special set of rules for terrorist detainees on its own. [66] This is a tragedy because we need effective rules arrived at through democratic debate and revisable in light of new experience, neither of which is likely to occur through judicial imposition.
The future of our anti-terror efforts will likely depend on our ability to chart a new course as citizens in dialogue with our representatives that properly merges the forms and ends of constitutional government.
